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PREFACE
Throughout this dissertation the former British East
Africa Protectorate will be referred to as Kenya although
contemporary documents listed it as the East Africa
Protectorate between 1895 and 1920 and as the Colony and
Protectorate of Kenya from 1920 until 1963.

It also

should be pointed that prior to 1918 Tanganyika Territory
was known as German East Africa.

In 1964 the country’s

name was changed to Tanzania to reflect the political
unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

For the sake of

uniformity the country will be referred to as Tanganyika
throughout this paper.

Finally, the reader is advised

that in 1919 the Society for the Preservation of the Wild
Fauna of the Empire changed its name to the Society for
the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire.

In 1950 the

organization became known as the Fauna Preservation
Society.

To avoid confusion the acronym FPS will be used

in this dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND
PURPOSE OF DISSERTATION
East Africa's incredible geographic diversity offers
the foreign tourist an unparalleled opportunity to
participate in a wide variety of exciting and disparate
activities, including sport fishing in the Indian Ocean,
climbing Mount Kenya or Kilimanjaro, or just enjoying
the region's pleasant climate.

The visitor also can

observe or study a fascinating array of African peoples,
such as the fierce-looking Maasai warriors of the vast
East African plains.

Most tourists, however, travel to

East Africa to experience the thrill of seeing one of
the last great assemblages of wildlife in the world.
More than 140 species of mammals may be found throughout
East Africa, most of them small nocturnal creatures
rarely seen by the visitor.

Of the larger species the

most familiar are the lion, the elephant, the buffalo,
and the rhinoceros.^
Unfortunately, East Africa's human population, which
has more than doubled in the past eighty years, has
threatened the very existence of these animals by placing
ever-increasing demands on the region's limited resources.
Many complex factors are involved in this menace,
including habitat destruction, poaching, and the unwill
ingness or the inability of officials to. enforce wildlife

vii
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protection laws; the present-day governments of Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanzania, however, still are seeking ways to
resolve these troublesome issues.

On 19 May 1977, for

example, Kenya's government announced a total ban on
hunting, explaining that the move was designed to end ■
I

permanently the threat to wildlife.

The following year

it banned all dealing in and export of raw ivory.

It

i
•

remains to be seen whether these measures will have the
desired effect.

2
t

The problem of preserving East Africa's fauna is
not, however, a recent phenomenon.

Indeed, as early as

1894 Sir Harry Johnston, the noted conservatipnist,
explorer, and colonial administrator, expressed concern
at the general decline of wildlife during the previous
decade and warned that special measures would be necessary
3
to protect certain species from extinction.
During the
ensuing seventy years of colonial rule a complexity of
ecological issues confronted East Africa’s European
administrators.

In Kenya, for example, an expanding

European population relentlessly battled millions of
wild animals for superiority over the land and its
resources.

In Uganda the confrontation was between the

country's massive elephant herds and its Afripan and
European farmers.

The relationship between the fauna

and the tsetse fly— which caused a fatal disease in man
and his domestic stock— caused many influential European
viii
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settlers and officials in Tanganyika to demand the total
destruction of all wildlife.

Moreover, as East Africa's

indigenous population grew and firearms became more
readily available, African poaching took an increasing
toll of the region’s wildlife.^
On a broader level the existence of large herds of
wild animals throughout East Africa impeded the growth cf
j

a capitalist-oriented money economy and the creation of

i

more advanced forms of production, health care, education,!
and transportation.

Indeed, the commitment to game

preservation— a concept which had deep roots in the
British experience— and the desire to modernise East
Africa's economy along western lines placed the colonial
authorities in the unenviable position of trying to
devise a land-use policy that would enable man and animal
to live side by side in relative peace and harmony with
out disturbing the region's economic growth.

These

issues, however, cannot be fully understood without some
comprehension of the most powerful factor in any study
of East Africa--its dramatic topography and natural
features.
TOPOGRAPHY AND NATURAL FEATURES
East Africa— or to be more precise Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanganyika— is a land of impressive proportions and
variety.

It covers approximately 683,000 square miles

ix
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■

or about the combined area of the British Isles, France,
Switzerland, Spain, and Italy.^

Of this about 39,000

square miles are inland lakes, streams, and rivers.
Despite these striking statistics, however, East Africa
is only a small part of the African continent-r-11,677,239
square miles including offshore islands.
East Africa's geographical boundaries encompass
some of the most beautiful territory in the world.

To

•

the east is the Indian Ocean, to the south the 450-mile- !
long Ruvuma River, to the west a great crescent of lakes i
stretching from southwestern Tanganyika to west-central
Uganda, and to the north the barren wastes of the
Sudanese desert.

The physiographic regions include the

coastal margins and the hinterland; the alluvial basins;
the plateaux of Maasailand, southeastern and central
Tanganyika, eastern and northern Kenya, and central
Uganda; the Lake Victoria basin; the rift valleys; and
the block mountains.
The region contains two types of coastal areas:
the swamplike river deltas and the coral-fringed regions
away from the rivers.

Deltaic zones usually are typified

by shallow water and low islands or by submerged banks,
which were formed by alluvial debris.

The coastline,

which is low and irregular, is dominated by numerous
small creeks, inlets, and large mangrove forests.
Further inland there is a gradual transition to the
x
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riverain flood plain, a good example of such a coast being
the Rufiji Delta south of Tanganyika's capital city,
Dar es Salaam.
Elsewhere on the coastal margins, coral formations
and banks are found up to eight to ten miles from the
main coastline, often characterized by a fringing reef,
suceeded inland by a platform cut at the base of low
cliffs.

There also is a one-to-ten-mile coastal plain

based on old coral platforms or marine terraces, typified
by the coast near Dar es Salaam and Mombasa.

In many

areas, coral sand has formed wide ranging beaches.

Else

where streams have cut narrow inlets through the coral
formations; and,when the post-glacial rise in sea level
submerged these inlets,the picturesque harbors of
Mombasa, Tanga, Mtwara, and Dar es Salaam were formed.
For centuries prior to the European colonial era traders
from as far away as the Persian Gulf area helped to build
commercial centers and small towns around many of these
g

harbors.

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century the

European colonial powers used these harbors as bases to
penetrate East Africa's interior.
Many scholars combine the coastal hinterland with
the coastal margins to form a single "coastal plain."
This is, however, extremely misleading for there is
normally a scarp separating the two areas, with a
coastal hinterland behind it, consisting of a dissected
xi
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plateau underlain by sedimentary rocks.

The plateau rises

more than one thousand feet in several localities, such
as in the Pugu hills south of Dar es Salaam or the Shimba
hills west of Mombasa.

In many places streams have cut

into the plateau to form steep-sided river valleys which
contrast sharply with the smooth plateau surfaces further
inland.

I

A number of. East Africa's major rivers— such as the
i

Ruvuma, Rufiji, Ruvu, Wami, Pangani, Galana-Sabaki, and
Tana— flow into the Indian Ocean.

All have well-developed

alluvial sections of gently sloping, seasonally swampy
ground.

Although these basins vary from river to river,

most were formed as a result of earth movements which
reduced river gradients and caused deposition.

Such

basins include the Wami-Magole north of Morogoro in
Tanganyika and the Great Ruaha south of Dodoma.

Each of

these in turn can be divided into two parts: tfye lower
flood plain along the river, which is covered periodically
by water and is permanently swampy in places; and the
margins where sediment carried by countless tributary
streams has been built up into a series of gently sipping
fans.
Further inland, East Africa is primarily a land of
plateaux, comprised of two main zones, the eastern or
lower plateaux and the central plateaux located between

xii
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the two arms of the region's rift system.

The character

of an individual plateau is determined by the local rock
type; most are diversified by scattered hill groups.
Tanganyika's southeast plateau is in the area south and
west of the Rufuji Delta, where the coastal hinterland
descends inland to a low area between one and two
thousand feet in height.

It is dissected by numerous

streams which form several different drainage basins and
which are centered near a point about sixty miles east
of Songea.

Over this immense area there is considerable

topographical variation.

In the Nachingwea region, for

example, any ten-mile straight line would not have more
than a 200-foot height difference; but in the region
north of Songea, rocks of the Karoo system have become
deeply dissected and there is considerable local relief
fluctuation.
Although the Maasai plateau appears to have parallels
to Tanganyika's southeast plateau, it is in fact very
different in character.

Its surface lies between three

and four thousand feet above sea level with wide areas
comprised of a gently rolling or flat topography.

Much

of the plateau is waterless, its endless grassland and
thorn bush vegetation sometimes described as the "Maasai
steppe."

In many places the plateau is underlain by

granite, which often forms hills or hill ranges.

The

region also is bounded by fault scarps or volcanic hills.
xiii
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In Kenya the region between the coast and the rift
valley has been less disturbed by faulting than has the
corresponding region in Tanzania.

A sloping plateau

rises from 800 to 3,300 feet above sea level, character
ized by numerous hill groups, the most prominent being
the Yatta plateau and the Taita Hills.

In northern

Kenya the plateau surface has been downwarped and partly
covered by sediments.

Much of the area, consequently, is

a low-lying, sandy arid plain of low relief.

To the north

and to the west of this area there are several hill groups,
the most notable being Marsabit and Eulal.

All of these

plateaux are relatively waterless and support few human
and animal inhabitants.
East Africa's other plateaux, which are considerably
less impressive, lie between the two rift zones.

Those

of major interest include Uganda's central plateau, the
Lake Victoria basin, and Tanganyika's central plateau.
Uganda's central plateau is comprised of Acholi, Lango,
Teso, and northwestern Bunyoro, all north of Lake
Victoria.

The area's drainage system has been affected

by Lake Albert's fault movements or by the warping move
ments associated with Lake Victoria's formation.

Within

the elevated zone between the two arms of the rift are
many downwarped areas, with Lake Victoria donpLnating the
largest of these depressions.

Although the lake is

roughly 26,000 square miles, it is less than three
xiv
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hundred feet deep, apparently formed by earth movements
which blocked an old drainage system linked with the
Congo River.
Tanganyika's central plateau contains several down
warped basins, most notably the Moyowosi (Malagarasi).
In general, the plateau averages about four thousand
feet above sea level, characterized around the Tabora
area by a flat, sweeping landscape broken by scattered
hills.

The flattest landscape is situated in the

Serengeti cohere lake deposits have covered much of the
surface.

On both sides of the central plateau the East

African rift is the landscape's most striking feature.
The western rift valley contains a number of lakes,
including Tanganyika; Malawi; and Albert.

The valley's

walls are steep, many of them several hundred feet high.
In Kenya the eastern rift valley boasts a number of
distinctive qualities, particularly in the area west of
t

Nairobi, where its steep walls and flat floor are sharply
defined; indeed, in recent years it has become a popular
tourist attraction.

In contrast to the western rift's

lakes, those in the eastern rift usually are shallow,
saline, and less impressive.
A by-product of the rift valley's formation has been
the upwarping of the areas on either side of the disloca
tions, where the land generally falls away from the rift's
margin, and streams draining away from thei rift frequently
xv
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having cut valleys into the slope.

In several areas

volcanic activity has increased the height of the rift
margins.

Because of the height advantage, the temperature

pattern, the rainfall associated with altitude, and the
fertile soils derived from the volcanic rocks, the
eastern rift uplands are among Kenya*s more important
agricultural areas.
Aside from the Ruwenzori mountains along the border
between Uganda and Zaire, East Africa's main block moun
tains are found in Tanganyika.

The Pare mountains,

Usambara, Uluguru, and the southern highlands all are
bounded by major faults.

Steep marginal slopes and

gently sloping plateau surfaces characterize the upland
areas, which form important water catchments, forest
reserves, and agricultural regions.
CLIMATE
Air streams from the Indian Ocean significantly
affect East Africa's climate.^

From May to September

the southeast trade winds are fairly strong along the
coast; just north of the equator, however, the oceanic
monsoon forces the wind to change direction to the south
west.

From November to March a light northeast trade

wind replaces the southeast trades.

April an£ October

are transition months, usually characterized by gentle
warm easterly breezes.

xvi
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East Africa*s rainfall pattern falls into three
major catagories.

The equatorial zones extend from 3°S.

on the plateau to 7°S. on the coastal belt.

The rains

fall from March until May and frcm mid-October to
December, the first rains usually longer and heavier.
East Africa*s extreme northern portion, however,
experiences a single rainy and dry season.

The southern

hemisphere's version of the same pattern covers most of
Tanganyika, with the rains beginning sometime between
November and December and continuing until April.
In most parts of East Africa the average rainfall
is more than forty inches annually.
numerous exceptions.

There are, however,

In northern Kenya, for example, it

is less than ten inches per year while the country's
eastern region receives about twenty inches annually.
The mountainous rim areas of Tanganyika's interior plateau,
on the other hand, are deluged with more than seventy
inches of rain every year, although the plateau's western
part only receives thirty to forty inches.

Vast stretches

of southeastern and northwestern Uganda have forty to
fifty inches of rain annually.

It is seasonally well

distributed and the country is generally more fortunate
than Kenya or Tanganyika, largely because the rainfall
is less variable as well as more abundant.

A dry zone,

nevertheless, stretches across Uganda from southwest to
northeast, and, receives less than forty inches per year.
xvii
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This.zone includes eastern Ankole, western Masaka, Bukoba,
and Karagwe, northern Buganda, southeastern Bunyoro, and
the Karamoja area adjacent to northern Kenya's dry region.
ANIMAL LIFE
Even today, no matter how impressive and awe-inspiring
these geographical and climatic features may be, they
cannot compare with East Africa's spectacular assortment
of wildlife.

Although it is impossible to estimate

accurately East Africa's original fauna population,
Richard Meinertzhagen, an officer in the King's African
Rifles, a military force which Britain had organized to
keep law and order, provided an indication of its concen
tration by conducting a selective census on 18 May 1902
between the Athi River train station and Nairobi, a
distance of only sixteen miles:
5
18
760
4,006
845

rhinoceros
giraffe
wildebeest
zebra
Coke's hartebeest

324 Grant'sgazelle
142 Thomson's gazelle
46 impala
24 ostrich
16 baboon
7 greater bustard g

Several other Europeans were over-awed by the
seemingly endless numbers of wild animals.

Sir Charles

Eliot, Kenya's Commissioner from 1900 to 1904, spoke of
g

seeing "miles of zebras" on favorable days.

John A.

Hunter, a Scottish immigrant who later worked for Kenya's
Game Department, claimed that he "went nearly mad with
excitement watching the strange beasts" that dotted the

xviii
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open plains.^

On his first journey through East Africa,

Alan Workman, who eventually became Postmaster-General
in Uganda, wrote that he "eagerly watched the well-nigh
constant procession of game."^

Even Theodore Roosevelt,

who visited Kenya and Uganda in 1909-i0 after leaving
the American presidency in the hands of William Taft, was
amazed to learn that there had been "quite a plague of
wild beasts" in Nairobi shortly before his arrival.

12

Most conspicuous among East Africa’s wild animals
are the huge and sometimes frightening ungulates, a genre
including the ubiquitous
quarter of a ton

elephant, which consumes up to a

of food per day. Of it, Edward Topsell

wrote in 1607:
There is nocreature among al CsicH the beasts of the
world which hath so great and
ampledemonstration
of the power and wisdom of almighty God as the
Elephant. 13
Also included in this classification is the rhinoceros,
a beast whose foul nature stems from continual bouts of
constipation; the giraffe, tallest of living quadrupeds;
the hippopotamus, a fierce-looking creature which can
weigh more than two tons; the zebra, a prodigious feeder
that can consume an entire maize field in a single night;
the buffalo, an uncanny animal noted for its ability to
kill unsuspecting hunters by doubling back on them; and
the profusion of different antelope species.
Among the carnivora, the lion— emblem of British

xix
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chivalry and power and symbol of courage throughout the
world— is clearly one of the most dangerous predators in
all East Africa.

Indeed, its mere presence has prevented

mail deliveries, stopped railroad construction work, and
terrorized isolated farms and settlements.

Other well-

known carnivores include the cheetah, a beautifully
spotted creature noted for its ability to attain speeds
of more than fifty miles per hour; the leopard, a
mysterious night hunter rarely seen by humans; the hyena,
another night hunter that will scavenge most anything,
including leather chairs and shoes; the jackal, a small
relatively harmless fox-like creature; and the serval,
a wild cat with a reputation of mating with the common
house cat.
East Africa also contains a bewildering array of
the more common primates.

Foremost among this class is

the baboon, a tough gregarious beast that travels in
troops, often of thirty or forty but sometimes of more
than a hundred.

Aside from the seldom seen gorilla and

the wide variety of smaller monkeys, the only other
primate of note is the black-faced vervet monkey, a
mischievous creature with an annoying habit of plaguing
hotels and homes in search of a handout.
In addition to these animals, there is a varied
assortment of rarer species scattered throughout East
Africa.

The wild ass, for example, now unfortunately
xx
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extinct, was indigenous only to the desert region around
Lake Turkana's northern shore.

In Kenya, the bongo

antelope is confined to the bamboo forest of Mount Kenya,
the Aberdare mountains, the Cherengani Range, and the Mau
Forest.

The sitatunga, originally known as Speke's

antelope or the marsh-buck, frequents some of the
uninhabited Sese Islands in Lake Victoria, the shores of
nearby Lake Nabugabo, and formerly European-owned land in
the Kitale area of western Kenya.

The beautiful sable

antelope is limited to the coastal area near the KenyaTanganyika border.

Thomas' kob, another antelope species,

can be seen only on the shores of Lake Victoria and the
Nzoia River in western Kenya.
THE COMING OF MAN
M o d e m anthropological theory holds that the same
climate which supports this vast assortment of wildlife
also was the scene of man's first appearance.

The

research of archeologists L.S.B. Leakey and D fW. Phillipson, in particular, places man's entry into this area
sometime during the Pliocene or Lower Pleistocene age.^
The intervening eons saw East Africa's human residents
developing into six distinct cultures:
I.

II.

Hunters who lived in open country, and moved
from place to place, and who obtained food by
killing wildlife and gathering plants.
Hunters who lived in thick forests, but were
otherwise fairly similar to the first group.

xxi
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III.

Lakeside dwellers who were basically fishermen
and hunters, and who tended to congregate into
permanent villages.

IV.

Forest agriculturalists who moved into a portion
of virgin forest, cleared the land, grew crops
until the soil was exhausted, and then travelled,
to another forest.

V.

Pastoralists who lived on East Africa's plains,
and kept a wide variety of domestic animals such
as sheep, goats, and camels, but above all,
cattle.

VI.

Grassland farmers who inhabited areas such as
Kenya's rift valley.

Unfortunately, until the coming of the European
powers in the second half of the nineteenth century, the
absence of reliable records, written or otherwise, makes
it difficult if not impossible to determine the region's
precise human population.

Most observers, however,

estimate that prior to the colonial period, East Africa
contained considerably fewer than ten million people.
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that men seriously
disturbed the balance of nature during this early era.
Africans who hunted usually did so with rudimentary
weapons.

The Ndorobo people, for example, killed

elephants with an eight-foot-long poison-tipped spear
made from the wood of the wild olive tree.

The Turkana,

on the other hand, caught the rhinoceros with a device
known as a wheel trap, an apparatus three feet across
with a rim of twisted rawhide.

Spikes were attached to

the circumference and the trap then was tied to a heavy
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log.

IJhen a rhinoceros stepped in the wheel, the spikes

penetrated its leg and the hapless beast dragged the tree
trunk until it died of exhaustion or was killed by bowmen;
in such an environment the balance of nature was obviously
weighted in favor of the wild animal.

Noel Simon, an

ardent conservationist and former chairman of the East
African Wild Life Society, suggested as much when he
pointed out: "In the past, human beings were few and
scattered, while the animals on which they preyed were
so plentiful that the human predator made little
impression on the t o t a l . T h e

coming of the Europeans

changed this situation dramatically.
EUROPEAN COLONIALISM
Modern Europe's contact with East Africa's interior
began in the 1840s with the explorations of two German
missionaries, Ludwig Krapf and Johannes Rebmann.

In the

following decades other explorers such as Richard Burton,
John Speke, and James Grant attracted popular interest
with stories of new discoveries, strange diseases, and
human slavery.

These factors, combined with Europe's

growing nationalism, eventually prompted several govern
ments, the most successful of which was Great Britain,
to engage in a scramble for control of East Africa.^
Any discussion of British colonialism in East Africa
must begin in the second half of the nineteenth century
when the major European powers, led by England and
xxiii
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Germany, embraced imperialism as a matter of national
pride and survival.

This prompted an enormous public

demand for information about the "Dark Continent."
Explorers, such as the twenty-four year old Joseph
Thomson, the first European to travel from Zanzibar to
Lake Victoria via Maasailand in 1884, brought back
thrilling descriptions of East Africa*s flora and fauna
and mysterious maps of its great mountains, rivers, lakes,
and jungles.^

Great Britain read about the region*s

grasslands and forests in such books as Captain James
Grant's A Walk Across Africa or Charles New's Life,
18
Wanderings and Labours in Eastern Africa.
More impor
tantly, these and scores of other books and articles con
tained tales of many different peoples— including the
Chagga, the Kamba, the Kikuyu, and the Baganda--who lived
and worked in East Africa.

Such stories attracted the

attention and concern of a plethora of missionaries eager
to save millions of heathen souls, of explorers hoping to
gain immortality by discovering a previously ynknown
mountain or lake, of big game hunters seeking an overnight
fortune in ivory, of politicians searching for overseas
colonies, and of businessmen looking for new markets.
By the mid-1880s the British and German governments
had expressed an interest in East Africa's strategic and
economic potential.

As each government began to fear the

ambitions of the other, the chances for a serious
xxiv
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disagreement or misunderstanding increased considerably.
To prevent this scramble from deteriorating into open war
fare, Great Britain and Germany signed an agreement on 29
October 1886, which was in effect the first European par
tition of East Africa.

Among other things, both powers

agreed to the following terms:
I.

The islands of Zanzibar, Lamu, Mafia, and a
strip of the coast ten miles wide, extending
from the middle of Tungi Bay just south of Cape
Delgado to Kipini at the mouth of the Tana Riyer,
was assigned to Seyyid Barghash, the Sultan of
Zanzibar, heretofore the nominal ruler of East
Africa's mainland.

II. The rest of East Africa was divided between Great
Britain and Germany along the present-day KenyaTanzanian border. England obtained the northern
half from the Umba River to the Juba River, a
distance of 405 miles, while Germany took the
southern portion from the Ruvuma River to the
Umba, a length of 620 miles. It was understood
that the claims of both states were to extend
inland as far as Lake Victoria.
III.
IV.

Germany was to enjoy unrestricted use of the
port of Dar es Salaam.
Germany retained the city of Witu on the Tana
River, an important trading enclave in the
British zone.19

The task of actually opening up the British section
fell to a small group of Manchester entrepreneurs who,
under the leadership of the Scottish shipping magnate
Sir William Mackinnon, had formed themselves into the
20
British East Africa Association in 1885.
Mackinnon* s
first significant accomplishment was to persuade the
Sultan of Zanzibar to relinquish control of the ten-mile
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coastal strip between the Umba River and Kipini, a small
harbor town south of Witu, to permit unrestricted access
to the interior.

In exchange for this concession, which

was signed on 24 March 1887, Mackinnon promised to ad
minister the territory in the Sultan's name and to provide
him with fifty per ,cent of any additional net revenues,
gained as a result of the agreement.
Mackinnon and his associates quickly realized that
administering and developing East Africa's interior, an
area more than twice the size of the United Kingdom, was
going to be a difficult task.

To raise the capital

necessary for such an undertaking, Mackinnon reorganized
the Association into the Imperial British East Africa
Company (hereafter IBEA) and secured a royal charter from
the British government on 3 September 1888, to convince
21
investors of the company's potential.
Among other
things, this charter empowered the IBEA to administer
those parts of the interior where it could acquire
treaties of protection approved by the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

On the basis of this clause, the

Company eventually established a string of fortified
posts stretching from its headquarters at Mombasa to
Tsavo, Kibwezi, Machakos, Fort Smith, Njemps, Mumias,
and onward to Uganda, a land supposedly "flowing with
milk and honey."
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Dr. Carl Peters, a German adventurer whose brutality
among the African people had earned him the reputation of
being Mkono wa Damu, "the man with blood on his hands,"
unwittingly aided the IBEA's effective penetration of
o?
East Africa*s interior.
In July 1889 he secretly
landed in Witu and, with a small force, set out up the
Tana River, ostensibly to relieve Emin Pasha, another
German national who held the Egyptian governorship of
Equatorial Province of the Sudan and who had been cut
off from the outside world by the 1883 Mahdist uprising.
In fact, Peters intended to seize the hinterland behind
Witu.

As part of his strategy he concluded a treaty with

Kabaka Mwanga of Buganda on 1 March 1890 which gave
Germany equal trade rights with other European states.
Peters hoped to use this agreement as a means to extend
German political control over the area of present-day
Uganda and to block British access to the country.
Unfortunately for Peters, the East Africa question was
settled in Europe without any reference to the Buganda
treaty or, for that matter, to the IBEA*s activities.
On 1 July 1890 another Anglo-German agreement was signed
which ended the scramble as far as East Africa was con
cerned.

The agreement further defined the boundary

between the British and the German protectorates,
assigned Witu, Zanzibar, and Uganda to Great Britain,
and awarded the North Sea island of Heligoland and a
xxvii
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large region west and south of Lake Victoria to Germany.
Peters was so indignant that he criticized the German
government for sacrificing two African kingdoms (Witu and .
Uganda) for a "bath-tub in the North Sea."

23

Thus by the end of the nineteenth century British
colonial rule in East Africa was beginning to take shape
around the IBEA.

After the Company suffered financial

difficulties in early 1893 the British government
assumed increasing responsibility for Uganda as well as
for Kenya (Tanganyika was acquired as a result of Germany’s
defeat in World War I).

As the administering power, the

Company and later the British government ultimately were
responsible for a wide range of activities, including
game preservation.

Given East Africa's limited resources

and steadily growing human population, this was an awe
some and increasingly difficult task.

Throughout the

entire colonial period, however, the British government
and, to a lesser extent, the respective colonial adminis
trations remained firmly committed to the ideology of
game preservation.

Nevertheless, East Africans fauna

continued to disappear in ever increasing numbers, not
only reflecting man's innate hostility toward wildlife
bat also supporting the theory that the colonial authori
ties paid lip service to wildlife conservation only to
help make British imperialism more tolerable to the
world community in general and to the people of East
Africa in particular.

01
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To suggest, however, that cynicism and sheer oppor
tunism guided East Africa's policy-makers ignores the
ecological, economic, and political complexities of the
wildlife issue.

Indeed, by the dawn of the twentieth

century the very notion of preserving wild animals was
still a relatively new concept in Africa,

In 1884, for

example, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, then president
of the South African Republic (Transvaal), warned the
Volksraad (parliament) that the country's game would not
survive without meaningful and immediate protection.
His admonition unfortunately went unheeded and the
Republic's wildlife continued to vanish before the
onslaught of western civilization.

But Kruger was a

stubborn and determined man; and eleven years later his
efforts finally were rewarded when the Volksraad finally
approved the creation of the Sabie Game Reserve, the
25
first of its kind in Africa.
As far as East Africa was concerned, there were
numerous factors limiting the nature, scope, and effec
tiveness of any wildlife preservation policy.

In Kenya,

for example, the colonial administration had to devise
a scheme that not only would protect wild animals but
also would encourage widespread agricultural development.
Policy-makers in Uganda had to formulate a plan that
would protect the country's huge elephant herds as well
as the crops of its African and European farmers.
xxix
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In Tanganyika, to take a final example, the government had
to eradicate the tsetse fly while at the same time preserv
ing the >7ild animals that carried and transmitted the dead
ly trypanosomes from fly to man.
Aside from ignoring these practical considerations,
the "lip service" theory fails to answer the wider philo
sophical questions that plagued British efforts to save
East Africa's wildlife.

How, for example, could the

colonial governments preserve large numbers of wild animals
without endangering the safety and welfare of East Africa's
growing human population or the region's economic develop
ment?

Indeed, was the very idea of wildlife preservation

an eccentric late nineteenth century concept doomed to
failure in the hustle and bustle of the twentieth century?
To answer these and other questions and indeed to under
stand the history of game preservation in East Africa it
is necessary to analyze the specific ecological issues
that confronted each country rather than to speak in
broad ideologically motivated political generalities.
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CHAPTER I
KENYA:

FARMING IN PARADISE, 1895-1945

Throughout the 1895-1945 period, Kenya's European
authorities sought to adopt a land-use policy that would
guarantee the preservation of large numbers of wild
animals without seriously dis'trubing or hampering the
country's economic development.

This became an increas

ingly hopeless task, however, as Kenya's European settler
community prospered and grew and more and more territory
came under cultivation or was sacrificed for schools,
roads, hospitals, towns, and other social advancements.
Indeed, by 1945 it was evident to conservationists as
well as to politicans that all attempts to achieve these
self-contradictory goals had failed and that a revolution
ary new land-use policy was needed to assure the future
survival of Kenya's wildlife.
Of the three British East African territories, Kenya
possesses the most striking physical features, consisting
of six geographical zones, all running parallel to the
coast.
are:
to

In addition to the coastal strip itself, there
the jungle belt, which varies in width from seventy

200 miles; the volcanic plains; the Great Rift

Valley; the Mau-Kamasia plateau; and the eastern portion
of the Lake Victoria basin.

The all-important plateau

region, also known as the Highlands, has a warm climate
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2

with moderate and reliable rainfall. Its soil, unlike that
of most of the country, is capable of sustaining a wide
variety of agricultural and pastoral activities. Indeed,
it was this fertile area that attracted ever-increasing
numbers of humans during the 1895-1945 period.
Kenya's wildlife is also unique because of its
tremendous abundance and variety. As of 1963, for example,
there was approximately fifty-seven major mammalian
species in the country, not including a plethora of
lesser mammals or the numerous sub-species.^ In greater
or lesser numbers these animals used to inhabit nearly all
of Kenya.
From 1895 to 1945, however, a rapidly expanding
human population drastically reduced their numbers, and
all but destroyed one of the world's most valuable
treasures. Indeed, by 1963, the year of Kenya's independence,
the country's indigenous population had grown from about .
two million at the turn of the century to more than
eight million while its European population had increased
from a few hundred to more than 65,000. As a result of
this explosion, both Africans and Europeans.steadily
moved into areas previously occupied only by wild animals.

Even more disastrous, from an ecological point of
view, were the far-reaching technological innovations that
accompanied the growth of the country's European settler
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community. One of the most important developments in
the initial years of colonial rule was the construction
of the 584-mile-long Uganda Railway from Mombasa to Port
Florence (later Kisumu)^ on the shores of Lake Victoria.

2

By providing relatively easy access to the country's
interior, which contained some of Africa's richest game
fields, the railroad drastically upset the tenuous balance
of nature that had existed prior to the European
penetration of East Africa. The problem became even
more complex when, to help ensure the railway's economic
success, the colonial administration encouraged the
creation of a European settler community in Kenya's
Highlands on the assumption that it would use the line
to ship produce to the coast for export to Europe and
the rest of the world.

Along with the settlers came all

the accoutrements of a highly advanced western society,
including farms, fences, cities, roads, schools,
medicines, hospitals, and guns. These and scores of
other factors which attended the Europeanization of
Kenya obviously were incompatible with the existence
of large numbers of wild animals, which often had to
travel hundred of miles in their endless search for food
and water. Thus, the British were in the unenviable
position of trying to create a new ecological balance in
society committed to rapid economic development.
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The

story of that struggle is the subject of this chapter.
The colonial period in Kenya can be divided into
three phases.

During the 1888-1895 period the IBEA laid

the foundation of British mile in East Africa by securing
control over a vast region with an area of more than
300,000 square miles and a coastline of approximately
400 miles.^

During the Foreign Office years (hereafter

FO), which lasted from 1895 until 1905, the British
government agreed to underwrite the construction costs
of the Uganda Railway and supported a scheme to trans
form Kenya into a "white man's country."^

Throughout

the Colonial Office (hereafter CO) era, which began in
1905, Kenya's growing European population appropriated
more and more land in an effort to increase their economic
wealth.^

Preserving wildlife in such an atmosphere be

came increasingly difficult as the years went by, and
undoubtedly contributed to the tense relationship that
existed between the settler community and the administra
tion for much of the colonial period..
GAME POLICY UNDER THE IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA

TSqm Fan?
The IBEA based its game preservation policy upon a
combination of political, economic, and ecological con
siderations.

Foremost among the Company's political con

cerns was its desire to keep European sportsman out of
Kenya's interior for fear that they would accidently or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

deliberately cause a conflict with Africans that would
necessitate a costly punitive expedition.

In view of

the fact that some of the Kamba and Kikuyu peoples
already had violently resisted the IBEA's encroachment
on their respective territories in the early 1890s, it
was hardly surprising that the Company wanted to restrict
the movements of errant sportsmen. ^
Accordingly, on 19 June 1891 the IBEA requested
the FO's approval of a scheme that prohibited uncondition
ally the hunting and killing of game, and granted the
Company the right to "interdict the passage of individuals
of parties from the coast ports in search of sport

"

The dispatch added that the hunting ban could be rescinded
as soon as the Company had extended its authority over
Kenya's interior.

In the meantime, hunting might be

allowed in those areas "infested to excess" with wildQ
life.
Eight days later the FO responded by claiming
that Articles IX and X of the Brussels Act of 1890, which
regulated the introduction of firearms into a large part
of Africa, should form the basis of the IBEA*s wildlife
preservation policy.

Under the terms of this agreement,

the Company possessed the right to issue gun licenses,
and could prohibit big game hunting by publishing a notice
to the effect that because of political problems in the
interior it could no longer issue licenses to European
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sportsmen.

9

Although it adopted this strategy, the IBEA, with a
European staff in Africa of only 117 men, was hardly in
a position to prevent conflicts between Europeans and
Africans from occurring in Kenya*s interior.

In August

1892, for example, Sir William Astor Chanler, a noted big
game hunter, and Ludwig von Hohnel, a Hungarian adventurer,
departed from the coast on an exploratory expedition to
the upper Tana River.

Upon reaching the river Chanler

realized that their supplies were dangerously low; and
when the Pokomo people, who were resident in the region,
refused to sell him food he took some by force, paying
the frightened people immediately afterwards.^

On their

way through the mountains northeast of Mount Kenya, Chanler
and Von Hohnel engaged in several battles with the Embu
people; and when the two arrived back in Zanzibar a group
of porters accused Chanler of extreme cruelty and homicxde.U
Despite the hunting ban, other Europeans continued
to incense some IBEA officials with their unwarrented
excesses.

In 1893, for example, Gardner Muir and his

Scottish ghillie killed more than eighty rhinpceroses
in the Machakos area in less than three month?.

Upon

learning of Muir's activities, the Company's 4irectors,
hoping to reduce the number of hunters within its terri-
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tories, enacted a plan whereby every European sportsmen
was assessed a L 500 sporting tax.

Judged by subs equent

events this scheme was a failure, largely because the IBEA
lacked the personnel to maintain an effective enforcement
system.

On 10 February 1893, for example, the directors

advised Ernest Bentley, the Acting Administrator at Mom
basa, to "do his best to collect the t 500 fee.1*"^

After

more than a year of little or no practical control over
European hunters, the IBEA decided to issue a series of
more realistic sporting regulations on 8 June 1894 based
on those in force in the British Central Africa Protector
ate.
Kenya's first game regulations— which were contained
in the Company's charter— had authorized the IBEA to license
only elephant hunters:
For regulating the hunting of elephants, and
for their preservation, for the purpose of
providing means of military and other transport
in Our Indian Empire or elsewhere, the Company
may, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore
contained, impose and levy within any terri
tories administered by them, other than their
Zanzibar territory, a licence to take or kill
elephants, or to export elephant's tusks or
ivory.
But under the new ordinance anyone entering the Company's
territory to hunt elephant, rhinoceros, and the larger
antelopes had to obtain a E 25 license from the Adminis
trator at Mombasa, or from district superintendents at
Wanga, Malindi, or Larnu.

Furthermore, the importation
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and use of fire arms were subject to the terms of the
General Act of the Brussels Conference. The IBEA assessed
a fifteen per. eent duty on all ivory and a ten per cent
duty on all rhinoceros horn and hippopotamus teeth
obtained within its domain. The Company also required
every sportsman to deposit a sum of L 100 as surety,
which was to be returned when the hunter left the country,
provided he had conformed to the game regulations. Finally,
the IBEA reserved the right to fine any person a sum of
not less than L 50 for taking game without a license.^
On 26 October 1894 the Company amended this ordinance
to prohibit the killing of cow elephants, on penalty
of a C 10 fine and confiscation of all ivory, a change
which the IBEA hoped would protect the elephant's
reproductive capabilities.^
As far as the ivory trade was concerned, the
Company, unable to break the age old Arab monopoly,
attempted to gain some share of the market by levying
the fifteen per cent export duty at Mombasa.

This po

licy, primarily designed to improve the IBEA's ailing
financial condition rather than to preserve Kenya's
elephants, caused a number of arguments with coastal
traders and with the German East Africa administration.
Commercial firms such as Smith, Mackenzie and Company
objected to paying an export duty in Uganda and another
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one in Mombasa.

The Germans complained that IBEA-spon-

sored ivory traders refused to pay duties at border
check-points, while private traders accused the Company
of harassment and illegal ivory confiscations.^
The Company's severe economic problems, which already
had caused its directors to approach the British govern
ment for relief, also hampered the development of an
effective wildlife preservation policy.

Without a mean

ingful enforcement agency in Kenya's interior, the IBEA
had to rely upon the individual sportsman's sense of re
straint; but, as illustrated by Chanler's adventure, this
strategy often failed to achieve the desired results.
The quest for financial stability even forced the Company
into the untenable position of advocating elephant con
servation while at the same time encouraging ivory exports
to gain much needed revenue.^

Although the monies gained

from this scheme were insufficient to support phe IBEA,
the following table indicates that it contributed sub
stantial sums to the Company's treasury.
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TABLE I
Imports of Ivory to Zanzibar^
Year

Total
imports
value
in L

Imports
from
Kenya
in L

1892
1893
1894
1895

148,495
150,930
152,181
102,351

23,153
?
20*975
17,069

Percentage
of total

15.5

Imports
from GEA
in L
116,169

9

9

13.’75
16.75

121*567
77,556

The IBEA period was a time of confusion and uncer
tainty with regard to Kenya's wildlife.

Although the

Company enacted the country's first sporting regulations,
it lacked the means to administer the ordinances properly.
The IBEA also paid lip service to elephant conservation,
but economic exigencies compelled its directors to act
otherwise.

In short, the Company's wildlife preservation

policy was one of words without deeds; but this criticism
must be tempered by the realization that, for all its fail
ings, the IBEA initiated the concept of game preservation
in East Africa.

That it fell short of achieving success

is a reflection upon the inability of man and animal to
live in peace and harmony rather than in indication of
deliberate or deceitful neglect.
GAME POLICY UNDER THE FOREIGN OFFICE
During this ten-year period the wildlife question
was transformed into a major political issue, partially
because of England's long-standing commitment to game
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preservation.

Indeed, shortly after the Norman invasion

in 1066, William the Conquerer enacted a series of strict
19
game laws, "with savagements for infringements,"
Henry
II codified the forest laws (viz. game laws) for the first
time in 1184 at the Assize of Woodstock to preserve "the
20
peace of the King's venison (pax vehationis suae)."
In 1217 Henry III, acting through his regents, agreed to
a Charter of the Forest (Carta fe Foresta), which provided
for the human occupation of large portions of England's
21
wildlife areas.
Charles II, known as the father of
translocation, imported deer from Europe to restock his
denuded forests and also was the first British monarch who
considered reforestation as a way to ensure the future
22
welfare of his stags.
Later kings attempted to preserve
"royal game" by enacting severe anti-poaching laws.

In

the late 1700s, for example, convicted poachers had their
hands cut off or were transported to Australia.-

But even

these harsh methods failed to achieve the desired results,
and by 1831 one-sixth of all convictions in England were
23
for poaching.
Given this legacy, it was unavoidable, and perhaps
inevitable, that the preservation of Africa's wildlife
became a hotly debated issue in public and official cir
cles long before the FO assumed administrative control of
Kenya.

In 1857, for example, no less a personage than
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David Livingstone claimed that Africa's fauna was melting
away "like snow in the spring."

24

Fourteen years later

Dr. Georg Schweinfurth, the noted explorer, warned of the
25
elephant's imminent extermination in eastern Africa.
Finally, in 1890 Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke, who was
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1880 to
1882, opined that Kenya's ivory resources would disappear
quickly unless strict conservation measures were imple
mented:
The principal trade of this part of the coast
has hitherto been in ivory, but such vast
quantities are yearly secured by Arab hunters
that, unless the British Company should be
successful in preserving the elephant in a
portion of their territories, no ivory is
likely to be obtained after the next fifteen
or twenty years.. 26
So, by the time the IBEA relinquished control of
Kenya, domestic and international opinion was being
mobilized in the cause of game preservation.

Even the

semi-official Gazette for Zanzibar and East Africa cri
ticized the newly formed colonial administration for its
apparent lackadaisical attitude toward the country's
fauna:
The devastation wrought by the rifle-bearing
hunter, professional and amatuer...in the
immense herds of big game which used to roam
the Prairies and Forests of North America, is
an object lesson which we in British East
Africa should take to heart. There is ample
evidence that the game of this country is
going the way of that in America; and consid
ering its commercial value
it would show a
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*3
lamentable lack of wisdom if measures were not
shortly instituted with a view to game preser
vation. .. 27
Concern for East Africa's fauna also reached the
highest level of the British government.

On 27 Hay 1896

Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, a
wildlife enthusias

o argued for the protection of

seals in North America ana who thrilled to stories of
man-eating lions along the Uganda Railway, dispatched a
communication to Sir Arthur Hardinge, Kenya's Commissioner,
in which he voiced concern over the "excessive destruc
tion" of the country's wild animals.

Unless the indis-.

criminate slaughter was stopped, Salisbury believed, all
Kenya's wildlife would disappear in a few years.

He also

inquired about the extent to which the IBEA's regulations
were being applied.

Lastly, Salisbury suggested that

Hardinge consider whether it would be advisable to deal
with the problem by enacting a close time (viz.. periods
during which all hunting was prohibited), by treating
reserves, by specifying bag limits, or by a prohibitively
high license f e e.^
In response to this communication, Clifford Craufurd,
Kenya's Acting Commissioner, submitted a series of draft
game regulations on 14 December 1896.

He pointed out

that the colonial administration was in the process of
conducting discussions with the Sub-Commissioners for
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Ukamba and Tanaland Provinces about the feasibility of
declaring the entire Kenia District in the southwestern
portion of the country a game sanctuary.

Furthermore,

Craufurd maintained that local administrative officers
could deal with the excesses of African hunters while
"non-native" sportsmen would be subject to a
deposit and

a h 25

twelve months.

h

100 surety

license fee, which would be valid for

The animals that could be shot on this

license included two each of the following:

elephant,

rhinoceros, hippopotamus, zebra, buffalo, warthog, giraffe,
each kind of antelope, and an unlimited number of lion,
leopard, hyena, and crocodile.

The proposed ordinance

prohibited the killing of elephants with tusks under ten
pounds each, and females and young of all species.

How

ever, because of their status as vermin, female lions,
leopards, hyenas, and crocodiles could be shot.

The

regulations also banned the use of game nets; fire, largescale drives, and other "unsportsmanlike" hunting methods.

29

Francis Hall, who like many IBEA officials accepted
employment with the colonial administration, complained
to his father that Craufurd's proposal to make the whole
of Kenia District a game sanctuary was "the most terrible
news we have heard. ..."

It meant that government officials

stationed in Kenia would be forced to apply for leave and
travel outside the District to s h o o t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for Hall and his brother officers, these objections failed
to stop the movement toward the establishment of Kenya's
first game reserve.
After a year's discussion between officials in London
and in Zanzibar, Hardinge finally persuaded the FO to
accept a revised draft regulation "more favorable to
wealthy sportsmen who bring money into the territory___ "
The 'major change limited the numbers which could be killed
on license only to elephant, rhinoceros, and giraffe.
Hardinge believed this revision would make Kenya more
desirable than German East Africa as a hunting ground for
such sportsmen.

31

The revenues gained from the sale of

additional hunting licenses also would help to justify
the preservation of Kenya's wildlife on economic grounds.
Finally, the new ordinance, which the FO approved on 30
December 1897, created a game sanctuary, which included
32
most of Kenia District.
Within three months these regulations had alienated
large segments of Kenya's growing European

coipmunity. On

2 February 1898, for example, Hardinge bowed to popular
pressure and requested that the Uganda Railway's employees
be allowed to shoot without
fee.

33

paym ent

of the L £5 license

Next, he asked permission to authorize "settlers

and missionaries" to kill a "limited" amount Q f game for
34
food.
Salisbury not only sanctioned both changes but
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reduced the license fee for all colonial officers to a
35
mere B 3.
To help offset some of its general administrative
expenses, the colonial authorities enacted a new game
ordinance in August 1899.

It provided for a broader and

more complex licensing scheme.

In place of the uniform

B 25 fee, the government now issued separate licenses to
sportsmen for 375 rupees* and to government officials,
settlers, and traders for 45 rupees.

The regulations

further stipulated that unless sportsmen and colonial
officials paid extra fees they could kill only two each
of the following:

elephant, rhinoceros, hippopotamus,

buffalo, and giraffe.
game on their lands.

Settlers, however, could shoot any
The statute also increased the

penalty for hunting in the Kenia reserve without a license
from B 5 to L 50.

Furthermore, the penalty for shooting

in breach of the ordinance was fixed at a maximum of 500
rupees, or if more than two animals were involved, at a
maximum of 200 rupees each.

In addition violaters could

be imprisoned for up to two months.

By October the FO had

amended these regulations to contain further the activities
of European hunters.

Henceforth, each license holder had
36
to submit game returns to the colonial authorities.
Kenya's new game ordinance caused a great deal of

*CAs of 1920 the rupee stood at the value of Is. 4d).
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friction between the European settler community and the
colonial administration.

Under the terms of the 45 rupee

non-native license, settlers were limited to hunting in
their home district and only were permitted to kill four
each of the more common antelopes.

Traders, on the other

hand, while restricted to the same bag limit, were allowed
to shoot in any district.

Furthermore, the 45 rupee

goyernment official's license entitled the bearer to the
same privileges granted under the 375 rupee sportsman's
license.

The colonial government justified these dif

ferences by indicating that settlers killed animals
primarily "for the pot"; therefore, there was no harm in
setting a bag limit or in confining their activities to
37

one district. '

Traders, however, were authorized to

hunt anywhere because they travelled through many dis
tricts in the course of a year.

The concession granted

to government officials was simply an economic-perquisite
designed to relieve the monotony and boredom of day-to-day
life in lonely outposts.

Objections to these regulations

arose partially because many settlers were keen on hunt
ing while others killed wild animals— especially elephants— to supplement meager incomes.

38

More important,

however, was the fact that scores of settlers refused to
accept a law that protected highly destructive animals:
...the farmer whose fences were destroyed
by elephant and buffalo, whose labour was
menaced by rhino, whose livestock was eaten
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by lions and leopards, and whose crops were
trampled and destroyed by herds of zebra, wilde
beest and antelope of various kinds, could hardly
be expected to limit his 'take' to two or three
individual animals.39
Sir Charles Eliot, Hardinge's successor who en
couraged a great expansion of European settlement, tried
to resolve this issue by asking the British government to
liberalize the settlers' bag limit.

The FO approved

Eliot's scheme and introduced an amendment to the game
ordinance whereby each colonist could shoot "not more than
ten animals of any one species other than Grant's gazelle,
Thomson's gazelle, Waterbuck, and Hartebeast."

40

Given

the types of wildlife problems that confronted the European
settler community, this amendment totally failed to placate
them.

Indeed, it was only after the CO assumed control

of Kenya in 1905 that the settlers succeeded in having
the law changed to reflect what they felt were the reali
ties of life in the East African bush,
Aside from playing a crucial role in the formulation
and implementation of Kenya's early game ordinances, the
FO also attacked the problem of African wildlife preser
vation on the international level.

On 8 September 1897

Lord Salisbury intimated to the CO that the "assembling
of a Conference" and the subsequent adoption of strict
resolutions by the international community would be the
only sure way of preserving Africa's wild animals.

41

He therefore proposed that such a conference be held in
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London in the spring of 1898; but because of the diffi
culties of arranging a meeting of this magnitude, it was
not until April 1900 that representatives of Great Britain,
France, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and the Congo
Free State finally met in London for the first International
Conference for the Preservation of the Wild Animals, Birds,
and Fishes of the African Continent.
After two months of negotiations the conference
agreed to a convention which strongly reflected Britain's
attitude toward game conservation.

This document proposed

to preserve Africa's fauna by implementing strict bag
limits, by establishing game sanctuaries, and by authorizing closed seasons.

42

Unfortunately, Portugal and France

refused to accept uniform export duties and export limita
tions on hides, skins, and horns; as a result, the conven/ n

tion never was ratified.
Despite foreign opposition, the British government
immediately incorporated the convention's principles into
Kenya's game regulations.

A new ordinance— which was

gazetted on 15 October 1900— increased all hunting fees;
henceforth, the colonial administration charged 750 rupees
for a sportsman's license and 150 rupees for a settler's*
or a government official's license.

The law also per

mitted settlers to kill two hippopotamuses a year, several
species of wild pig, and certain antelopes and gazelles
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up to a bag limit of five per month.

The penalty for

violating the regulations was raised to 1,000 rupees and,
in the case of multiple offenses, 500 rupees per animal.
The most important change, however, was the creation of
two new game sanctuaries.

The Northern Reserve stretched

from the Uganda Protectorate's border to Marsabit, then
south to the Guaso Nyiro River, and then to the Lake Baringo area.

The Southern Reserve adjoined the Uganda Rail

way in the north, the German East Africa border in the
south, the Uganda Protectorate in the west, and the upper
Tsavo River in the East.

The old Kenia District Reserve

was abolished.
In addition to the FO's international activities,
a group of private English citizens, headed by Edward
Buxton, a former big game hunter, also championed the
cause of trans-national wildlife preservation.

On 11

December 1903 Buxton launched the Society for the Preser
vation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire^"* (hereafter FPS).
Its purpose was to collect information on the number of
wild animals killed each year throughout the British
Empire and to take all necessary steps to chefck this
destruction.

It also sought "to create a sound public

opinion on the subject at home and in our Dependencies,
further the formation of game reserves and sanctuaries,
the selection of the most suitable places for these
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sanctuaries, and the enforcing of suitable game laws and
46
regulations."
By the end of its first year Buxton's
FPS had seventy ordinary and thirty honorary members,
and by 1904 it began publication of an annual journal.
These accomplishments found the nucleus of a highly in
fluential political pressure group which, by the time of
the CO's takeover of Kenya in 1905, was prepared to try to
exert considerable influence in the formulation and imple
mentation of the country's wildlife preservation policy.
In the final analysis the effectiveness of the wild
life policies enacted during the 1895-1905 period depended
upon the colonial administration's willingness and ability
to enforce them.

Unfortunately, the British government

was in no mood for increased imperial expenditures,
especially for something as eccentric as the preservation
of wild animals in Kenya.

Consequently, the official

policy, as enunciated by Sir John Kirk, the former Consul»

General of Zanzibar, was to establish vast game reserves
and leave them unpoliced.

47

Even the FO realized that a

credible enforcement system was needed if the principles
set forth in the 1900 convention were to be carried out
successfully and therefore suggested to Sir Apthur Hardinge that some experienced officer might "devote atten48
tion" to this matter.
Subsequently, the administration
assigned Richard Crawshay to the task of policing Kenya's
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two game reserves, which totalled more than 48,000 square
miles, or an area approximately the size of England.
There obviously was very little that one individual could
hope to accomplish in such a vast area.

Even after the FO

had approved the appointment of A. Blayney Percival as
Game Ranger in 1901, the situation remained unsettled; in
his first report Percival complained that only "a consid
erable force of police or scouts" could prevent breaches
49
of the game ordinance.
Sir Charles Eliot, who had re
signed in 1904 because of a dispute with the British
government over his pro-settler policies, sympathized
with Percival's plight and openly stated in his book on
the protectorate he had recently left that:
...even among average law-abiding citizens
there is a feeling that game regulations,
like customs regulations, belong to that
class of enactments which have no moral
force, and may be violated without loss of
moral character when they can be violated
w ith

im p u n ity .

Ensuring African compliance with the game regulations
was even more difficult.

According to Hardinge:

Most of these tribes are
too primitive to
be made to comprehende CsicD or apply a
system of game licenses; and too nomadic
for it to be possible without a force of
police throughout their countries, the size
and cost of which would be out of propor
tion to the end in view....51
Frederick C. Selous, a noted big game hunter, supported
Hardinge's assessment and advised Lord Salisbury that
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controlling African hunters would be a most "difficult
matter.""*2
The FO period, therefore, witnessed the introduction
of many advances in Kenya's wildlife preservation program,
including the 1900 Conference, the creation of two game
reserves, and the appointment of a full-time Game Ranger.
Uhfortunately, little, if anything, was done to establish
a widespread and effective policing system,

This is not

to suggest, however, that the official view of Kenya's
ecological problems was one of benign neglect.

On the

contrary, the achievements of the FO era can only be
appreciated when examined against the backdrop of the
entire range of political and economic problems that
plagued the British during those years.
Many areas of the country still had to be brought
under active administration.

In Jubaland, the Northern

Frontier District, and portions of western Kenya, for
example, the British presence amounted to little more
than a few fortified stations or trading posts.
the British extended their rule over these areas

Until
the

danger of violence or open revolt was a constant threat.
Moreover, the cost of administering those territories
already controlled by the government had increased at
such a frightening pace that from 1895 to 1905 the Bri
tish Treasury had given as grants-in-aid no less than 5
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1,656,408.
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In such an atmosphere it hardly was reason

able or realistic to expect that vast sums of money would
have been spent on preserving wild animals.
GAME POLICY UNDER THE COLONIAL OFFICE
On 1 April 1905 the CO assumed control of Kenya and
the Protectorates of Uganda, Central Africa, and British
Somaliland. ^

Even before this takeover the conflict for

land-use between the European settlers and the country's
wildlife had reached the critical stage.

As indicated

by the following poem, which appeared in the African
Standard in 1903, many settlers (especially those from
South Africa whose reputation for cruelty to animals
was legendary) perceived the country's fauna and game
regulations with extreme bitterness:
THE EAST AFRICAN MENAGERIE (INSPIRED ON
R E 5 D W T H E EAST AFRICA GAME REGULATIONS)
You
And
You
And

pay your money, in you come,
walk around the show
pitch your tent and take your pick
aprospecting go.

While you're away a hippo comes,
A smelling round for roots,
He sees your tent and eats it up,
But woe to him who shoots.
You place your billie on the ground
And leave it in your rear
An ape he comes and rips it off,
But you mustn’t shoot the dear.
A Mighty Tusker strolls along,
And thinks he'd like some fun,
You drop your pick and run like mad,
But you mustn't use your gun.
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You
And
But
But

turn to
what do
a rhino
my, you

camp in dead disgust
you see en route;
goring of your boy
daren' t shoot.

And when your near starvation point
With rations down to half
You daren't shoot an antelope,
Mich less a young giraffe.
A rich man’s park's no place for me
So I give myself a boot
Back to the White man's land in the South,
Where it isn't a crime to shoot.55
In the years after 1905 settler complaints against
wildlife were endless.

To protect crops and valuable

water supplies from the ravages of zebras, wildebeests,
hartebeests, elands, and gazelles, farmers who could
afford them erected barbed wire fences at a cost of
approximately L 40 per mile.

56

Unfortunately, such

barriers hardly were effective against a thirsty rhinosceros or a hungry gazelle.that jumped four or five foot
fences with ease or a frightened herd of zebra that was
stampeded by marauding lions. ^

For those who refused

to build fences for economic reasons matters were even
worse.

A single herd of wildebeests could eat and tramp

down fifty acres of wheat in a single night.

58

One

planter reported that Thomson's gazelles and hartebeests
consumed ten acres of beans while another complained that
zebras and hartebeests destroyed fifty acres of young
sisal plants.

59

Baboons also were a nuisance; on one

plantation they cleared an entire maize field in a few
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days.

Such feelings notwithstanding,

the FPS and, to a

lesser extent, the British government remained committed
to a policy of game preservation.

The colonial admini*

tration— responsible for the growth and development of
the European settler community as well as for the safety
of the country's fauna— usually found itself vacillating
between these two extremes.

Indeed, throughout the 1905-

1939 period the colonial government was in the unenviableposition of trying to devise a scheme that would pacify
the settlers by encouraging economic developmemt as well
as appease the FPS and the British government by preserv
ing large numbers of wild animals.

It proved a hopeless

under taking.
Edward Buxton, founder of the FPS, launched a
political campaign to pressure the British government
into adopting a stronger fauna preservation policy shortly
before the CO takeover of Kenya.

In

the 1905 issue of

the Journal of the Society for the Preservation of the
Wild Fauna of the Empire.Buxton included an article by
Lord Hindlip, an influential Kenya settler and noted
conservationist.

Among other things, Hindlip argued

for increased government expediture for the preservation
of the country1s wildlife.^

On 2 February 1905 a depu

tation from the FPS visited the Secretary of State for
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the Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton.

In his opening

remarks Buxton, echoing Hindlip's sentiments, informed
Lyttelton that in Kenya "a very considerable revenue is
derived from the game, to put it on the lowest ground—
from the licenses— and nothing like that sum is spent on
preserving it."

Buxton also maintained that

game reserves should be established in areas where it
was possible to enforce a strict administration of the
game regulations.^
On 1 June 1905 Lyttelton advised East Africa's Com
missioners that in response to the FPS's suggestions:
I stated that I did not think that there was
any chance at the present moment of obtaining
any contribution from the Imperial Exchequer
in aid of the establishment of game reserves
....I agreed that the reserves should be
brought, where feasible, along the navigable
rivers or railways...and that their size
should be so restricted as to give them a
fair chance of being e f f e c t i v e . o3
So, although Buxton failed to persuade the British
government to allocate funds for the creation of additional
reserves, he succeeded in initiating a process whereby
Kenya's existing sanctuaries were reduced to more manage
able and realistic proportions.
When the colonial administration established the
Northern Reserve in 1900 it not only hoped to prevent
European sportsmen from ravaging the region's wildlife
but also from precipitating political problems with the
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local inhabitants.^

The sanctuary was located in what

would become the Northern Frontier Province, a sparsely
populated semi-desert area of more than 125,000 square
miles bordering Ethiopia and the Sudan.

Because of the

lack of adequate grazing grounds, the reserve contained
a comparatively small fauna population, which included
elephant, rhinoceros, buffalo, giraffe, eland, greater
and lesser kudu, impala, Waller's gazelle, and several
lesser antelope.

Until 1907 the sanctuary was entirely beyond the
limits of effective British control and was nothing more
than "a happy hunting-round for Somalis, Baluchis, Abyssinians, and all manner of straying p e o p l e s . B e g i n n i n g
in that year, however, the colonial administration grad
ually extended its rule over this hostile region.

Among

other things, Major H. F. Ward founded the Boma Trading
Company for the purpose of developing commercial relations
with Ethiopia.

fifi

Shortly afterwards, Captain. G. H. Rid

dell, a Company employee, opened a route from Harrar, in
Ethiopia, down the Juba River to Kismayu.

He also pioneered

a second road from Marsabit to the Kenya highlands via
Rumuruti.

By the end of the year a Greek citizen by the

name of Zaphiro, who was in the employ of the British
embassy at Addis Ababa, had built a fort at Moyale, north
east of Marsabit.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Then in 1908, at the behest of T. B. Hohler, the
British Minister in Addis Ababa, additional stations were
established at Golbo and Dolo to check the slaughter of
elephants by Ethiopian raiders.

67

Along with the construc

tion of these two forts, the colonial administration,
acting on Lyttelton's communication to Sir Donald Stewart,
also decided to reduce the Northern Reserve "from its prego
sent unwieldly size."
As practically nothing was known
about the variety and quantity of game in the sanctuary,
Kenya's Lt. Governor Frederick Jackson dispatched John
H. Patterson, who had helped to build the Uganda Railway
and had been appointed Principal Game Ranger in 1907,
to the area to mark out new boundaries and to conduct a
game census.

Unfortunately, illness forced Patterson

back to Nairobi just after he demarcated the Urray Moun
tains, north of Marsabit, as the reserve's eastern border.
Jackson, incensed by Patterson's failure to complete
the missions, filed a most unflattering minute on 1 July
1908:
...his report gives little or no information
about the game that we did not know before, and
we are still in ignorance regarding the variety
and approximate quantity of game between Pat
terson's suggested boundary and the Laikipia
escarpment.
By August, however, Jackson, a naturalist in his own
right, decided that "though our information is scanty, we
know enough about the game to warrant our dealing with
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this reserve."

He therefore proposed "to cut the Rift

Valley portion north of Lake Baringo, and make the Laikipia Escarpment and Mount Nyiro the western boundary;
and reduce the eastern portion by one degree of longi
tude."^

Kenya's 1909 Game Ordinance re-defined the

reserve's boundaries according to Jackson's suggestions,
thiereby leaving an area of approximately 13,000 square
•i
71
miles.
The same ordinance also consolidated the Southern
Reserve, but this was done purely for economic reasons.
Jackson and Sir James Hayes-Sadler, Kenya’s Governor,
already had recommended that the reserve be reduced "by
the area between the Railway and the Kyulu Hills from
the Kiboko or Makindu River to the Tsavo."

This portion

eventually was eliminated because it contained little
game and was required for the development of the proposed
72
sanseviera fibre industry.
The colonial administration
also intimated that the eastern boundary might be moved
back even further if the preservation of game conflicted
with the interests of this industry.

73

Aside from making the reserves more manageable, the
1909 regulations formalized the principle whereby game
reserves could be established, decreased in size, or
abolished altogether by government order;
The governor, with approval of the Secretary
of State may by Proclamation declare any
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other portion of the Protectorate to be a game
reserve, and may define or alter the limits
of any game reserve, and this, ordinance shall
apply to every such game r e s e r v e . 74
To prevent what he termed "an invasion of the sanc
tity of a Reserve," Buxton unsuccessfully had attempted
to persuade the British government to assume sole responsi
bility for Kenya's game reserves.^

Ironically, his fail

ure contributed to the rise of the country's national
park movement.

Wildlife enthusiasts argued that under

the terms of the 1909 Ordinance a game reserve could be
"imperilled by a variety of causes" but a national park
was "sacred...in perpetuity."

76

Unfortunately, because

of public and private lethargy and a general connaitment
to economic development at any costs, it took nearly forty
years for the national park dream to become a reality.
Buxton also used his organization to pressure the
British government into expending Kenya's inadequate
Game Department.

As was mentioned, the colonial adminis

tration appointed A. Blayney Percival to the post of Game
Ranger in 1901; but for the next six years he worked alone
to preserve the country's wildlife.

By 1906 two influen

tial members of the colonial government, who also believed
that Percival was working against hopeless oddg, had joindd
Buxton's campaign in an unofficial capacity.

Cjn 16 Febru

ary Frederick Jackson had pointed out to the .British gov
ernment that:
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The 'Department' consisting as it does at
present, of Mr. Percival, the Ranger, and
four or six native scouts is considered...
to be little more than a farce. This I sub
mit, is no fault of Mr. Percival... .Even if
Mr. Percival had more funds at his disposal
for an increased staff of native scouts,
they would be of little use without European
supervision....If the question is to be taken
up seriously with a view to preserving the
game from extinction within the next decade
or two...an adequate and properly organized
game ranger's Department should be established
without further delay.77
Within seven months of the Jackson memorandum,
Hayes-Sadler, submitted a detailed report to the British
government in which he outlined the probable cost of a
Game Department:
1
Ranger
.
1
Senior Assistant.........
2
Assistants....L 250 each
Horse and Travelling Allowance.
Native Scouts.................
Rewards and Incidental Expensess ........
Total
E

E 600
E 300
E 500
E 325
E 200
t 500
2,425“

7 0

°

In view of Sadler's support and the fact that since
1904 the revenue derived from game licenses and fines for
breaches of the game regulation amounted to E 13,236 while
expenditures only were E 242, the British government
finally allocated E 2,300 in late 1906 for the creation
79
of a Game Department.
In 1907 the colonial administration organized a
four-man Game Department with Lieutenant-Colonel John H.
Patterson as Principal Game Ranger, A. Blayney Percival
as Senior Assistant Game Ranger, and C. J. Ross and G. H.
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Goldfinch as Assistant Game Rangers.

Until 1923 a

variety of personal, financial, and political factors
severely limited the Department's overall effective
ness.

For example, within seven months of his appoint

ment, Patterson was invalided to England and the Depart
ment was reduced to three men.

In 1909 the administra

tion appointed a temporary assistant and assigned Percival
to the post of Acting Game Ranger.

Finally, in October

1910 the Department acquired a permanent Game Ranger,
R. B. Woosnam, and a fifth European officer, C. W. Woodhouse.

With this comparatively large staff the Depart

ment should have been able to solve at least partially
the problem of enforcing Kenya's game regulations.
Unfortunately, with the outbreak of the First World
War, the Department virtually ceased to exist when the
colonial administration drafted all five officers into
the intelligence service.

The following year the Depart

ment resumed its activities on a limited basis with
Goldfinch and a reduced staff of African scouts.

On 4

June 1915 Woosnam was killed in action at the Dardanelles,
and his post remained vacant until the colonial government
80
appointed Percival as Game Warden in 1919.
For several
years Percival unsuccessfully struggled to regain a full
complement of European officers; in his last report
written in 1922 he accused the colonial administration
of playing politics with the Game Department:
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The remnant of the Game Department, despoiled
of the hardly collected Csic] transport mules
etc. by military necessity during the war and
later when permission to expend the money re
ceived for mules etc. from the military on a
Motor Car Csic] , the car commandered [laic]
and sold; personnel cut down til during 1923
•the Department will probably consist of one
man sitting in an office....I am of the opinion
that it was false economy to cut down the Game
Department expenditure to the extent that it
has been. ^8

Despite this pessimistic assessment, with the appoint
ment of Arthur Ritchie--the acknowledged "grand old man" of
the East African Game Departments— as Game Warden in late
1923, Kenyafs Game Department received a new lease on
life.

82

Unlike his two predecessors, Ritchie possessed

a high level of scientific knowledge, having earned an
honors degree in zoology from Magdalen College, Oxford.
Consequently, his opinions regarding wildlife and its
preservation carried considerable weight in influential
political and scientific circles.

According to Charles

Pitman, Uganda's chief game warden from 1925 to 1950,
Ritchie used this influence to wage a one man "diplomatic
guerrilla action against small-minded officials who...
tried, time and again, to clip the wings of the Kenya
Game Department."

83

By 1925 Ritchie had succeeded in restoring the Game
Department to its pre-war strength, and in 1929 acquired
two European game control officers.

Throughout the 1930s

Ritchie usually managed to have at his disposal four
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European officers and one full-time game control officer.
He also persuaded the parsimonious colonial administra
tion to increase the Game Department's budget from {, 7,237
in 1925 to L 12,557 in 1929.^^

These individual advances

unfortunately failed to improve the Department's overall
operating capabilities.
As late as 1936 the Department discharged its duties
with the same number of European officers as it had done
during the pre-World War I period, despite the fact that
its duties had been expanded to include game control and
the scientific study of wild animals.

Moreover the De

partment’s revenue increased from an average of

h

4,934

annually during the 1904-1914 period to an annual average
of

h

11,510 during the 1926-1936 decade, without a con-

comitant budgetary increase.

85

The colonial government's

penury caused Ritchie to observe that his main problem
86
was "how to show champagne results on a beer budget."
On a practical level, Ritchie believed the Game
Department's most important duty was to prevent conflict
between humans and animals.

87

Given the increasing

number of European settlers and the growing African popu
lations, this task became more and more difficult with
each passing year.

As the problem intensified, the De

partment's reputation deteriorated, causing Ritchie to
observe:
It is with the greatest reluctance that a body
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of the community will cease to look upon the *
Game Department as other than a source of
arbitrary interference with the just rights
and liberties of the individual, appearing
to consider that game is preserved for the
benefit of the Department. It must be the
constant endeavour of this Department...to
impresis upon every person that the game
belongs to them primarily, to the world
more generally, and by reversion, to pos
terity .
Indeed, it was the inability to resolve this conflict
and, more importantly, the essential incompatibility of
man and animals that threatened Kenya*s wildlife with
utter extinction.
Predators presented one of the greatest obstacles
to profitable farming and ranching.

Leopards usually

snapped up guard dogs and sheep that carelessly were
89
left out at night.
Baboons annually killed thousands
of lambs and calves.

90

Hyenas, East Africa's greatest

scavengers, ate shoes and leather chairs as well as calves
91
and sheep.
Lions were a special scourge; one report
indicated that a settler could expect to lose at least
five per cent of his stock annually to these crafty beasts.

92

Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that
many of Kenya's European and African farmers adopted an ex
tremely harsh anti-wildlife attitude.

Some even advocated

the total extermination of the country's fauna for the sake
of economic development

. ^ 3

But the animals somehow endured

the farmer's onslaught and by Ritchie's time the game, though

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

considerably reduced, was still present in most areas of
Kenya.^
Ritchie believed that there were three ways to pre
vent serious clashes between man and animal; namely, to
drive the fauna out of areas where their presence was
undesirable; to instill within each animal or herd of
animals a sense of discipline and respect for man and his
property; or to exterminate the wildlife on a local basis.
On the strength of this three-point program Ritchie then
formulated a "game control" policy which was:
...an essential corollary of Game Preservation;
for no human community will tolerate in its
vicinity the existence of— much less subscribe
to the protection of— species that are a per
petual source of danger or depredation; and if
any general system of preservation is to persist,
active intervention must always be ready at
hand.95
According to Rennie Bere, Director of the Uganda National
Parks from 1955 to 1960, the first two alternatives were
little more than stop-gap measures.

Animals driven out

of a particular area usually returned, especially if it
contained food and water; and most species were incapable
of learning -"discipline and respect," no matter what the
inducement or the penalty.

96

Game control, therefore, was

the only realistic alternative, and,from the mid-1920s
onward,it was used with increasingly regularity.
In 1924, for example, the Game Department provided
20,000 rounds of ammunition to a party of five African
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game scouts and dispatched it to the Uasin Gishu Plateau
in northwestern Kenya.

Since the early 1900s Afrikaaner

settlers from South Africa had battled the plateau's
wildlife for control of its limited resources.

Ritchie

hoped that this expedition would resolve the issue once
and for all.

By the end of the year the scouts had killed

approximately 4,000 head of zebra, one of the most dangerour animals as far as crop destruction was concerned.
Although this was only a tiny fraction of the plateau's
zebra population, the constant harassment kept most of
them away from farms.
of the operation's cost

The Game Department recouped some
by selling the hides locally for

three shillings, and the trade became so profitable that
by 1925 the price had risen to as much as ten shillings
per skin.

When the colonial administration permitted

private individuals to sell hides at this price, scores
of settlers joined in the slaughter and by the-end of
1926 the zebra almost had vanished from the plateau.

97

By 1933, however, H.G. Evans, District Commissioner
from Uasin Gishu, reported that game once again was
causing "a lot of damage to young wheat."

The District

Council, the settlers' local governmental body, appealed
again to the Game Department in 1926 for assistance in
dealing with the increasing herds of zebra, topi, and
hartebeest.

When the Department failed to take action the
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District Council decided to shoulder "the responsibility
of evolving suitable measures to combat incursion by
game."

In 1938 the Council adopted a policy of "controlled

shooting" and by the end of the year the general situation
98
had in its view, improved considerably.
In all fairness to the Boers in particular and to
the European settlers in general, it should be pointed
out that many large land-owners maintained wildlife
sanctuaries on their own land.

Indeed, according to Hugh

Lamprey, a biologist with Tanganyika's Game Department,
some of Kenya's most inviolable game reserves were those
99
located on private property.
Even during the height
of Uasin Gishu's wild animal difficulties in the mid1930s E.L.B. Anderson, the District Commissioner, reported
that wealthy farmers regarded game as a natural asset to
the plateau while small farmers continued to view it as
an "unmitigated c u r s e . A s i d e from incurring the wrath
of their less fortunate neighbors, the pro-wildlife land
owners risked considerable damage to their property and
crops.

As time passed, therefore, more and mqre farmers

exchanged their sympathetic attitude for one pf intoler
ance and belligerence.^^
Aside from carrying out "game control" schemes in
areas such as Uasin Gishu, the Game Department also acted
as the government’s land clearing agent throughout the
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late 1920s and early 1930s.

John A. Hunter, who was first

engaged by the department as an elephant control officer
in June 1927, participated in a clearing project in Machakos District east of Nairobi.

According to Hunter, the

Kamba community had increased at least six-fold since the
advent of colonial rule while the rhinoceros population
had grown to such an extent that they "disputed the na
tives* existing huts and crops.”

Arthur Ritchie dispatched

Hunter to the area to eliminate this threat, and in three
months he killed 163 of the beasts.

On his return to

Machakos, Hunter glimpsed into the future and was chilled
by man*s destructiveness:
We could walk freely through the bush now for
there was little chance of meeting a rhino...
Walking in a single file, we topped a little
rise. I stopped in astonishment.
Three
months before we had crossed the same country
that lay before us. Then it had been a maze
of thorn bush and acacia, cut by a tangle of
narrow rhino trails. Now it lay.bare as a
polished table...labor gangs had been moving
steadily behind u s , cutting down the bush and
dlearing the land. What a short time before
had been as wild-'a. bit of Africa as Gpd ever
made was now farming country. Not a tree or
bush remained. Now that the scrub was gone,
I could see the white network of rhinp trails
criss-crossing over the whole land. Already
the grass was beginning to obliterate them.
The freakish beasts that had traveled those
trails for centuries were now dead and gone.
Game control and land clearing obviously were
inimical to wildlife preservation, and indeed made the
1929-39 period a time of ambiguous successes as far as
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the Game Department was concerned.

Ritchie, through the

power of his personality, had ensured that the Department
usually operated with a full complement of European officers;
but in real terms he failed to command a greater share of
the colonial administration's limited financial resources,
partially because of public hostility toward wild animals.
He achieved a modus vivendi of sorts with the European
settlers and the African community by implementing a
highly destructive "control" program, which only further
reduced Kenya’s rapidly diminishing wildlife.
Ritchie

Moreover,

failed to address meaningfully the problem of

preserving fauna in a society committed to European settle
ment and rapid economic development.

This is not to sug

gest, however, that Ritchie was inefficient or derelict
in the performance of his duties; on the contrary, he was
a farsighted official who repeatedly argued for the estab
lishment of a national park system as the only sure way of
103
preserving Kenya's wild animals.
That such reserves
were not created until after the Second World War indi
cates the complexity of the national park issue rather than
the Game Department's ineptitude.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the 1895-1939 period the wildlife preserva
tion problem plagued Kenya's economic, social, and politi
cal development.

It also challenged the very essence of

British colonialism; namely, that Great Britain had the
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right to act as a trustee for another c o m try's resources.
Given today's aversion to European colonialism, it is
extremely difficult to judge England's fauna policy in
Kenya without condemnatory preconceptions.

Yet an apprai

sal must be made if this important aspect of Kenya's
history is to be understood.
Prior to 1895 the IBEA, a chartered commercial enter
prise, was responsible for administering approximately
300,000 square miles, an area more than three times the
size of the United Kingdom.

With chronic political and

economic problems and a general Africa staff Qf only 117
Europeans, its overall performance was necessarily delin
quent in many areas— transportation, medicine, education,
and wildlife preservation.

Despite these shortcomings,

however, the IBEA enacted East Africa's first game regu
lations, which sought to preserve wild animals from de
struction by Europeans throughout its territories by
requiring hunters to purchase a

h

25 hunting license.

So,

although the Gompany can be criticized for failing to
police adequately this system or for trying tq use Kenya's
fauna to ensure its economic well being, the fact of the
matter was that it took steps, however tentative or inef
fective, to preserve East Africa's wildlife at a time when
most colonial governments refused to adopt similar policies
When the P0 assumed administrative control of Kenya
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in 1895, it not only extended the game regulations to the
area north of the Tana River but supplemented them by
declaring the Kenia District a reserve in which ivory
hunters and European sportsmen were prohibited from enter94
ing for shooting purposes.
Then in 1900 the FO authorized
the creation of the Northern and Southern Game Reserves,
the latter replacing the old Kenia District Reserve.
With the beginning of European settlement in 1903,
Kenya's faunal history reached a watershed; henceforth,
the country's wildlife was reduced in direct proportion
to the growth of the settler community.

The colonial

administration formalized this principle by refusing to
allow game to hinder Kenya's economic development.

This

policy reached its logical conclusion in the late 1920s
when Arthur Ritchie formulated a "game control" strategy
whereby the Game Department eliminated any and all wild
life that interfered with what was seen as the country's
economic well being.
To ensure the survival of as much wildlife as possible,
Ritchie, aided and supported by the FPS, by elements with
in the British and colonial governments, and by private
citizens throughout the world, argued for the adoption of
a national park policy.

As will be shown lat^r, in 1933

the international community took steps to make this dream
a reality; but a technical disagreement and the outbreak
of the Second World War postponed the creation of Kenya's
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first national park until 1945.
t

To condemn the British colonial system for its failure
to arrest totally the destruction of Kenya's fauna during
the 1895-1939 period is unfair and unrealistic.

There was

not a government in Africa, or for that matter in the world,
that placed the interests of wild animals before those of
•man.

Moreover, the British government repeatedly demon

strated its concern for the country's wild animals by host
ing an international conference, by authorizing the creation
of one of the first game departments in Africa, and by
approving numerous modifications to the country's game
ordinance to reflect changing conditions.

Despite these

advances the human demand for ever-increasing amounts of
land and water had a disastrous impact on Kenya's fauna.
According to Noel Simon, the founder of the Kenya Wild
Life Society:
Many of the isolated pockets of game which
had managed to survive. ..were ruthlessly
eliminated. On the Kinangop, for example,
thousands of acres of new land were broken
and sown to cereals. All game was classified
as vermin and treated as such. In was con
sidered to be in the country's interests
to destroy everything on four legs, and there
were no rules. Where a few years before the
plains had been white with zebra and Thomson's
gazelle, and Kongoni had roamed at will, there
were how acres of crops rippling in the breeze.
Progress had used her scythe with devastating
effect.
That so much wildlife perished during this brief fortyfour year span is an indication of man's innate and ever-
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lasting hostility toward wild animals rather than a mani
festation of the inefficiency of any particular form of
government controls.
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CHAPTER II

UGANDA:

ELEPHANTS AND SHAMBAS, 1895-1945

In contrast to Kenya, the ecological situation in
Uganda revolved around a single comparatively simple issue.
The introduction of game preservation laws in the last
years of the 19th century had precipitated a tremendous
population explosion among the country's elephant herds.
In their endless quest for food and water these massive
beasts began to threaten Uganda's agricultural capabilities.
In an effort to restore a more realistic balance between
man and animal the colonial administration initiated
several elephant control schemes, all of which were based
upon a bounty system whereby individual hunters were paid
according to the weight of the tusks they accumulated.
Unfortunately, this strategy failed to resolve the ecolog
ical conflict confronting Uganda, largely because hunters
usually pursued males for their heavier ivory rather than
females and young elephants who were responsible for most
agricultural damage.

Indeed, it was only after the colonial

administration had created a Game Department in 1925 and
had employed salaried hunters that the situation was re
versed and the country's elephant herds were thinned out.
By the eve of the Second World War, however, j.t had become
evident that Uganda's elephants were on the defensive and
that a radical new game preservation plan was needed to
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guarantee their future survival.

Once again this had to be

accomplished without disturbing or impairing the country's
economic development.
Located astride the equator, Uganda is 91,134 square
miles in area, or a little larger than Great Britain.
Approximately one-seventh of its total area, or nearly
14,000 square miles, is comprised of lakes, swamps, and
rivers, including the majestic Nile.

Despite its compara

tive smallness, Uganda possesses an incredibly varied en
vironment.

In the west are the fabled Mountains of the

Moon, otherwise known as the Ruwenzori range, whose peaks
rise to more than 16,000 feet above sea level.
east is the
Valley.

To the

lush and humid portion of the western Rift

In the north the land is primarily grassy savannah

and semi-desert while the country's southern region borders
on the great tropical forest that extends from the jungles
of Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo) to the great lakes
region.
This diverse terrain is home for a bewildering assort
ment of wild animals, from the mammoth elephant to the
Deminoff's galago, which can fit in the palm pf a hand.
According to Rennie Bere, the Director of Uganda's national
parks from 1955 until 1960, the country's more common
species includes buffalo, waterbuck, hartebeest, Uganda
kob, bushbuck, and reedbuck.^

Uganda's most numerous and
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most dangerous animal was the elephant; indeed, much of
the country's faunal and economic history revolves primarily
around this beast’s activities.^
Although its land and wildlife are rich and varied,
Uganda's climate is decidedly unhealthful.

Time and again

diseases such as sleeping sickness, smallpox, typhoid,
malaria, and plague decimated the country* s African popula
tion and, in part, prevented the establishment of a large
land-hungry European settler community.^

By 1939, for

example, Uganda's European population was only 2,206 while
Kenya's and Tanganyika's were 22,808 and 7,925 respectively.^
The prevalence of these diseases as well as the comparative
paucity of wildlife also discouraged large numbers, of
European sportsmen from visiting Uganda.^
At the dawn of the British colonial period in the
last quarter of the 19th century the elephant was found
throughout Uganda, except, perhaps, in the more developed
areas of the Buganda Province in the south central region
of the country.**

This herbivorous creature, whose average

adult weight is 7,720 lbs., consumes between 525 lbs. and
687 lbs. of food per day.^

In its daily and seasonal

wanderings for food and water the elephant repeatedly
raided and damaged the country's few European plantations
as well as the more numerous African shambas (cultivated
O

areas).

Particularly vulnerable were plantations and
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shambas on the edge of inhabited areas, or in comparatively
isolated locations,

"Dirty, unweeded, overgrown planata-

tions and banana patches" also attracted hungry elephants.^
These depredations gave rise to countless complaints
throughout the country.

For example, in its first report,

issued in 1925, the Game Department reported that the annual
April rains forced a herd of elephants out of the thick
bush bordering the Nkusi River into an area of dense
elephant grass from which they repeatedly raided adjacent
shambas between 1 May 1924 and 31 August 1924, causing
"damage on an extensive scale."10

In the same report the

Department disclosed that four bulls destroyed two acres,
of bananas, the country's staple food, and one quarter of
an acre of sweet potatoes in a single foray on a shamba
near the Butara Forest in Toro District. H

Even individual

elephants were capable of causing a great deal of agricul
tural damage.

In Kitagweta a bull, known by the sobriquet

of Kisassa, smashed fifty banana stems in one day.^

These

examples unfortunately fail to convey the horror and frus
tration experienced by Uganda's farmers and plantation
owners as a result of these attacks.

As Alistair Graham,

a former Kenya Game Department official, has pointed out:
The idea of elephants taking over tracts of
country from humans was no laughing matter;
it really happened. Whenever a local community
of humans was decimated or wrecked by war,
famine or disease it ran the risk of having
its decline accelerated, or even terminated,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60
by elephants. Crops that could not be
protected full time would rapidly be
destroyed by raiding elephants and actual
physical occupation of this area by ele
phants could take place
. 1

Because so much of Uganda* s faunal history during the
colonial period centered around the depredations of ele
phants it was inevitable that the colonial administration
eventually adopted an ecological policy that favored human
settlement and economic development rather than wildlife
preservation.^

Indeed, the evolution of this policy

began during the dawn of the colonial period.
The British government's interest in Uganda's fauna
began on 27 Hay 1896 when Lord Salisbury, the Prime Min
ister and Foreign Secretary, dispatched the following
communication to Sir Ernest Berkely, the country's Commis
sioner and Consul-General:
My attention has recently been called to
the excessive destruction, by travellers
and others in East Africa, of the larger
wild animals generally known as 'big game.'
There is reason to fear that unless some
check is imposed upon the indiscriminate
slaughter of these animals, they will, in
the course of a few years, disappear from
the British Protectorate.
I am not aware how far the enclosed Regulations
for sporting licences, issued by the Imperial
British East Africa Company have even been
applied, and it is obviously difficult to
ensure the observance by parties inland of
regulations affecting the killing of game.
It is eminently desirable, however, that
some steps should be taken, and I have,
therefore, to request that you will furnish
me with a report on the subject. It will be
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for your consideration whether it would be
advisable to deal with the question to some
extent by establishing a close time, by
specifying reserved districts, and by
limiting the number of any particular
class of game to be shot by an individual
sportsman.
In any case a regulation should be issued,
if not already in force, requiring persons,
intending to shoot big game for sporting
purposes, to take out a licence, the fee
for which should be sufficiently high to
serve as a check. In British Central-,.
Africa the cost of a license is I 25.
Approximately six months later Berkeley responded to
Salisbury's inquiry by submitting a series of draft game
regulations based "upon what would seem to be the best
means of providing for the undoubtedly needed protection
and preservation of 'big game' in this Protectorate."
Among other things, this ordinance would have created a
dual licensing system whereby a prospective hunter could
have paid

1 , 0 0 0

rupees for the right to hunt throughout

Uganda or 500 rupees to hunt in a particular district.
Moreover, only a specified number of the follpwing species
could have been shot under each license:

twelve elephants,

three rhinoceroses, six hippopotamuses, one giraffe, and
one buffalo.

A further charge of 100 rupees would have

been levied for each elephant acutally bagged.

Lastly,

each sportsman would have had to submit to the colonial
authorities a record of all game killed on license.

Those

individuals who would have been exempt from this licensing
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system included government officials, caravan leaders
•shooting "for the pot," and farmers or plantation owners
defending their crops and/or property.
To protect Uganda*s elephants, Berkeley proposed to
prohibit the issuance of hunting licenses to professional
ivory hunters.

He also suggested that the colonial admin

istration give public notice to all African peoples within
the country that,six months after the adoption of a game
ordinance,all elephant tusks weighing ten pounds or less
would be subject to confiscation.

Finally, Berkeley rec

ommended that the FO authorize Uganda*s Commissioner to
declare from time to time any district to be "closed" to
all forms of hunting.

He refused, however, to commit the

colonial administration on the game sanctuary issue, claim
ing that "the matter would at present offer various and not
inconsiderable difficulties... and it may therefore as well
be left over for consideration at some future period."^
Although these proposals incorporated Salisbury* s
suggestions that the country's game laws be predicated
upon bag limits and high license fees, the FO rejected
Berkeley's plan without comment, and imposed a game ordi
nance on Uganda that failed to take proper account of
local conditions.

Under the terms of these regulations,

a sportsman paid 375 rupees for a hunting license while
settlers and government officials were charged only
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45 rupees.

The license enabled sportsman and government

officials to kill anything outside a game reserve except
for two each of the following animals:

elephant (male),

rhinoceros, hippopotamus, buffalo, and giraffe.

These

regulations authorized a Sub-Commissioner, in the absence
of the District Commissioner, to remove the restriction
providing that each hunter who expected the bag limit
paid 180 rupees for each additional elephant and 90 rupees
for each additional rhinoceros, hippopotamus, buffalo, or
giraffe.

The settler's license allowed the bearer to hunt

only within his own district and to kill only four each
per month of the following species:

Thomson's gazelle,

Grant's gazelle, hartebeest, impala, and wildebeest.^
By failing to anticipate Uganda's elephant problem,
by trying to preserve rather than control these beasts,
and by reducing the number of elephants that could be
shot on license from twelve to two, the FO precipitated
a pachyderm population explosion, although it took approx
imately twenty years for this situation to reach the
critical stage.

In the interim the British government as

well as the colonial authorities unwittingly exacerbated
the problem by implementing a series of preservation
policies that further stimulated the growth of Uganda's
18
elephant population.
The individual who shaped many of these early policies
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was Sir Harry Johnston, explorer, imperialist, big game
hunter, and wildlife enthusiast.^

One month after be

coming Uganda's Special Commissioner in October 1899 Johnston
asked the FO for permission to proclaim a temporary Game
Reserve in the area comprised within the following limits:
Starting from the mouth of the River Turkwel
where that river enters Lake Rudolf, the
boundary of the Sugota Game Reserve shall
follow the coast of Lake Rudolf southwards
until it reaches the south-eastern most point
of the lake. From this point the boundary
shall be carried south-eastwards to the
western flank of Mount Nyiro, and thence
shall continue southwards along the western
face of the Laikipia escarpment until it
reaches the source of the small stream
which flows into the north-eastern most
gulf of Lake Baringo. Following this stream,
downstream, the boundary of the said game
reserve shall continue along the north coast
of Lake Baringo, and shall thence be drawn
north-westward to the western most source of
the River Oron in the Kamasia Mountains.
From this point the boundary shall be carried
in a north-westerly direction along the northern
flanks of the Kamasia and Elgeyo plateau
till it reaches the right bank of the River
Weiwei or Turkwel, and thence shall follow
the right bank...downstream to where the
said river enters Lake Rudolf.20
On 11 January 1900 the FO approved Johnston's request and
the colonial administration established the Sugota Game
Reserve, an area which covered 13,000 square miles and
included much of the Pokot and the Turkana country.
Johnston also was concerned with the effect of the
African hunter on Uganda's wildlife, particularly the
elephant.

Prior to 1900 Africans? armed with old-fashioned
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flintlocks, killed an untold number of elephants to supply
the lucrative Arab-dominated ivory trade.22

Charles Pitman,

Uganda’s Game Warden from 1925 to 1950, claimed that
"armed natives CwhoJ were sent ahead into various parts
of Uganda to pave the way for British Administration"
further reduced the country’s elephant population to
O O

feed the ivory trade.

J

By early 1900 Johnston was con

vinced that the combination of these two threats would
exterminate the country’s elephant herds in every district:
except Karamoja, an extremely dry and inaccessible area
in north-eastern U g a n d a . H e therefore took several
steps to prevent Africans from hunting and slaughtering
Uganda’s elephants.

Among other things, he concluded an

agreement with the Kingdom of Buganda that provided for
a precise definition of its territorial boundaries and
for the abrogation of any rights of suzerainty, tribute,
or privileged position whatever over the Protectorate’s
adjoining provinces.

Under the old system African hunters

had sallied forth several times a year and killed large
numbers of elephants in the Kingdoms of Toro, Ankole, and
Bunyoro.

Inside Buganda, Johnston induced the regents and

the chiefs to enact a law through the Lukiko, or council,
which prohibitied the killing of female or immature male
elephants.

It also should be pointed out that: this agree

ment laid the foundation of British colonial rule in the
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country* s most powerful African kingdom.

In the years to

come Buganda would act as the agent of British imperialism
in many other.regions of Uganda.

2*5

As far as the country*s other areas were concerned,
Johnston simply banned the killing of elephants.

He in

formed the FO, however, that this law would be a "dead
letter'* in many districts until the administration had
acquired "a firmer hold over the country."

Johnston also

established a 2,500 square mile elephant reserve in Bunyoro
and one of 200 square miles in Toro.

Finally, he dis

patched H.H. Miller with a "large force of police" to
guard the sanctity of the Sugota Game Reserve.

26

Johnston's efforts to preserve Uganda's elephants
succeeded to such an extent that Sir James Hayes-Sadler,
the country's Commissioner from 1902 to 1905, who earlier
had served as Political Agent and Consul in the Somaliland
Protectorate, dispatched a report to Lord Lansdowne, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, proposing to amend
the existing game ordinance in favor of harsher regula
tions.

Sadler claimed that the change was necessary be

cause "Complaints have been received from various parts of
the Protectorate of the damage done to plantations by
elephants, whole shambas being sometimes devastated."
However, because he believed that some Africans would use
any opportunity to participate in the ivory trade, Sadler
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refused to permit the outright killing of elephants to
protect agricultural settlements.

Instead, he ordered

local European administrators to advise any African whose
shamba was attacked by elephants to scare the beasts away
by lighting fires, by shooting guns, or by beating drums.
When this policy failed to achieve the desired results,
Sadler opined that "What we have to do is, first, to pre
serve the cultivation, secondly, to preserve the elephant
which destroys the cultivation, to find means by which
both ends can be met."
decided to allow

To achieve these goals Sadler

:Sub-Commissioners to issue a E 10 hunting

license to the greater and, in some cases, to the lesser
chiefs, permitting them to kill two elephants.

In those

cases where an individual or a community could not afford
the license fee, the amendment allowed the nearest chief
"to shoot one, or at the most two, elephants actually doing
damage."27

On 16 June 1903 the FO approved Sadler's

28
suggestions and recommendations without comment. °

By 1903 then it was clear that the success or fail
ure of Uganda's wildlife preservation policy depended upon
the colonial administration's ability to lessen the
elephant's agricultural impact on the African community.
Indeed, the African hardly could be expected to comply
with the game laws that repeaitedly resulted in the de
struction of his crops.

Ironically, this critical issue
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failed to attract the attention of the British government
or the FPS, most likely because Uganda*s Africans lacked
the political organization necessary to express their
grievances effectively,

Even when Edward Buxton led a

deputation to the CO on 2 February 1905 to discuss wildlife
preservation in East Africa, the elephant problem was not
on the agenda.

Instead, Buxton criticized the colonial

administration for its failure to provide for an adequate
policing system in the country's game reserves, claiming
that if a sanctuary was worth establishing it was worth
spending "a little money1' to see that it was guarded
properly.

He also suggested the British government adopt

a policy "to prevent modern weapons getting into the hands
of the natives, on the ground of the claims of the
game...."29
Sir Alfred Sharpe, who originally had travelled to
Central Africa on a hunting expedition and later had
served as Commissioner of the British Central Africa Pro
tectorate, supported Buxton's view of the African hunters'
threat to wildlife by submitting a memorandum to the
deputation's delegates entitled "Slaughter by Natives."
The gist of Sharpe's report was that the indiscriminate
destruction of wild animals by African hunters could be
stopped ohly by the enforcement of a native gun tax, by
subjecting Africans to the same game regulations as
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Europeans, and by punishing all Africans found guilty of
30
shooting wildlife without licenses.
Even Alfred
Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, failed to
appreciate the elephant’s destructive feeding habits and
their impact on Uganda’s agricultural system.

In summa

rising the deputation's activities, he indicated that the
FPS's motives were ”to draw my attention to the necessity
of providing for the formation and effective working of
game reserves... and for the proper control of the pursuit
31'
of game by natives!’
In the absence of written records it is impossible to
determine African reaction to this policy of neglect.
Commissioner Sadler, however, dispatched a detailed report
to Lyttelton, reviewing the general state of game preser
vation in Uganda until the end of 1905 and demonstrating
the need for a more realistic elephant policy.

Among other

things, he rejected Buxton's notion that the country's game
reserves were only paper creations designed to calm public
opinion in England, and pointed out that since 1902 wild
life had increased and not a single species "was even
remotely threatened with extinction."

Sadler believed that

it was unnecessary to create an expensive policing system
in the reserves as their sanctity already was "fully re
spected."

With regard to Uganda’s elephants, Sadler

argued that in the Kingdoms of Toro, Ahkole, and Bxmyoro
their preservation was "a hardship to the people" and "a
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decided nuisance in the plantations.”

Moreover, he main

tained that in most areas the African required more pro
tection than the elephant.

Sadler concluded his comments

by reiterating Uganda* s basic ecological problem; namely,
"how to preserve the elephant, and at the same time pro
tect the cultivator whose crops he destroys.
Six months later Acting Commissioner O.A.J. Wilson
also advised the CO that the British government's philo
sophy of preserving Uganda's elephants at all costs had
placed the country’s African communities in an untenable
position:
I know there is much that can be put forward
in opposition to the absolute preservation
of Game and I am inclined to believe that the
movers in the policy having that object have
not acquired a full grasp of all affecting
circumstances. Otherwise it would almost
seem that a tenderness of feeling in this
particular direction is allowed to obscure
the senses to the happening of much actual
distress in another and more serious direction.
I have seen villages and plantations which
had just been devasted by elephants-and worse,
I have passed through districts where lives
of the native have been lost and those re
maining were in daily danger through the
outrageous agressions of these protected
beasts.33
The protestations of Sadler and Wilson caused the
British government and the FPS to consider the possibility
of a policy reevaluation.

When Edward Buxton led another

deputation to the CO on 15 June 1906 Lord Curzon, repre
senting the FPS, suggested that the views of those
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people who protested against the very existence of game
reserves "on agricultural grounds, on economical grounds,
on the grounds of protection for the natives, and on the
grounds of the depredations alleged to be committed by
the wild game" should be taken into consideration by
British policy-makers.34

Unfortunately, the delegates

failed to go beyond these generalities, and Uganda's
elephant problem remained a local issue.^
The colonial administration attempted to resolve the
issue by enacting a new Game Ordinance later in the year.
Among other things,- it increased license fees, an action
which undoubtedly limited the number of big game hunters
in Uganda.

The new regulations also provided financial

compensation for Africans whose crops were damaged or
destroyed by elephants.

Under this scheme the government

permitted chiefs to kill up to two marauding elephants
without a license.

An administration official then divided

the ivory between the chief, the government, and the shamba
owner, who also kept the carcasses.

36

Despite these concessions most Africans pot only con
tinued to resent the elephant but also their country's game
laws.

In January 1908

Six.

Hesketh Bell, Uganda's first

Governor, tried to reverse this situation by recommending
that "no considerations connected either with sport or
with the preservation of fauna should be allowed to weigh
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against the great hardships to which the natives of this
country are now being subjected."

As evidence he pointed

out that since 1905 elephants had killed or had severely
37
wounded 101 people in the Kingdoms of Toro and Buganda.
Bell also deplored the fact that an African whose shamba
was being ravaged by elephants was not allowed to shoot
them.

Rather:
He can only send to his chief, who is
empowered to act in such cases, and is
advised, in the meantime, to try to frighten
the animals off by shouting and beating drums.
The chief may take two or three days to reach
the spot, and by the time he arrives on the
scene the elephants are probably thirty or
forty miles off, and quite out of reach.
The subject is one that bristles with
difficulties, and...the animals are being
protected to such a degree that they are
devastating a populous and promising
country.

Lastly, Bell warned the CO that the seeming inability to
solve this vexing problem had exasperated several African
communities and "the representatives of the chiefs... Cwerel
so strong and frequent that action can no longer be de- ■.
layed."^
To forestall potential political trouble the colonial
administration enacted a policy later in the year whereby
it employed professional elephant hunters to "thin out"
the country's huge herds.

These hunters had to purchase

a special government license, entitling them to shoot ten
or twenty elephants and to keep fifty per cent of the ivory
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the remainder to be turned over to the colonial authorities.
According to G.H. Anderson, a noted big game hunter, this '
scheme caused all of the old elephant hunters of Kenya
and Uganda to come out of retirement "like a swarm of
bees around a honey-pot."

As was mentioned earlier,

however, many of the hunters killed only bulls carrying
heavy tusks and ignored the shamba-raiding elephants,
which usually were females or young males.

As a result,

the colonial government discontinued this policy and
temporarily abandoned its efforts to control the
marauding beasts.^O
By November 1909 economic exigencies forced Alexander
Boyle, Uganda's Acting Governor, to adopt a policy which
further increased the country's elephant herds.

The pro

blem stemmed from the fact that the British government's
grant-in-aid to Uganda had increased from j, 85,000 in
1907-8 to

h

103,262 in 1909-10.^

To help reduce the

country's dependence on the British taxpayer, Boyle pro
posed to amend the 1906 Game Ordinance by requiring
European sportsmen to purchase a special elephant license,
ranging in cost from 150 to 450 rupees.^

On

5

April 1910

the CO approved Boyle's recommendation and unwittingly
sacrificed African interests to increase revepue.43
Indeed, as the following figures indicate government
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earnings from game licenses dropped drastically because of
Boyle’s plan.
TABLE II45
1907-8
1908-9
1909-10

.£ 2,391
L 3,329
L 3,872

1910-11

(to the end of
November) L 1,450
(estimated)^ 2,100 ■

1911-12

There also was a noticeable reduction in the number of
big game hunters operating in Uganda.

Acting Governor

Stanley Tomkins believed many of them went to Kenya where
there was a "wider selection of game" and less expensive
licensing fees.

Moreover, Tomkins claimed that because

of this exodus the country’s elephants "have become still
more dangerous and destructive, and they are becoming •
bolder in approaching inhabited areas."

Faced with in

creased herds and decreased revenues the British govern
ment quickly acceded to Tomkin’s request to abolish the
1909 amendment.
In retrospect it seems incredible that the colonial
admin istration' remained committed to an elephant preservation
policy until after the First World War, especially in
view of the fact that African peasants produced eighty
AC

per cent of the country’s exports up to 1920. °

Yet as

late as 18 October 1913 Sir Frederick Jackson, then
Governor of Uganda, argued in favor of an international
agreement to protect the country’s e l e p h a n t s . P r i o r
to World War I this policy caused little damage to Uganda’s

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

overall economic output primarily because African shambas
usually were limited to a few acres.

After 1918, however,

this trend changed and Africans started "to grow larger
plantations, which they worked more intensely and on a
larger scale, so that they could no
frequent raids of

e l e p h a n t s . "48

longer endure the

Indeed, according to

Bruce Kinloch, who became Uganda’s Game Warden in 1950,
elephant raids on shambas had become "so serious and
widespread" by 1920 that the authorities were "forced to
take positive action to remedy the

s i t u a t i o n . "49

Actually by 1920 the colonial government already had
taken tentative steps to implement a more effective and
realistic elephant control policy.

From 1917 to 1921,

for example, it issued 20,328 rounds of ammunition to
African hunters, and from 1918 onward it empowered Distric
Commissioners to enlist the talents of European elephant
hunters to control the herds.

As payment, the administra

tion allowed these hunters to keep a percentage of the
ivory.

Although this scheme resulted in the destruction

of 3,992 elephants between 1917 and 1921 it failed to
achieve meaningful long-term results, largely because
the hunters once again only pursued bulls with heavy
ivory. 50

Many hunters also resorted to elaborate sub

terfuges to justify the killing of innocent elephants.
According to Keith Caldwell, a conservationist with wide
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experience in East Africa, when a "certain European”
discovered that elephants no longer were doing damage in
his district he paid an African to dig up roots in his
shamba and to stamp the ground with stuffed elephant feet
After the District Commissioner investigated this "attack*
he permitted the European to shoot two elephants per day
until the beasts retreated.^
The other factor that contributed to this plan's
ultimate collapse concerned the escapades of unskilled
African hunters who wounded substantial numbers of ele
phants* only to have the half-crazed
scores of villages.

beasts

te rro riz e

Many other indigenous hunters fre

quently used government-issued ammunition to kill other
game, hoping to sell the meat in their own communities or
in the European areas.

Like their European counterparts,

Africans too often ignored the shamba raiders, usually
females and young males, and concentrated on searching
for the big tuskers.

According to Charles Swynnerton, a

Tanganyika Game Department official who studied Uganda* s
elephant problem, this practice actually increased the
pressure on the country*s African farmers:
Shooting of this type broke up the herds,
the migrations and the feeding habits of the
elephants, and these, always moved greatly
when much shot at and now harried from pillar
to post, and getting no time for their
ordinary leisured feeding, turned to the
„
shambas as the means of readiest sustenance.
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In view of these shortcomings E.C. Eliot, the Acting
Governor, considered it advisable to convene a special
committee to investigate the matter and to submit a list
of recommendations as to the best means of resolving the
issue.

Consequently, a committee under the chairmanship

of P.W. Cooper, Provincial Commissioner of Western Province,
met in March 1922 to review Uganda's wildlife policy.
Among other things, it drew attention "to the spasmodic
and indefinite character" of the protective measures used
during the 1917-1921 period and pointed out that "there
are more elephants in Uganda at present time than ever
before...."

To rectify this situation the Cooper commit

tee recommended the adoption of a complex three-step pro
gram.

Under this scheme Uganda would be divided into

elephant and non-elephant areas and specially assembled
teams, financed by the government, then would drive all
the beasts into the latter zones.

Malingering or bellig

erent animals simply would be killed.

Any elephant that

returned to a restricted area would be regarded as vermin
and treated accordingly, with the ivory being shared
between the colonial administration and the hunter.

53

Unfortunately, E.B. Harvis, Deputy to the Governor, re
jected these proposals as being "financially impracti
cable

. " 5 4

When Uganda's Executive Council convened on

8

December
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it approved an alternate plan, formulated by

E.C. Eliot, the Acting Governor, whereby the government
would issue special licenses to "approved hunters", en
abling them to shoot up to twenty elephants.

To induce

these hunters to kill females and young males— the real
culprits— Eliot recommended the following for schedule:
I)

Shillings 50/-

For Every pair of
female tusks not ex
ceeding
lbs. or for
every pair of male
tusks not exceeding
40 lbs.
2 0

II)

Shillings 100/-....For every pair of female
tusks exceeding
lbs.
or for every pair of
male tusks exceeding
40 lbs. but not more
than 70 lbs.
2 0

Ill)

Shillings 150/-....For every pair of tusks
exceeding 70 lbs
. 5 5

On February 12, 1923 Sir Geoffrey Archer, a nephew
of Sir Frederick Jackson and a naturalist and sportsman
in his own right, arrived in Entebbe to assume the office
of Governor.

At his first Executive Council meeting

Archer branded the Eliot plan a "ghastly mistake" and
refused to authorize the issuance of special hunting li
censes, publicly, Archer justified his positiqn by saying
that:
Professional hunters would not concern them
selves with protecting shambas... but would
establish themselves, each and all, in the
main haunts of the elephaints throughout the
Protectorate. As one herd was stampeded by
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riflefire, it would arrive in a new locality
only to be fired at again by another him ter,
or party of hunters working together. And
in the end we should have the whole of the
elephant population in Uganda terrified and
crashing its way across country and doing
no end of damage in the course of a pricipitate flight from pillar to post.56
Privately, however, he doubted whether Uganda’s Executive
Council, comprised of the Chief Secretary, the Treasurer,
the Attorney-General, the Principal Medical Officer, and
several other office-bound administrators, "would have any
particular vision or useful idea as to how best to control
masses of wild animals.
Archer’s solution to this problem was to eliminate
the financial motive from elephant control.

Instead of

paying individual hunters according to the weight of ivory
Archer wanted to hire two full-time hunters— one for Toro
and one for Bunyoro— on an annual fixed salary of £> 600
plustravelling expenses.

As far as Buganda was concerned

he believed that because of the growing herds "the neces
sity of exterminating the elephants in that Province might
have to be faced."

Lastly, Archer suggested that the

colonial administration attempt to engage the services of
Charles Swynnerton, Tanganyika’s Game Warden, to supervise the operation.

58

When the Executive Council reconvened to consider
Archer’s plan on 20 April 1923 A. Hogg, the AttorneyGeneral, submitted that there was a danger of ivory being
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80
smuggled over the border by the men employed to kill ele
phants.

He therefore recommended that their compensation

should be a fixed salary plus a fixed reward for each ele
phant killed.

Archer retorted by saying that the smuggling

problem could be solved by granting a percentage of the
ivory's value to the Council, or Lukiko.

Archer maintained

that this would give all chiefs an interest in reporting
the killing of elephants and the activities of the govern
ment's hunters.

After this exchange the Council completely

reversed itself and agreed to employ five temporary full
time European hunters on a fixed salary of 1000 shillings
per month. Archer wanted the three additional hunters post
ed to the Masaka District, the Mubendi District and the
counties of Bulemezi and Buruli, all in the Kingdom of
Buganda.

Finally, the council decided to postpone the im

plementation of this scheme until Swynnerton had arrived
cq

to supervise its operation.
Archer further elaborated on his plan when he dis
patched a report of these meetings to the CO on 30 April
1923.

Like Sir James Hayes-Sadler, Archer believed that

the colonial government's primary responsibility was to
provide "adequate protection of cultivation" in African
areas and to ensure the continued existence of at least
some of Uganda's elephants.

With regard to the first

objective Archer opined that it was logistically impossible
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for the administration to assume the task of safeguarding
crops in the country's remoter areas.

He therefore sug

gested that "the inhabitants of those areas should be in
duced to move to the settled and closely cultivated
districts where they can be given protection and can, at
the same time, be brought under better administrative con
trol."

As far as elephant preservation was concerned,

Archer maintained that "there must be no conflict in the
hunter's mind of financial gain versus an adequate dis
charge of duty."

By employing hunters on a fixed wage

Archer believed that it would be financially immaterial
to the individual hunter whether he shot two elephants at
a time or twenty.

He ended his report by pointing out

that:
If, eventually certain herds of elephants
in thickly populated and cultivated areas
were found impossible to control and im
possible to move forward into an area where
they could do no harm, there will then be
no alternative but to exterminate them.
Unfortunately, by the end of April dozens of pro
fessional European elephant hunters already had arrived
in Kampala from all over Africa— particularly South Africa
and Kenya— hoping to participate in the Eliot percentage
plan.

When the hunters learned of Archer's scheme they

charged that they had been "misled and ruined!' by the
colonial administration's premature announcement in the
30 December 1922 issue of the Uganda Gazette of the special
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license project, and demanded a personal interview with
the Governor.

Archer consented, and,when a deputation

arrived at Government House,he spoke to them "frankly as
one hunter to another'' and opened the interview by saying
that they knew as well as he did that Eliot's idea was
prescription for disaster.

Captain Roy Salmon responded

to Archer's frankness by- admitting that the Eliot plan
"was the elephant hunters' dream come true."

Indeed,

Archer believed that men like Salmon "stood to make very
easily in the course of a few months several thousands of
pounds after paying all expenses."

Under the circum

stances , however, Archer offered to see to it that they
suffered "no financial loss" in getting to and from Uganda.
This concession satisfied the hunters and the meeting adfil
j o u m e d in a relatively amiable atmosphere.OJOn 25 September 1923 Charles Swynnerton arrived in
Entebbe "to render advice as to the control of the ele
phants."

After visiting Masindi and Fort Portal,

Swynnerton proceeded to the tiny government hill station
at Mubende in the Kingdom of Buganda— where the colonial
administration maintained a bungalow for the Governor's
personal use— to participate in a conference between Archer
and several professional European elephant hunters, in
cluding Pete Pearson and Captain Roy

S a l m o n . ^

After dis

cussing all aspects of the elephant problem, the conference
decided to engage the services of six European hunters to
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form a Government Elephant Control Staff.

Because of the

potential hazards involved, their terms of appointment were
fairly liberal:

1

) they were to be regarded as full-time

government employees, and their pay was fixed at £ 600 per
annum (the same as that of a District Commissioner); 2) the
government would provide each hunter with a box-car to
sleep in while in the field, and would pay the normal mile
age allowance for patrol; and 3) the government also would
lend each hunter two D.B. Cordite Rifles, one for his own
use and one for his gun-bearer.
As to actual strategy the conference formulated a very
simple plan in which the Elephant Control Staff would study
and plot the movements of the country’s herds.

Uganda then

would be divided into six elephant zones, maps would be
printed, and herd movements would be telegraphed from one
Control Officer to another so that necessary preparations
could be made to drive them back into less populated areas.
The conference hoped that this policy ultimately would stop
seasonal elephant migrations into the country’s cultivated
regions and justify the destruction of all shamba raiders,
whether male or female, with or without tusks.

To prevent

possible financial speculation or unnecessary shooting, all
ivory from these beasts automatically belonged to the govgq
ernment.
On

6

November 1923 Swynnerton submitted his report to

the colonial authorities on his month-long fact finding
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mission.

To help explain the historical development of

Uganda's burgeoning elephant herds, he solicited the views
of the Katikiro, or Prime Minister, of Buganda, Sir Apolo
Kagwa, a man whose country had suffered tremendously from
the ravages of these beasts.

According to Kagwa:

before the Europeans came the elephants
were far less troublesome because, firstly,
the population was more concentrated,
secondly, the elephants were hunted down
remorselessly when they appeared near
cultivation.
As the religious wars of the late 1880s scattered
the human population of Buganda and neighboring areas and
the colonial administration enacted strict wildlife pre
servation laws, the elephant herds grew at an alarming
rate.

Indeed, Swynnerton warned the government that

Uganda's elephant population— which he estimated to be
somewhere tinder 30,000— would double in the next thirty
years, despite the fact that

1 , 0 0 0

head would be killed

annually by man and one half the yearly progeny would be
lost to natural causes.

In other words, unless the colo

nial administration immediately adopted strict control
laws Uganda probably would be taken over by hordes of
hungry elephantsI
To prevent this catastrophe Swynnerton suggested the
adoption of a policy that strongly reflected the Mubende
Conference's recommendations.

According to his proposals,

which in fact formed the basis of Uganda's elephant control
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policy until the outbreak of the Second World War:
I)

It should be the policy to encourage
reasonable concentration on the part
of the natives. Outlying villages
cannot be protected and in every dis
trict liable to elephant attacks
defensible areas or patches of denser
settlement should be selected, and
the villages scattered over the country
outside these areas be informed that :
these are areas which are to receive
protection from the elephant and that
if they remain outside them it will be
at their own risk.

II)

The present wish for 'mailos' (square
miles) has been suggested as a difficulty.
It would be well to give out none except
in the areas to be protected, whether or
not it may be advisable that any should
be given in these areas in lieu of mailos
that fall outside them (mailos land was
held by Buganda's Lukiko) .

Ill)

Under this scheme the country will become
divided into cultivated areas, especially
selected and specially protected from
elephants, which could for the most part,
be the 'tribal areas' of the future;
elephant reserves well selected and
specially protected against all shootings;
and buffer or sportsmen's areas-eventual
'crown areas', perhaps-which will not be
specially selected but will comprise the
rest of the country, in these, ordinary
shooting under license will take place;
but unless on their margins, they will
not be the scene of any special operations
against the elephants. The protected
areas generally should be well selected
and neither by over -numerous nor their
villages unduly scattered. The elephant
should be taught once more to associate
cultivation with danger. ^

On March 17, 1924 Governor Archer informed the CO that
Swynnerton* s report was "in complete agreement with the
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views I have formed."

He also reported that for the pre

sent four salaried European hunters— to be known as Game
Rangers— were sufficient to control Uganda's marauding
elephants.

Under this arrangement one hunter would be

stationed at Fort Portal to deal with the Toro herds, one
at Mubende to watch over the herds in Mengo and in Mubende
districts of Buganda, one at Masindi to control the ele
phants in Bunyoro, and in Masaka.

Archer also believed

that the appointment of a full-time Game Warden was "a
most urgent necessity.

" 6 6

Within three months of this

dispatch, Archer had hired four Game Rangers— Captain
Roy Salmon, F.G. Banks, P.C. Pearson, and Captain C.D.K.
Palmer Kerrison— and had approved the employment of a
"certain number" of trained African hunters to work with
each of them.67
Thus,by the middle of 1924 Governor Archer had
succeeded in laying the foundation of Uganda's Game De
partment.

In December Keith Caldwell, then Kenya's deputy

Game Warden, arrived in Entebbe

to organize the Depart

ment's administration, but was recalled after only three
weeks for duty with the Royal Safari of the Duke and
Duchess of York.

Although Archer appointed Charles Pitman

an experienced big game hunter and a knowledgeable natural
ist, to the post of Acting Game Warden on 25 February 1925
Caldwell's departure postponed the Department's operating
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capabilities for four

m on t h s .

^ 8

This delay caused at

least one outraged citizen to send an anonymous letter to
the Uganda Herald*s editor supporting the non-existent
Game Department and criticizing the hapless African hunters
It seems about time something was done regarding
the Elephant question here. . . .There is no
doubt that in some districts the whple show
is being run, not by the white hunters, but
by black ones. These brave fellows who get
high wages, are given rifles, plenty of am
munition and then simply let loose to kill
*ad lib.'
No doubt they do kill some elephants, but how
many do they wound, how many head of other
game do they shoot and how many shillings a
month to they make extra out of selling
the meat?. . . .Again, how many of the
elephants they do kill, were shot because
they did damage to native crops, or because
they strayed beyond their reserves?, . . .
The only sound scheme is to leave the whole
show in the hands of capable European hunters
employing natives as scouts only. . . .if
they go on as they are at present the
general opinion is that (1) Most of the game
in Uganda will be gradually exterminated
(2) There will be a lot more Europeans and
Natives charged at sight (3) The very few
decent Tuskers left will soon be fewer
still. . . .69
Uganda's Game Department finally came info being on
26 September 1925 when Caldwell— having finished his ad
visory assignment-formally turned over the office of Game
Warden to Charles Pitman.^0

By this time the wildlife

situation had deteriorated so dramatically that "nearly
75 per cent of Uganda was occupied by elephants."

For

Pitman to resolve this issue, without eradicating all the
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ss
herds in the process, was in itself a major challenge
"which had to be dealt with before general wildlife conservation measures could be considered.

"71

Unfortunately,

public and private opinion hampered Pitman*s efforts to
create a more realistic balance between man and animal by
treating the Game Department as a Cinderella operation.
Indeed, as late as June 1931 the Uganda News published an
article declaring that "The starting of *stunt* departments
has been the greatest scandal in Uganda in recent years.
Game Rangers where there is no game!"^
According to Bruce Kinloch, the colonial administra
tion further hindered Pitman by requiring yearly demonstra
tions that the Game Department "was not a drain on the ex
chequer but, on the contrary, more than paid its way
through the revenue obtained from the sale of control
ivory and hunting l icenses. n/3

Even Pitman realized at'

the time of his appointment that "with elephants roaming
the

countryside, an indigenous, steadily increasing popu

lation of some three million, together with the space
available for the wild life...dwindling and contracting,"
it was going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to restore a proper balance of nature. ^

In such an at

mosphere Pitman somehow had "to prevent the large game
animals from becoming a nuisance and thereby unpopular
with the general public."^
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Governor
Archer already had determined that the only
.
a

way to prevent elephants from raiding African shambas and
European plantations was to kill them.

Archer's successors

maintained this policy and, as Game Warden, Pitman there
fore was committed to a massive extermination campaign.
Privately, however, Pitman voiced considerable doubts as
to this strategy's long term effectiveness:
In 'control' operations elephants can be
satisfactorily harried only to a limited
extent. Once this limit is exceeded
'control' will defeat its object by dispers
ing herds,, often scattering them far and
wide, to exert increasing pressure on
cultivation and settlement hitherto free
from depredation. At the same time there
could be no deviation from the avowed
object of 'control', to protect the lives
and property of the local inhabitants...."7°
On another occassion he claimed that the control policy
was unlikely to check the elephant population growth.77
In view of these reservations Pitman and his Game
Rangers initially attempted to implement a modified
version of the Archer scheme so as to preserve as much
wildlife as possible.

Under this plan when elephants

attacked a shamba or a plantation the Game Department
would shoot one of the marauders and, if the herd moved
away, leave the rest alone.

This tactic repeatedly failed

because the elephants in question— or possibly another
herd altogether— quickly returned to resume feeding.
a result Pitman reluctantly decided to adopt Archer's
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policy and to deal with Uganda's elephants "in drastic
fashion."78
Pitman ordered the Game Department to try to confine
the herds to their traditional breeding grounds or to un
inhabited areas, which fortunately often coincided with
localities closed to human settlement because of the pre
sence of sleeping sickness.

In these regions elephants

would be free to roam at will, while those found in other
parts of the country would be shot on sight so as to con
vince their compatriots to associate cultivated areas "in
.their minds with danger to themselves."79

Pitman hoped

that this "system of defensive fronts" would prevent ele
phants from encroaching of Uganda's settled areas.

In his

first report in 1925 Pitman pointed out that these "defen
sive fronts" would vary greatly according to local circum
stances.

In Bunyoro, for example, the front measured 150

miles, while in Toro, where there were several small breed
ing grounds, the elephants were contained by a series of
mini-fronts.80
As far as actual wildlife preservation was concerned,
the Game Department remained committed in principle to the
game reserve concept enunciated by Sir Harry Johnston in
1900.

Pitman, however, effected a significant? change

whereby the country wildlife sanctuaries were.divided into
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three classes:
I)
II)

Ill)

Of considerable extent and permanent
in nature.
Of lesser extent, for the purpose of
a) Absolutely protecting some rare
species
b) Protecting a variety of interesting
fauna in an area where the game would
otherwise be rapidly wiped out.
Of a temporary nature, for the purpose
of enabling game to recover its numbers
in certain areas, or, in order to ex
tend protection to any species which
shows a tendency to decrease.

Pitman believed that this flexible approach not only would
preserve a modicum of wildlife— including elephants— but
also eventually would persuade the colonial government to
extend the size of the reserves.

Regrettably, it never

occurred to Pitman or to anyone else in the Game Depart
ment that the policies of game preservation and of ele
phant control w^re incompatible and would conflict with
each other throughout the early 1930s. ^
Initially, however, it appeared as though Pitman’s
dual policy would be a complete success.

At the Provincial

Commissioners Conference held at Entebbe in June 1925 the
delegates expressed their "appreciation" to the authorities
for deciding to create a Game Department to inclement an
elephant control policy.

Moreover, by the end of the year

the Game Department reported that it had killed 587 ele
phants on control operations and that
From all districts where the Game Rangers
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and their staffs have been operating
reports have testified to the success of
the methods employed, and a decided check
has been put on shamba d e s t r u c t i o n . ^
Even as late as 1927 the Department claimed that it had
made "marked progress" and that all control areas had
announced "a dimunition of damage done by elephants and
a falling off in the number of complaints.
Notwithstanding the Game Department's initial optimism,
the plan ultimately failed and the Second African Game
Conference— held at Mombasa from 11 to 15 January 1927—

!

concluded that apart from wildlife preservatiph the most
serious ecological problem that confronted East Africa in.
general and Uganda in particular was elephant control.®^
The reasons for this debacle are as varied as Uganda's
landscape.

In Toro District, for example, impenetrable

swamps and dense elephant grass, often reaching heights of
fifteen to twenty feet, formed an ideal cover for large
herds of

e le p h a n ts .^

Even after the CO had approved a

project on 13 December 1928 whereby the colonial adminis
tration paid European planters in Toro L

8

for each twenty

elephants shot, F.G. Banks, the region's Game Ranger, re
ported in 1931 that "his herds were increasing and that
the killing had to be accelerated

. " 8 6

Although the Game

Department advised Banks to encourage his African staff
to attack the elephants on "every possible occasion," the
Toro herds continued to increase.^7

To bring the situation
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under control Captain Roy Salmon, Acting Game Warden for
Pitman, who had been seconded to Southern Rhodesia, de
vised the "Toro Special Elephant Scheme," to license six
European hunters for six months to shoot up to 100 elephants
each.

8 8

By.mid-April 1933 these hunters had succeeded in

killing 419 shamba raiders, but Banks remained pessimistic.
In his official report he maintained that although some
herds indeed had been reduced the scheme*s general impact
was "scarcely noticeable."89

In 1934 even the Game Depart

ment admitted that:
In spite of heavy elephant shooting and some
consequent reduction during the last twelve
years or more, elephants are still too plenti
ful in Toro where they have good protection
in the numerous swamps and dense jungles.
On a broader scale the circumstances were just as
disappointing.

In 1935, for example, Charles Pitman re

vealed that with the exception of Uganda*s Eastern Province,
control measures were "still necessary in nearly every dis
trict throughout the country"despite the fact that approx
imately 14,000 elephants had been killed since the adoption
of the Archer strategy.^

The following year he disclosed

that for every elephant killed it almost seemed as if two
mysteriously appeared to replace i t . ^

By 1937 an exas

perated Pitman dropped all pretense and declared flatly
that "The outstanding feature of the elephant situation
is the abundance of elephants."93
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In addition to these practical considerations, offi
cial indifference and even outright hostility toward the
Game Department also contributed to the failure of Archer*s
elephant control scheme.

According to Pitman's successor,

Bruce Kinloch, inadequate financing was a continual prob
lem:
The Game...Department had long been one of the
major sufferers from this scarcity of funds;
it was the "Cinderella* of the government
departments, and its annual 'slice* of the
budget *cake' had always been the smallest....
From its inception the Department had had
view that its
As a result of this parsimony, the Game Department had

to 1

rely heavily upon the voluntary assistance of the European
officers of the King's African Rifle's 4th Battalion in
many of its control operations in Buruli, Bulemezi, and
Entebbe District throughout the 1925-1935 period.^5

^t

times, even European administrative officers assisted the
department by filling in as Game Rangers from time to time.
In the 1930s, for example, Rennie Bere, who later became
Director and Chief Warden of the Uganda National Parks,
reported that as an Assistant District Commissioner he
rarely missed the opportunity to shoot marauding

e le p h a n ts .96

Aside from these economic difficulties, personnel
shortages continually plagued the Game Department.

Rinder

pest control operations, for example, repeatedly forced
Pitman to divert African Game Guards from their normal duties
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to assist in killing cattle and wild animals suspected of
97
carrying the disease.
The economic recession of the
early 1930s compelled the colonial government to order
substantial European and African staff reductions. Accord
ingly, in 1932 the Department functioned with only one
European field officer and fifteen African Game Guards.98
Even as late as 1949 Kinloch complained that for the whole
country— an area the size of the British Isles— there was
a total field force of only two permanent European Game
Rangers, forty-four African Game Guards, eight African

j

Game Scouts, and seven African gun-bearers.^9
Another factor that impeded the solution of Uganda's
elephant problem was the existence and eventual prolifera
tion of the country's game reserves.

As early as 1931 the

Game Department noted that it was "a well -established fact
that wild elephants, running adjacent to cultivation, per
sist in garden raiding...."100

But despite the damage

caused by these "reserve" elephants there never was an
official movement to abolish Uganda's wildlife sanctuaries.
Indeed, given the British government's philosophical and
political committment to game preservation it is most un
likely that the colonial administration could have adopted
such a policy, no matter what the circumstances.
The existence of a small but growing and increasingly
profitable tourist industry also prevented the abolition
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of the country's game reserves.

At the end of 1928, for

example, the Uganda Railway had commenced special fort
nightly game viewing excursions between December and April
to the Murchison Falls— a scenic area in the Victoria Nile
just above Lake Albert— by the luxurious river steamer
S.W. Lugard from Butiaba via Lake Kyoga. -*-01 These trips
were extremely popular and, according to Charles Pitman,
quite exciting:
The river is entered at such an hour as to
make the journey to the Falls (approximately
thirty miles as the stream winds) by daylight,
and immediately as one leaves the lake the
pageant of nature begins....Elephants are
nearly always feeding amongst the islands
of the delta and at the edge of the Gulu
(right) bank, alongside which the main
channel flows....About two hours later the
head of the delta is reached; here the main
stream is entered and one's advent is welcomed
by a couple of hundred of hippopotami....Thence
onwards excitement increases to fever pitch:
elephants swarm on either side; hippopotami
become more and more numerous; crocidiles in
hundreds fringe the banks...and various an
telopes. .. feed in leisurely fashion.' Baboons
with rancous bark...voice their resentment at
the intrusion of their domain, while timid...
colobus monkeys are seen on either bank....In
the earlier hours...both buffaloes and lions
have been observed from the s t r e a m e r . ^
In addition to the revenue from these tourist excur
sions, the colonial treasury also earned a large income
from the sale of hunting licenses, despite the fact that
Kenya and Tanganyika were more popular with European sportsment.

From 1925 to 1935, for example, these monies amounted

to fc 43,741, certainly a welcome sum for a financially
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starved

administration.

This industry obviously depend

ed solely upon the existence of relatively large herds of
wild animals, including elephants; the only way to guaran
tee their future preservation was by the maintenance of
extensive game reserves.

Thus by 1935 there were five re

serves in Uganda as opposed to two in 1900.

They included

the Bunyoro and Gulu, 1800 square miles; Toro, 200 square miles
Lake George, 266 square miles; Lake Edward, 216 square
miles; and Damba— an island— twelve square miles. 104- As
was mentioned earlier, however, these sanctuaries all but
ensured the failure of the Game Department's elephant con
trol scheme.

So, unable to abandon either policy complete

ly, the colonial administration pursued the difficult
course of attempting to preserve wildlife and to control
the country's elephants for the sake of economic develop
ment until well after the conclusion of the Second World
War.
According to Alistar Graham, Uganda's elephant prob
lem stemmed not so much from the Game Department's in
ability to implement this dual policy successfully as from
its gross lack of scientific expertise regarding wildlife.
Among other things, he has pointed out that half the Game
Rangers employed between 1924 and 1939 "sported military
rank" and possessed little or no scientific training.

As

a result control operations were organized "along the lines
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of a military campaign" without the slightest reference to
ecological principles.

Indeed, Graham has accused Pitman

and his Game Rangers of viewing Uganda's elephants as
nothing more than a "horde of hostile barbarians" to be
destroyed wherever and whenever they attacked human settle
ments .
More importantly, however, Graham has maintained that
Pitman totally misrepresented and misunderstood the very
nature of Uganda’s elephant problem.

In Graham's view,

Pitman, as well as Charles Swynnerton, utterly failed to
appreciate the true size of the country*s herds.

Their

calculations were based on guesses "arrived at by driving
about from place to place for a while, judging what they
saw of the elephants according to whether they thought them
'a lot' or *a few'."

Because of this unscientific and

highly impressionistic method of counting, Swynnerton reck
oned Uganda's elephants at approximately 30,000 while
Pitman believed they numbered only about 20,000; the actual
figure, according to Graham, was closer to 50,000.106

Con

sequently, as an expanding human population squeezed the
elephants into smaller and smaller areas Pitman presumed
that the control scheme was ineffective because the herds
appeared to be increasing!

He therefore ordered the de

struction of more and more elephants at a time when the
herds were dangerously low.

Graham has claimed that this
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misguided policy reduced the elephant*s range from seventyfive per cent in 1924 to less than thirteen per cent in 1973 107
Graham*s analysis— which he also has applied to Kenya
and to Tanganyika— has been unpopular with many former
Game Department officials.

Nevertheless, his theories have

gained a degree of public acceptance, possibly because they
can be used as further evidence to condemn East Africa's
colonial period.

In all fairness to Graham, however, it

should be pointed out that his commentary contains some
good points regarding the necessity for a greater knowledge
and understanding of wildlife in general and the elephant
in particular.

But, because of a lack of historical per

spective, many of his accusations and conclusions are
overstated and unfair.
For example, the fact that so many of East Africa's
pre-World War II Game Department officials had military
backgrounds with little or no scientific training indicates
more than a mere lack of administrative concern or commitment to wildlife control and preservation.

Living condi

tions in East Africa were extremely harsh and adequate
transportation facilities were, for the most part, non
existent.

In such an environment adequate field perfor

mance obviously required individuals who possessed tremen
dous physical strength and stamina.

Military men were a

natural,, and perhaps necessary, choice.

Kinloch further
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explained the relative lack of trained personnel and uni
versity graduates in East Africa's Game Departments by
revealing that:
People joined the Game and Fisheries Department
not for financial reward— which was small— nor
for the chances of advancement--which were
virtually non-existent-.-but for their interest
in wildlife and the relative freedom of the
life that it offered.
Given these circumstances it is surprising that men like
Arthur Ritchie and Charles Swynnerton, both of whom had
university training, devoted their careers to the preser
vation of East Africa's wildlife.
With regard to Graham's allegation that Pitman and
Swynnerton failed to calculate properly the size of Uganda's
elephant herds--thereby precipitating their excessive de
struction— it must be remembered that personnel shortages
and, more importantly, the fact that Pitman operated with
out departmental transport of any kind until 1950, made it
impossible to procure an accurate census.

Even as late as

1965-66 R.M. Laws, I.S.C. Parker, and R.C.B. Johnstone—
all of whom conducted scientific research for the Nuffield
Unit of Tropical Animal Ecology in North Bunypro— experi
enced difficulty in counting Uganda's elephants.

After

more than a hundred routine observation flights and three
complete aerial surveys, they reported mathmatical errors
of up to 27.9 per cent.^®^

For Graham to expect one man,

operating on foot and horseback, to make a precise estimate
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of all of Uganda's elephants was both unfair and unrealis
tic.
The same can be said of Graham's accusation that the
Game Department unnecessarily hunted the country's elephants
to the brink of extinction.

As long as these beasts con

tinued to raid shambas and plantations Pitman had to kill
them.

To have done otherwise would have placed the inter

ests of animals above those of man; this would not have
been tolerated by Uganda's African or European communities.
Indeed, it was this realization that convinced Pitman as
well as Ritchie and others that inviolable national parks
were needed if any of East Africa's wildlife was to survive
the hustle and bustle of the twentieth century.

Unfortu

nately, a combination of official apathy and public appre
hension toward such parks postponed their creation until
the post-World War II era.
Another of Graham's weaknesses was his unshakable be
lief in the ability of science and rationalism to solve all
of East Africa's ecological problems.

Although science un

doubtedly has contributed significantly to the cause of
wildlife preservation, history clearly demonstrates that
it is not a pancea.

In Tanganyika, for example, Swynnerton

worked for years to demonstrate that the spread of sleeping
sickness could not be stopped by the systematic extermina
tion of wild animals.

Using all the scientific knowledge
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at his disposal he eventually succeeded and saved countless
thousands of innocent beasts from certain destruction.

But,

as will be shown in the following chapter, science utterly
failed to create a peaceful balance between man and animal;
by the end of the Second World War the need for national
parks in Tanganyika was as great as in Kenya and Uganda.
In summary, therefore, the 1895-1939 period in Uganda
was a time of experimentation for the colonial administra
tion in general and the Game Department in particular.
Unfortunately, all attempts to implement an ecologically
sound and politically acceptable wildlife preservation
policy failed, causing many anti-fauna elements to demand
the eradication of the country’s elephant herds for the
sake of economic development.

Pitman countered this argu

ment by supporting the national park concept, which theo
retically would create an atmosphere where man and animal
could live side by side in relative peace and harmony.
Ironically, subsequent events failed to justify Pitman's
faith in the ability of national parks to resplve Uganda's
elephant problem.
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CHAPTER III

TANGANYIKA:

THE TSETSE FLY AND- GAME PRESERVATION

The overwhelming feature in the study of wildlife
preservation in Tanganyika during the British period
was the presence of the tsetse fly.

Historically, this

harmless looking insect not only had endangered the
future survival of the country* s fauna but also its
human population.

More importantly, its existence in any

given area generally has meant the absence of domestic
animals, especially cattle.

Thus, unlike the ecological

conflict in Kenya and Uganda, where wild animals battled
man for control of the land and its resources, Tanganyika
was confronted with a situation in which the tsetse
menace severely restricted all human activity.

In an

effort to resolve this problem, many European and African
land-owners demanded the eradication of the country's
fauna, which supposedly carried fatal diseases between
the fly and man and his domestic animals.

Fortunately, a

small group of wildlife enthusiasts, led by Charles
Swynnerton, Tanganyika's Game Warder, resisted this
press tire, and eventually proved that the destruction
of the country's wild animals would not prevent the
tsetse fly from spreading diseases.

Despite these

successes, Tanganyika's wildlife continued to disappear
at an alarming rate, and by 1945 it was evident that
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only a comprehensive national park system could
guarantee a relatively harmonious relationship between
man and animal.
Tanganyika is 364,943 square miles (including
the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar), or more than three
times the area of Great Britain. It is bounded on three
sides by a host of other countries, including Kenya,
Uganda, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, Burundi,
and Ruanda. To the east lies the Indian Ocean, the
country’s outlet to the world. The Great Rift Valley’s
eastern arm cuts through Tanganyika, dividing it into
five natural geographic regions. According to John Iliffe,
Fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge, these areas—
the western plateau, the northwest, the southern high
lands, the southeast, and the northeast— are the com
ponent parts of an ecological system that has dictated
much of the country's political, social, and economic
history.
Tanganyika’s wildlife is as varied as that of
Kenya, with more than 140 species of mammals still
inhabiting the country’s open grasslands, woodlands and
bush, and forests.

On the plains' the most commonly

found animals are the wildebeest, hartebeest, topi,
eland, and Thomson's and Grant’s gazelle. With the
exception of the massive eland, which can weigh up to
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a ton, all of these species fall prey to lions.
Tanganyika's woodlands and bush areas contain a wide
variety of wildlife, ranging from the stately giraffe
to the repulsive warthog.

The elephant, rhinoceros,

buffalo, and bongo usually confine their activities
to the country's comparatively lush forests.
Like their counterparts in Kenya, Tanganyika's
fauna had to cope with the presence of a European
settler community, which by 1948 amounted to 11,300.3
Although many of these settlers were just as destructive
as their northern neighbors, the main threat to the
country's wildlife came not from the Europeans, or even
from the more numerous Africans, but rather from a
unique combination of ecological factors that threatened
man and animal alike.
the more

Im p o r ta n t

In relation to this study, two of

characteristics of Tanganyika's eco

system were the comparative lack of adequate water supplies
and the presence of the tsetse fly, a long snouted, folded
wing insect that bears an uncanny resemblance to the common
housefly.
As late as 1953-55 the East Africa Royal Commission—
which was appointed "to examine measures necessary to be
taken to achieve an improved standard of living"— concluded
that only one-third of Tanganyika possessed the water re
sources necessary for an unintensive type of pastoralism.
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It also placed vast areas of the country's western
and southern regions into a marginal category between
pastoral and arable zones.^ These factors, along with
the damage caused by the tsetse fly, not only restricted
Tanganyika*s economic growth but also forced five-sixths
of its human population and hundreds of thousands of
wild animals into one-sixth of its land area.^ As far
as wildlife preservation was concerned, the tsetse fly*s
depredations provided justification for those Europeans
and Africans who believed that Tanganyika* s social and
economic development depended upon the eradication of
all wild animals.
Tsetse are blood-sucking flies which are found
over a 4.25 million-square-mile area of tropical Africa,
beginning south of the Gambia River in West Africa,
continuing eastward across the southern portions of the
Niger River into Central Africa, and proceeding onward
to East Africa’s grasslands. They form the genus
Glossina, a name which refers to the proboscis located
on the front of the insect’s head. There are thirty-four
species' and sub-species * and the races of tsetse and the name
of each class usually is prefixed by the letter **G",.
C

the abbreviation for Glossina.

In Tanganyika there are

eight species of tsetse: G. Morsitans, G. Swynnertoni,
G. Pallidipes, G. Austeni, G. Palpalis, G. Brevipalpis,
G. Fuscipleuris, and G. Longpennis.^
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The trypanosomes which tsetse flies carry and
transmit to other living organisms belong to the sub
kingdom of microscopic unicellular organisms known as
protozoa, and are slender and elongated in appearance
with a flagellum at the anterior end. Although trypan
osomes live as parasites in fish, reptiles, birds, and
mammals, this discussion will be limited to those
species which occur in man, domestic animals, and wild
life. The length of such species is approximately the
same as that of 1.5 to 3.5 human red blood cells, and the
disease caused by these organisms usually is referred
to as trypanosomiases, or in humans as sleeping sickness
and in domestic animals as nagana.
The tsetse feeds solely on blood and is quite
harmless when it hatches from the pupa. If, however,
the fly feeds on a host infected with trypanosomes—
usually a wild mammal— it can become infected and can
transmit the organism to man, domestic animals, or
other wild animals. Two species of trypanosomes, the
T. Gambierise and the T. Rhodesiense, cause trypanosomiases,
or sleeping sickness, while three other species— T.
Brucei, T. Vivax, and T. Con go lens e— are responsible for
most of the nagana in cattle and in horses. The naganaproducing trypanosomes cannot affect humans; they are
carried solely by wild animals, which act as a reservoir
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for an illness which does not affect them.

S

Indeed,

trypanosomes pathogenic to domestic livestock have been
identified in more than thirty species of wild mammals.
These trypanosomes usually are transmitted when a
tsetse fly is interupted in a meal on an infected host
and transfers its attention to a healthy animal in the
9
same herd or another herd altogether.
In man the disease develops slowly but steadily,
beginning with an inflammation at the site of the tsetse
bite. For the next two years the victim may experience
a wide variety of symptoms, including headaches, fever,
insomnia, daytime drowsiness, irregular body rashes,
muscular cramps, swollen glands, and neurological pains.
After this incubation period, the patient usually
suffers from a fever and a fast pulse-rate accompanied
by severe sweating, especially at night. Insomnia and
daytime drowsiness also increase, and malnutrition
eventually ensues because the sleeplessness becomes so
overpowering that the victim stops eating. His general
health steadily disintegrates until he becomes comatose
and dies.^® The fatality rates are frighteningly high.
In Uganda's Busoga Province, for example, approximately
2 0 0 , 0 0 0

people, or about two-thirds of the population,

died as a result of a 1902-05 epidemic.^
In its most acute form nagana strikes more quickly
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than sleeping sickness and usually causes death in animals
within a matter of weeks.

According to V.S. Leese, a

Veterinary Officer in Kenya's colonial service, cattle
are particularly susceptible to the disease and develop
the following symptoms shortly after a tsetse attack:
He grazes poorly, fitfully, or not at all;
but may eat rations well. His flanks fall
in, the head and neck droop a little, he
stands about listlessly and a slight watery
discharge runs from the eyes....Temperature
generally between 98.5 and 103F in the morning
and 102 to 106F in the evening. Cows in calf
as a rule abort, of if in milk, go dry. There
is frequently nothing very definite beyond
the symptoms of fever... .The end is often
hastened by complications such as broncho
pneumonia or oedema of the lungs, or death
may occur.suddenly in the night or on the
march....
In view of these circumstances, it hardly is surpris
ing that laymen spoke of nagana as if it were a biblical
plague.

In 1850, for example, Roualeyn Gordon Cumming, a

Scottish big game hunter who spent most of the 1840s in
southern Africa, horrified England with an account of his
experiences in the Limpopo lowlands north of Transvaal:
I met with the famous fly called 'tsetse*,
whose bite is certain death to oxen and
horses...; they are very quick and active,
and storm a horse like a swarm of bees,
alighting on him in hundreds and drinking
his blood.^3
Even though Cumming quickly fled from the fly area, all
his stock developed nagana.

"The cattle presented a woe

ful appearance", he wrote; "listless and powerless, they
cared not to feed, and, though the grass covered the
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country with the richest and most luxiriant pasturage,
their sides remained hollow, and their whole bodies became
daily more emaciated; the eyes also of many of them were
closed and swollen.
Although the lack of reliable records makes it diffi
cult, if not impossible, to determine the fatality rate
among domestic animals, T.A.M. Nash, former Director of
the West African Institute for Trypanosomiasis Reserach
in Kaduma, Nigeria, has claimed that nagana has been re
sponsible for the death of "hundreds of thousands of do
mestic

animals.

"1^

In a country like Tanganyika— where

so many people were engaged in pastoral pursuits— the
presence of this disease obviously had catastrophic polit
ical, social, and economic implications.
In the Kimbu country of western Tanganyika, for ex
ample, the tsetse.fly made it "virtually impossible to
keep any livestock other than a few chickens and

doves.

"16

This not only isolated the Kimbu from neighboring farm
communities but also prevented them from starting large
scale farms of their own.

The Kimbu therefore gradually

developed into smaller and smaller villages to survive,
which in turn contributed to the general proliferation of
loosely federated, quasi-independent chiefdoms, many of
which were politically impotent and militarily

weak.

17

In other areas the disease's inpact was even more
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serious.

According to Richard Burton, the noted nineteenth

century explorer, central Tanganyika enjoyed a relatively
prosperous economy during the 1850s:
The land of the Moon, which is the garden
of Central Intertropical Africa, presents
an aspect of peaceful rural beauty which
soothes the eye like a medicine after the
red glare of barren Ugogo, and the dark
monotonous verdue of the western provinces.
The inhabitants are comparatively numerous
in the villages, which rise at short inter
vals above their impervious walls of the
lustrous green milk-bush, with its coral
shaped arms, variegating the well-hoed
plains; whilst in the pasture-lands fre
quent herds of many-coloured cattle, plump,
round-barrelled, and high-humped, like the
Indian breeds, and mingled flocks of goats
and sheep dispersed over the landscape,
suggest,ideas of barbarous comfort and
plenty
. 1 8

Burton also revealed that Chief Fundikara of the Nyamwezi
owned three hundred homes and two thousand head of cattle. ^
1

When John Hanning Speke, another explorer, travelled through
Msalala District north of the Nyamwezi he remarked that the
land "abounds in flesh, milk, eggs, and vegetables of every
variety."^®

He also observed that:

The quantity of cattle in Msalala surpasses
anything I have seen in Africa. Large droves,
tended by a few men each, are to be seen in
every direction over the extensive plains,
and every village if filled with them at
night
. ^ 1

By the time Dr. Kurt WBhfel, a German veterinary bac
teriologist, visited the area in 1911 the herds that Burton
and Speke had seen had been reduced considerably by the
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nagana disease:
Over half of the Tabora District is
overgrown with bush and forest. Gloss5na
Morsitans are found throughout and cattlekeeping is possible only in limited areas
of the district. At present, the entire
western part is unsuited for cattle. With
few exceptions, the situation is similar in
the south....Already, some cattle are
grazing in the tsetse-infested bush. This
practice causes losses through nagana and
prevents the herds from reaching their
previous size. Today, there are only
around 2,500 cattle left in the north
western part of T a b o r a . . . . 2 2
This is not to suggest, however, that pre-colonial
Tanganyika stood helpless before the dreaded tsetse fly.
On the contrary many early European explorers and travel
lers reported that several African communities possessed
a relatively sophisticated knowledge of entomology.

In

1865, for example, Sir John Kirk, later British ConsulGeneral in Zanzibar, revealed that many pastoral peoples
had experimented with a strange-sounding but apparently
effective repellent:
The fly avoids human excrement, so the
natives told us, and we have found it true,
and they say that cattle have been passed
by day through fly country when smeared
with a composition containing this. Native
doctors have an herb to which they attribute
a similar effect....23
According to David and Charles Livingstone, still
others used herbal medicines to ward off nagana:
Moyara showed us a plant...and likewise
told us how the medicine was prepared;
the bark of the root, and what might please
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our homoeopathic friends, a dozen of the
tsetse are dried, and ground together into
a fine powder. This mixture is administered
internally; and the cattle are fumigated by
burning tinder them the rest of the plant
collected.
Many Africans, however, believed that the most effective
method of dealing with the tsetse fly was the destruction
of disease-carrying wildlife.

The eradication scheme used

in the 1860s by Mzila, a Ngoni chief in northern Mozambique,
was a typical example:
Drives with nets were organized across the
country, and game, pigs and baboons were
thus killed wholesale. If a herd of buffaloes
was reported...it was at once hunted; if pigs
appeared in a garden, they were at once
traced down to their retreat and, the people
round having been called out, were surrounded
and killed. 5
3y employing one or a combination of these techniques many
of Tanganyika's indigenous communities were able to achieve
a tenuous stand-off with the forces of nature long before
the advent of European colonialism in the second half of
the nineteenth century.
THE GERMAN PERIOD
Shortly after the German Imperial Government as sinned
control of Tanganyika on 1 January 1891, the colonial ad
ministration upset this balance by imposing a wildlife
preservation policy that severely restricted traditional
African hunting practices.

Governor Julius von Soden, a

career diplomat known to Africans as Mr. Paper, issued
the first game regulations in 1891 for the Moshi District
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of northern Tanganyika.

Among other things, this ordinance

required African hunters to pay 500 rupees for permission
to kill

elephants.

26

Cto

7

May 1896 Governor Hermann von

Wissman, a big game hunter and early conservationist, en
acted a more comprehensive game ordinance, creating two
wildlife sanctuaries, one on Mount Kilimanjaro's western
slopes, and another between the Rufiji river and the Rubehobeho country in east central Tanganyika.

The 1896

regulations also introduced a comprehensive licensing
system whereby the colonial government required African
hunters to purchase a basic shooting permit for five rupees
Professional African elephant and rhinoceros hunters had
to pay 500 rupees for the right to hunt throughout the
territory.

It was, however, unnecessary for Africans to

have a license "to shoot animals trespassing on cultivated
ground.

"27

The Hunting Ordinance of 5 November 1908

established even more game reserves and by the time of the
British takeover in 1919 the German colonial government
had created twenty sanctuaries throughout the

country.28

Further regulations prohibited all shooting in these areas
"without the special permission of the Imperial Govern
ment.'^
As in Kenya and Uganda, the creation of game reserves
and the imposition of a costly licensing system not only
curbed the wanton destruction of wildlife but also precipated a population crisis throughout the country.

With an
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increased number of disease-carrying wild animals and the
centuries-old equilibruim between man and tsetse fly ir
revocably altered by German game laws, sleeping sickness
and nagana became more widespread.

By 1906, for example,

sleeping sickness was well established along the shores of
Lake Victoria and was spreading to the country around both
ends of Lake Tanganyika. 30

Indeed, in 1908 Alexander

Wollaston, a traveller and naturalist, reported that whole
villages in the Lake Tanganyika area "have been wiped out

i

and huge tracts of fertile land...which were formerly cultivated, have become impenetrable jungle."31

In August

1911 another outbreak erupted in a new area, the Ruvuma
oo
River near Songea in southern Tanganyika.
Dr. Feldman of the German medical corps believed that
incidents such as these probably were caused by tsetse
flies entering the country from the Congo, Mozambique, and
Rhodesia along with herds of wild animals.

Dr. Robert

Koch, a government bacteriologist and entomologist,
strengthened the theory that wild animals were entirely re
sponsible for the presence of tsetse flies when he dis
covered that crocodiles were a favorite breeding ground
of G. Papalis. Indeed, as a result of Koch's findings, the
colonial administration, under pressure from frustrated
European farmers and officials, attempted to eradicate the
country's crocodiles by offering a reward to anyone who
brought crocidile eggs to a government station.33
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Later British entomologists rejected this wildlife
thesis, claiming instead that sleeping sickness and nagana
arose as "a consequence of quantitative changes in the
relationships of three of the five populations involved—
man, his domestic livestock, and the wild fauna— and the
effects of these changes upon the remaining two popula
tions, the trypanosomes and the tsetses."34

Obviously,

the German colonial government had triggered these changes
by enacting a comprehensive game preservation policy which
seriously disturbed the delicate balance that had existed
between man and animal prior to the colonial period.
These changes in turn caused an ecological catastrophe of
frightening proportions which, according to John Illiffe,
literally altered the course of Tanganyika’s history:
From the turn of the century many woodland
savannah peoples suffered plagues of bush
pigs and baboons which ruined their crops.
Shortly afterwards lions and other predators
multiplied, forcing the people to retreat
from the forest fringes. The deserted fields
relapsed to bush, soon intensified by tsetse
flies. Cattle began to die of trypanosomiasis
and men of a disease which developed from
fever and lassitude to coma and death. Men
and livestock retreated further. Pigs, lions,
bush, and tsetses followed them. Nature was
reconquering the land.35
THE BRITISH PERIOD
The British failed to abandon the principles of the
German' game preservation policy; and by the time the
Supreme Council of the Great Powers assigned the country
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to Great Britain as a mandated territory on 7 May 1919,
the ecological situation had deteriorated even further.
Thousands of acres of European and African farmland had
fallen into decay when the owners left to join the de
fense force.

Wild animals repopulated much of this land—

thereby extending the range of the tsetse fly— despite the
fact that the ravages of war had reduced their numbers
considerably.

With Tanganyika's economic, political, and

transportation systems all but destroyed as a result of
the war, famine and influenza epidemics became widespread
and added to the environment's general devastation.
Aside from the wider and more important issues of
Tanganyika's political, economic, and social reconstruc
tion, the most perplexing problems confronting the British
administration between the two world wars concerned the
preservation of the country's wildlife and the eradication
of the tsetse fly.

As early as 2 October 1918 Sir Horace

Byatt, Tanganyika's Administrator and first British Gover
nor, noted Germany's long-standing commitment to game
preservation and intimated that he would pursue a similar
policy:
There is no doubt that German East Africa
is as a whole...very rich in big game. The
former German administration...made and
zealously enforced laws for their protection
and preservation. This is a principle with
which I am entirely in sympathy, for although
myself fond of shooting, a good many years'
experience in various parts of Africa have
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convinced me that it is the duty of
responsible authorities at the present
day to prevent too great a reduction in
the numbers of such animals....3®
Given the fact that many powerful elements within
British-controlled Africa had opposed game preservation
long before the end of the First World War because of the
I
connection between the tsetse fly and wild animals, the
colonial government understandably experienced much diffilculty in implementing this plan.

The resulting coni

fusion undoubtedly contributed to Byatt’s early reputation
among the settlers as a poor administrator.
One of the earliest displays of public hostility
toward wild animals because of their relationship with the
tsetse fly occurred on 5 September 1908 when The Pioneer:
The British East Africa and Uganda News, an influential
Nairobi-based pro-settler newspaper, railed against the
very notion of game preservation, claiming that there
should be "a little more sympathy for the genus homo and
less for the

g a m e . "3?

Approximately two years later the

London Times warned, "Our great impediment to the protec
tion of big game in many parts of Africa is the suspicion
under which it lies of harbouring the tsetse fly."38

By

1913 Major James Stevenson-Hami1ton, warden of the Trans
vaal government’s game reserves, believed that the theory
that wild animals were solely responsible for the presence
of tsetse flies had become "so firmly fixed in the mind of
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the average man...that no amount of contrary argument or
even proof could ever have much effect in altering his
opinion.
The work of many concerned individuals only confirmed
Stevenson-Hamilton* s cynical assessment of this problem.
For example, when Sir W.H. Manning, a staunch wildlife en
thusiast, brilliantly argued against wildlife destruction
as a solution to the tsetse menance, he failed to gain
significant popular support:
Admitting that there may be a connection
between fly and game, the proposal to
slaughter all game animals, even if feasible,
is unsound...since it is fully recognized
that game, when harried, as it would be in
such an attempt, betakes itself to places
difficult of access to man, or scatters in
small herds... over wide areas. It is mani
fest that game would thus be driven to places
where it has hitherto been -unknown, where it
is highly probable that it might be followed
by tsetse, thus spreading the danger of the
transmission of trypanosomiasis to wide areas
now free from game and fly.40
On a practical level, the conflict between anti and pro
game groups forced Tanganyika's administration to pursue
an incongrous policy of advocating the eradication of the
tsetse fly and preserving the country's wild animals.
The man who tried to strike a balance between these
two extremes was Charles Francis Massy Swynnerton, one of
the most remarkable individuals who ever served in Tangan
yika.^

B o m on 3 December 1877 of missionary parents,
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young Swynnerton developed an interest in natural history
at Lancing College in West Sussex and hoped to continue his
studies at Oxford.

But his parents wanted him to go to

South Africa to earn a proper living; so in 1897 at the age
of nineteen he arrived in Natal, alone, determined, and
afraid.

Shortly thereafter he accepted employment as an

assistant in a general store.

Not being a tradesman

Swynnerton soon resigned and for the next twenty-one years
worked in a variety of different capacities, including
those of farm manager, big game hunter, and amateur natu
ralist.

Then in June 1918, after a severe physical break

down, Swynnerton signed a three-month contract with Mozam
bique Company to survey tsetse distribution and habits in
Mozambique's North Mossurise territory.

His findings,

which were published in the Bulletin of Entomological Re
search. yielded three conclusions that would be of benefit
during his Tanganyika years:

that concentrated human

settlements could clear the land of G. Brevipalpis and
G. Pallidipes; that properly controlled grass fires could
restrict the spread of tsetse; and that G. Morsitans. one
of the more common wildlife flies,

"might survive the de

struction of all large mammalian life."^
On the advice of Sir Horace Byatt, the CO appointed
Swynnerton

Director of Game Preservation, Tanganyika Ter

ritory on 30 November 1919.^3

As a conservationist,

Swynnerton was more practical than most and realized that
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controlling the spread of the tsetse fly could entail the
extermination of certain wildlife species.

Nevertheless

he worked tirelessly to preserve Tanganyika's fauna and
searched continually for methods other than game destruc
tion for eradicating the tsetse

fly.

44

Swynnerton's first

significant accomplishment after assuming office was to
draft the Game Preservation Ordinance, 1921, which embodied
most of the principles employed in other British

colonies.45

Ironically, these regulations failed to create a single game
reserve; rather, they assumed control of those established
by the German colonial government.^

According to the

Swynnerton plan, the new regulations divided Tanganyika's
game sanctuaries into Complete Reserves in which "except
as may be otherwise prescribed, no person shall hunt any
animal" and info Partial Reserves in which "no person shall
hunt game of the species declared...to be protected in those
reserves."

The 1921 Ordinance also continued the practice

started by the Germans of severely limiting African hunt
ers.

Among other things, the regulations outlawed the use

of nets, guns, traps, snares, pit-falls, poison, or poison
weapons to hunt wild animals.

Furthermore, the ordinance

stipulated that "no Game Licence shall be issued to a na
tive without the consent of the Governor, who may impose
such special regulations as he may think fit."47

Helge

Kjekshus, senior lecturer in Political Science at the Uni
versity of Dar es Salaam from 1966 to 1975, claimed these
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restrictions— as with the German game laws— precipitated
a fauna population explosion and contributed to the spread
of the tsetse f l y . s i x months after the enactment of the
1921 regulations the colonial administration, hoping to
correct this error, empowered Swynnerton to kill or ’’au
thorise the killing of elephant, buffalo, hippopotamus or
any animal which may become dangerous by reason of it being
a carrier of tsetse fly, in such areas and in such numbers
as the Governor may from time to time

d i r e c t . " ^

Swynnerton* s second major achievement was the organi
zation of a Game Department ”to administer the Game Laws
and to prevent and detect offences thereunder. "50
not an easy task.

It was

As in Uganda and, to a lesser extent, in

Kenya many officials in the administration looked upon the
Game Department as a "Cinderella” organization or a ’’luxury”
department; whenever Tanganyika's financial position neces
sitated cutbacks it usually was the Game Department that
suffered.

In a particularly grim economic depression from

1937 to 1938, for example, the colonial government serious
ly considered the Department’s abolition.

The annual bud

getary battles between the Game Warden and the Finance
Committee in Dar es Salaam were invariably tense and—
according to George Rushby who joined the Game Department
in 1938 and later became Deputy Game Warden— "extremely
bitter

. " 5 1

Despite these limitations, Swynnerton--through the
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sheer force of his personality and the unwavering support
of his staff— transformed the Game Department into East
Africa's most effective wildlife preservation institution.^
When he first organized the Department in 1919, for example
its only recognized purpose was the "preservation of ani
mals in their natural state and in as large numbers as
possible...."53

by 1925 the colonial administration,

with Swynnerton*s concurrence, had expanded its
duties to include:

the protection of European and African

cultivation against game; the study of the relationship
between wildlife and the tsetse fly; and the reclamation
of land infested with tsetse.54

Swynnerton also dramati

cally increased the Department's European personnel.

In

1919 it employed only four Assistant Game Rangers, but by
1926 there were eighteen positions, more than three times
the number engaged by either Uganda or Kenya.

Even more

impressive was the fact that fully qualified scientists—
including a microscopist, an entomologist, a botanist, and
four reclamation officers— staffed many of these positions.
In 1928 Swynnerton added a trained zoologist to the Depart
ment.^

Apart from their regular duties Swynnerton en

couraged the Game Rangers to make specialized studies of
particular wildlife species.

Constantine Ionides, who

joined the Department in 1933 as an elephant control offi
cer, became a world renown herpetologist.

George Rushby

specialized in elephants and published a number of game-
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related articles in Tanganyika Notes and Records, including
"The African Elephant and Its Hunters."5?

Swynnerton him

self was a noted authority on Tanganyika's rodents and
lesser mammals.
These advances unfortunately failed to result in great
er wildlife protection.

Prior to the Second World War the

average area patrolled by a Game Ranger was about the size
CO

of Scotland.

Because of the immense size of each region

it was "physically impossible" for a ranger and his African
scouts to safeguard wild animals in more than a quarter of
the territory for which he was responsible.

As a result,

most Game Rangers concentrated their efforts on preserving
wildlife within the well-defined borders of the country's
game r e s e r v e s . O u t s i d e the sanctuaries the District
Commissioner— an overworked offical who served his communi
ty as veterinarian, postmaster, judge, police investigator,
jailer, and oftentimes marraige counsellor— was responsible
for administering the game laws and prosecuting violators.
MOst District Commissioners, in Ionides' opinion, however,
were indifferent toward wildlife and the problems confront
ing Swynnerton's Game Department.^®
At times the impact of their indifference was catas
trophic.

In the late 1920s, for example, the government

office at Mkalama in north-central Tanganyika organized a
game drive in the neighborhood of Iambi, which was nothing
more than a wildlife killing expedition to eradicate the
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tsetse fly.

The District Commissioner invited all inter

ested European hunters to come to Iambi on a certain Sun
day to shoot any animal they desired.

On the morning in

question "truckload after truckload" of "sportsmen" passed
the government station en route to the hunting ground.
V.E. Johnson, a Lutheran missionary, beseeched the Dis
trict Commissioner to change the day because he feared
that the trigger-happy Europeans would needlessly destroy
ordinary plains game such as antelopes, gazelles, giraffes,
and zebras rather than known disease-carriers such as the
buffalo.

Johnson reasoned that if the day was changed the

District Commissioner could supervise the game drive.

The

official, however, refused to alter the day and the slaugh
ter took place as scheduled.^

Incidents such as these

obviously were tremendously destructive to the country's
wildlife; but given the colonial administration's unwill
ingness or inability to increase the Game Department's
field staff, they were commonplace, and were tolerated
by officials at all levels of government.
Swynnerton*s third and greatest feat during his
tenure concerned his investigation into the nature of the
relationship between the tsetse fly and wild animals.

In

deed, his research significantly contributed to the cause
of wildlife preservation by demonstrating that the de
struction of wild animals would not necessarily result in
the eradication of the tsetse fly.

Swynnerton*s work
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began in 1921 when the government ordered him to conduct
a survey of tsetse fly distribution throughout Tanganyika.
After completing this assignment, he sketched a tsetse
distribution map and conducted preliminary experiments at
Kilosa in east central Tanganyika to determine the effect
of previous grass burning on G. Morsitans.
Within a few months a more serious situation confront
ed Swynnerton.

Late in February 1922 Salim, the headman

of Basheshi, reported to the authorities that sleeping
sickness had broken out in Maswa District southeast of
Lake Victoria.

i

Dr. George Maclean, the Medical Officer

at Mwanza immediately investigated the matter and discoverd by blood examination that the disease— which the local
inhabitants initially regarded as safula or hookworm— was
in fact trypanosomiasis.

Maclean then ordered the con

struction of hospitals in the district's fly-free zones
and the segregation there of the sick.
When Swynnerton learned of the epidemic he decided
to go to Maswa as soon as possible "to gain a first-hand
knowledge of the probable relationship of the game to such
62

an outbreak."0

At the beginning of May Swynnerton pro

ceeded to Mwanza on the shores of Lake Victoria, by car
and foot from Tabora to Smith's Sound, and then by dhow.
After a brief reconnoiter, he noted that numerous wildlife
regions crisscrossed the entire tsetse fly area.

The

first zone passed north of the Duma River, through
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Ngasamo and Mas a, and then southwards to the MaswaLuguru area.

North and east of this line most wildlife,

species, except elephant and situtunga, were present in
ever-increasing numbers until, in the Ikoma and Seregenti
areas, they became very abundant, particularly wildebeest,
zebra, Thomson's and Grant's gazelles, topi, and various
carnivora.

South and west of this line, in the woodland

regions most closely associated with the epidemic, wild
animals were comparatively scarce.
This variation in fauna distribution was critical
because it suggested that wildlife was not necessarily
soley responsible for spreading trypanosomiasis.

Swynn

erton, however, failed to make a firm scientific commitment
on the matter because he was unable to ascertain whether
T. Gambiense or T. Rhodesiense caused the epidemic.

If

the disease was the West African strain, infected humans
from the Congo or elsewhere could have brought the try
panosomes into Tanganyika, or it could have been dormant
in the Maswa area since the First World War when the
German authorities discovered sleeping sickness "among a
small number of Belgian askaris who were prisoners of
war."

If, on the other hand, the disease was the Rhode

sian variety, the infectious agent could have been carried
into Tanganyika by soldiers or by a strain that arose from
T. Brucei, which was common to wildlife.

It also could

have been present all along as a trypanosome pathogenic to
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man.63

Despite his refusal to express an opinion regarding
the origin of the deadly trypanosomes, Swynnerton serious
ly doubted that wild animals were soley responsible for
the spread of sleeping sickness or nagana.

As evidence

he cited the findings of several research scientists who j
had investigated earlier epidemics.

In 1913-14, for ex

ample, Dr. Max Taute had informed the British government's
Interdepartmental Committee on Sleeping Sickness that the
infectious districts of former German East Africa were
generally ones that were not very rich in game.

He also

warned the committee that G. Morsitans could feed on humans
as well as wild animals, and it was highly likely that the
fly would use man as its chief blood supplier if all wild
life were hilled.

Dr. Aylmer Mays— who had conducted a

sleeping sickness survey for the British South Africa
Company in Northern Rhodesia— advised the committee that
most epidemics occurred "in the vicinity of man traffic
routes" away from the game areas. Mays also stated that
his findings tended to support the view that the disease
was transmitted "from man to man rather than that game is
the chief reservoir.
Thus on the basis of this evidence and his own find
ings, Swynnerton rejected the fly-wildlife-man connection,
claiming instead that:
...the trypanosome does not gain and may not
keep up its full infectivity for m a n .in places
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in which the fly does not depend, or
ceases to depand, on man for its food;
further, that man, at least for all
practical purposes, is the only reservoir;
and that in either case an epidemic when
it comes into definite contact with a
game population that is sufficient to
break freely the continuity of the
attendance of the fly on man, and reduce
its avidity... .The presence, nof game would
thus be protective to man.
Swynnerton realized that this thesis.would be highly un
popular among the Africans and Europeans who lived in the
affected areas and who believed that the only way to erad
icate the tsetse was to destroy all wildlife.

He there-

^

fore included in his Maswa report an eloquent refutation
of the anti-game position.

Among other things, he re

marked that the extermination of wild animals over exten
sive areas by specially employed game control officers
was simply "too expensive to contemplate," and that unless
the region in question was fully settled by humans it
gradually would fill with fauna again.

Swynnerton also

maintained that to arm Africans and to allow unlimited
shooting as in pre-colonial days undoubtedly would succeed
in decimating the larger ungulates and carnivores but
would leave bush-pigs and other small animals free to roam
the country and spread the disease.®^

He ended the report

by recommending the establishment of a broad strip of hu
man settlement between game and fly because he believed
the tsetse fly inevitably used a tree or a bush as a
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resting place between feedings on fauna and cattle.68
On a more practical level the Maswa epidemic provided
Swynnerton with an opportunity to launch a full-scale
investigation of the tsetse menace.

On 17 May 1922 he

submitted a memorandum, reviewing the events of the past
year and outlining his future research plans, to Acting
Governor Alfred Claude Hollis for dispatch to the CO.

As

part of his strategy he exhorted the British government
to take cognizance of the fact that Tanganyika offered
exceptional advantages "as the final home of the Empire's
African Game...Cbecausel vast areas of it will never be
claimed for European settlement."

To refute those who

accused him of favoring game preservation at any cost,
Swynnerton pointed out that he had in fact recommended the
killing of buffalo near Namanyere and expected to propose
similar measures elsewhere in the territory.

He again

warned that wildlife was not the only disease carrier,
revealing that cars, trains, and bicycles transported the
tsetse fly all over Tanganyika.

As evidence he disclosed

that after a massive wildlife extermination campaign in
the coastal district of Tanga the tsetse fly remained ac
tive and prevented the keeping of cattle.

Lastly, Swynn

erton expressed the belief that because of the size and
variety of its tsetse population, Tanganyika was ideal
"for scientific and thorough experiementation which will
give us the real solution of the tsetse problem."69
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As soon as he returned to Tanganyika from leave in
1923, Swynnerton selected the Shinyanga sub-district of
Tabora as the first experimental area and proceeded to
put his views on game and tsetse to a practical test.
Shinyanga is gently undulating country with rich soil
which produced cotton, food-crops, and ground-nuts and
with grasslands which supported about 345,000 domestic
cattle.

At the time of Swynnerton’s investigation approx

imately half the district was depopulated because of the
fly’s presence, and this portion, according to the local
inhabitants, contained the best soil and the best pasture
Numerous wildlife species, including impala, eland, gi
raffe, steinbuck, dikdik, zebra, wildebeest, hartebeest,
and wart-hog, abounded throughout this region, and at
least four different tsetse flies— G. Palpalis, G. Pallidipes, G. Morsitans, and G. Swynnertoni— roamed over the
area, competing for space and food.

Swynnerton quickly

discovered that the fly was steadily extending its range
at the expense of Shinyanga’s. 150,000 human inhabitants:
Everywhere on the edges of the cattle-areas
there was the same advance of the young bush
and the tsetse, and everywhere inside them
are still the live roots of the suppressed
bush. The natives themselves were highly
alarmed, and some said...’Where will the
end be?’ I replied, ’Unless you stand firm
and yourselves attack, the end will be in
little more than twenty years’. ™
Swynnerton chose an abandoned German fort built in
1912 for his headquarters in Shinyanga.

Although the
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installation was poorly located for research on G. Morsitans, the most common tsetse fly, it was ideally situated
for the study of G. Swynnertoni, which dominated Shinyanga.
After intensely surveying the area, he concluded that
sleeping sickness passed most readily from man to fly to
man, primarily as a result of traffic and trade between
Shinyanga*s scattered villages.

As far as nagana was con

cerned, Swynnerton noted that the local herdsmen incurred
the greatest losses when they pushed their cattle into
fly zones late each dry season in search of food and
water .

^

On the basis of these findings Swynnerton formulated
an anti-tsetse strategy which excluded the mass destruc
tion of wildlife.

He presented the plan's first phase to

a group of African leaders at a meeting convened by C.
McMahon, the District Officer, at Kizumbi in November
1923.

He told the gathering that their people could save

the situation by using pangas to clear the young bush in
the margins of the settled areas each year.^

The massive

bush-clearing campaign got under way in May 1924.

To

assist with the program's day-to-day operation, Swynnerton
assembled a highly qualified research team from all areas
of the natural sciences which included B.D. Burtt, a bot
anist; John F.V. Phillips, an ecologist, W.H. Potts, C.H.N.
Jackson, and T.A.M. Nash, entomologists; G. St. Clair
Thompson, a forester; and S.P. Teare, Game Ranger.
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local people also participated on an unprecedented scale,
thanks largely to the efforts of their leaders.

Chiefs

Ikombe, Makwaia, Makolo, and Luhende furnished 4,500 men;
four western chiefdoms supplied 2,000; and Chiefs Mahizi
and Masanja sent 1,400 men.

As the campaign progressed,

some workers tired and left while others rallied to the
cause; in all more than 10,000 men worked on the project
during the first season.^

Considering the experimental

nature of Swynnerton's work, they accomplished a great
deal.

In the Kizumbi area, for example, the men cleared

an area "for many cattle" and provided a site for a new
ploughing school.

They also created a seven-mile-long

fly-free corridor connecting the western with the eastern
chiefdoms and reclaimed "many square miles" of grazing
land.^
The second phase of Swynnerton*s plan concerned the
means of preventing people and. game from carrying tsetse
flies into the recently cleared cattle country of Kizumbi.
He achieved this by relying heavily upon the local people's
willingness and ability to discipline their day-to-day
activities.

Swynnerton's scheme restricted travel to the

grazing grounds to people of open country villages, and
guards stationed on the main road checked all wayfarers
and motorized vehicles entering the area.

The colonial

administration closed several minor paths to the grazing
grounds and prohibited direct passage between the infested
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bush and the ploughing school*s pasture.

After consulta

tion with African cattle-owners, the administration also
forbade people to allow tsetse flies to travel on their
clothes, enjoining them to make periodic checks of their
person.

Finally, specially appointed game control officers

killed all wildlife caught trying to enter the experimen
tal zone.75
It should be pointed out, however, that these mea
sures failed to satisfy those dissidents, such as Dr. John
B. Davey, who favored the mass destruction of wildlife as
the only sure way of eradicating the tsetse fly.

Indeed,

Davey characterized Swynnerton "as one interested in game
preservation who has, with masterely hand, marshalled a
formidable array of facts and theory to exculpate the
game... .moreover he believes...the much-needed experiment
in game destruction has, for practical purposes, been
carried out, and that we know the result. "76

In Tangan

yika's 1924 annual medical report, Davey also noted the
proximity of the epidemic foci to heavy wildlife concen
trations and suggested a possible

connection.

77

Fortunately,

Swynnerton anticipated such criticism and concluded his
Shinyanga report by saying:
The relations of the fly and the game are
not being ignored. They are beipg studied
and will be the subject of special experi
mentation and, if necessary, of special
localised mealsures fitted into our general
scheme of control. 78.
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The East African Commission, a body appointed by the
British government to advise upon the potential for eco
nomic development of all the Central and East African
territories, finally resolved this conflict in Swynnerton'
favor after a delegation visited Shinyanga and registered
its satisfaction with his work.

The following year

William Ormsby-Gore, then Under-Secretary of State for the
Colonies, persuaded the Earl of Balfour, then Lord Presi
dent of the Council, and Chairman of the Committee of
Civil Research, to establish in London the Tsetse Fly
Committee of the Economic Advisory Council.

The committee

then recognized two investigatory bodies, one in Nigeria
under Dr. W.B. Johnson and Dr. L.L. Lloyd, and one in
Tanganyika under Swynnerton, who had urged in 1921 that
"only by investigation on ecological lines" would the
tsetse problem be solved.

Immediately after the committee

action, Swynnerton began assembling a scientific team of
entomologists, botanists, zoologists, and field officers,
which commenced intensive research in 1927.

By the end

of the following year the work had become so specialized
that early in 1929 the colonial administration converted .
the Game Department's Tsetse Division into a separate de
partment under Swynnerton, with its headquarters at Kondoa
Irangi in central

Tanganyika.

79

I.u. Battye replaced

Swynnerton as Warden, and henceforth the Game Department
concerned itself primarily with elephant control and crop
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protection.
In the wake of these appointments Swynnerton hoped he
would be. able to resolve the tsetse issue and, by doing so,
strike a blow for game preservation.

As a result of the

Shinyanga experience, he realized that the Tsetse Research
Department* s performance not only depended upon an adequate
staff but also upon relatively uncontrollable
graphic trends.

human demor

Thousands of acres of tsetse-infested

bush could be cleared, but if the land remained unpopu
lated and undeveloped it was only a matter of time before
the area reverted back to bushland.

Regions with a pop

ulation density as low as one person per square mile could
not mount an adequate anti-tsetse campaign.

Twenty-five

persons per square mile provided :a settlement sufficient
to clear the land of bush and to till the soil, thereby
permanently reducing but not eliminating the tsetse fly's
operational range.

One hundred persons per square mile

produced a fly-free zone large enough to protect the in
habitants from spreading sleeping sickness amongst them
selves. 80

In view of the fact that as of 26 April 1931

Tanganyika's average population density was less than
fifteen per square mile, it was inevitable that T. Rhode✓
siense continued to spread throughout the country. Indeed,
by the time of the 1931 census it already had caused a
major epidemic near Lake Rukwa in Iringa Province and had
overrun vast regions of Mwanza Province near Lake Victoria
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and nearly all of Kigoma and Tabora Provinces south of
Mwanza.
With approximately two-thirds of Tanganyika already
under the fly and the danger of further infection an everpresent reality, it was only natural that Swynnerton*s
critics throughout East Africa redoubled their efforts to
undermine his program.

On 25 November 1930, for example,

Sir William Gowers, Uganda*s Governor, informed the SubCommittee of the Tsetse Fly Committee that he supported
the recommendations of a Nigerian study which maintained
that:
...a tsetse-infected country that fosters
its game can only retrogress....After five
years of study of conditions in this country
(viz. Nigeria) we have been compelled to
recommend to the government that all laws
that might lead to the increase of wild un
gulates should be abolished, except in care
fully selected game reserves. ^
Tanganyika's Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, inexplic
ably avoided the Swynnerton issue and gave as his opinion
a rather vague statement, which also had been given to the
CO eighteen months prior to the Sub-Committee's meeting:
...that the present indiscriminate preser
vation of game is not compatible with
agricultural development, and should be
superseded by a system of relying exclusively
on reserves.
Despite Cameron's reticence to give strong support to the
Tsetse Research Department's work, he concluded that "Mr.
Swynnerton's policy of clearing and burning so as to
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establish 'fly' barriers had justified itself."®^
The continued spread of the sleeping sickness disease
and Governor Cameron's lackadaisical attitude toward the
Tsetse Department's activities at the Sub-Committee's
London meeting failed to discourage Swynnerton.

Indeed,

he plunged ahead with his work at Shinyanga and elsewhere,
and even formulated a comprehensive anti-tsetse policy
based on eliminating two of the following three alterna
tives :
I.

Retreat. In other words, people would
be evacuated from fly zones into con
centrated human settlements which will
keep the bush and the tsetse fly under
reasonable control, followed by the
gradual expansion of these areas.

II.

Wildlife destruction. That is to say
that only through a holocaust of the
game can the tsetse be destroyed.

III.

Balanced approach. This option advocated
the fly's expulsion from large areas of
bushland without totally destroying the
woodland and the establishment of wider
African settlements. This school of
thought 'also recognized the necessity
of "discriminative game explusion" but
absolutely rejected the concept of
general extermination.

Swynnerton rejected the first option primarily be
cause it eventually would involve the complete destruction
of Tanganyika's forests.

As far as wildlife destruction

was concerned, he once again pointed out that "chile such
tactics might work in certain limited open types of
wooding they could not be applied to all areas of the
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country because of the high cost of hiring professional
hunters.

To permit unrestricted killing by Africans, ac

cording to Swynnerton, would have encouraged the spread
of tsetse by the movements of man and game which this form
of hunting engenders.

He therefore supported the adoption

of the balanced approach as the "only full solution" avail
able to the colonial administration.

In large infected

areas (e.g. 500 miles by 300 miles) Swynnerton proposed
that the land be surveyed to determine vegetational, ag
ricultural, and tsetse patterns, and then by sub-divided
into smaller, more manageable parts before attacking the
fly.

Where sufficient people were available he favored

"the judiciously sited concentration of scattered villages"
to achieve a population density of at least one hundred
people per square mile.

The economic and social institu

tions of these villages then would be organized to secure
the gradual extension of their boundaries till they co
alesced with other settlements or natural barriers, thus
ultimately completing an effective defense system.

Swynn

erton also intended the concentrated villages to facilitate
the growth and development of public services such as
schools and hospitals.

Moreover, he planned to introduce

new methods of agriculture and husbandry to improve the
85
general economic well being of the affected areas.
The colonial administration approved Swynnerton* s
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strategy and, as indicated by the following table, quickly
implemented a widespread resettlement program:
TABLE III 86

D T S T R IC T
D IS T R IC T

TO TAL POP
1934
r u i A i i irKjr .,

NO. OF PEOPLE
SLEEPING
SICKNESS

PERCENTAGE
OF
PEOPLE
CONCENTRATED

SETTLEMENTS
Kahama
Biraramulo
Tabora
Uha
Ufipa
Mbeya

76,000
90,700
154,300
181,500
92,800
106,400

32,200
37,600
22,200
22,800
9,800
5,400

43.5
41.5
14.5
12.5
10.5
5.0

Dr. George Maclean, a Sleeping Sickness Officer, started.
one of the first anti-tsetse campaigns based on this
strategy when he introduced his so-called "hexagaon scheme",
which was nothing more than a rotation system and six years
of fallow, at selected sites throughout Tanganyika.

He

calculated that each family could effectively control eight
to twelve acres of land.

87

Initially, the response to Swynnerton*s plan was quite
favorable.

In 1933, for example, the Provincial Commis

sioner of Kigoma Province reported that the resettlement
of the Ha people of the Kibonda-Kasulu area adjacent to
what was then the Belgian Congo marked "something like a
revolution in their tribal life" and simplified "the task
of changing a disease-ridden and backward horde of savages
into a disciplined and prosperous community."88

J.P.

Moffat, the officer who supervised the 1936-37 concentra
tion of 1,000 families in Urambo east of Tabora, claimed
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the people involved in the move were "happy and content"
and "genuinely pleased with their new surroundings.
Aside from these practical considerations, F.I.C. Apted,
a Sleeping Sickness Officer, disclosed that the settlements
actually caused a decline in the number of new infections
from more than 3,000 to fewer than 600 by

1

9

3

6

.^

In the long run, however, Swynnerton's resettlement
scheme failed to provide the widespread economic and social
development necessary to ensure meaningful African co
operation.

According to Apted:
The incidence of the disease was kept down
and the threat of epidemic outbreak was
minimized, but at the same time there
was little chance of development and vast
areas of land, much of it of potential
value, had to remain mused.

This was particularly true in regions such as Singida to
southeast of Shinyanga where by 1942 Maclean's hexagon
strategy had broken down and only the peripheral areas of
the concentrated villages were maintained as cultivated
land.

In one such village eighty-five per cent of the

people effectively controlled only about one-third of the
territory scheduled for cultivation.

92

Besides keeping

vast areas of Tanganyika uncultivated, Swynnerton*s anti
tsetse campaign enabled the deadly combination of bush,
wildlife, and tsetse to reclaim vast tracts of land
go

throughout the country.
Swynnerton did not live to see the full economic and
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social impact of his policy.

On 8 June 1938 during a

routine aerial game survey, Swynnerton and his botanist,
Burtt, crashed in the bush near Singida.^

His death

marked the end of an era, both in terms of game preserva
tion and of the tsetse research.

The practical application

of his scientific knowledge significantly slowed the pro- .
cess of wildlife destruction and convinced many government
officials that killing wild animals could not effectively
stop the spread of sleeping sickness or nagana.

Indeed,

the example of Swynnerton's commitment to scientific in
vestigation continued to be a vital force in Tanganyika
long after his tragic accident.
Seven years after his death, for example, two of
Swynnerton's former colleagues, Potts and Jackson, under
took a further five-year experiment at Shinyanga to deter
mine once and for all whether the destruction of hoofed
game animals would result in the eradication of the common
tsetse fly, G. Morsitans, G. Swynnertoni, and G. Pallidipes,
and if so over what period of time and at what cost.^

To

prevent the movement of wild animals in and out of the six
hundred-square-mile test site, Potts and Jackson selected
a region bounded on three sides by village settlements.
As the fourth side bordered on a grassy plain grazed by
game and cattle, they initially hoped to keep wildlife
out by shooting; but eventually Potts and Jackson found
it necessary to construct a fifty-mile-long barbed wire

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

fence to accomplish the task.

To remove the wildlife in

side this area— which.supported a population of ten animals
per square mile— professional hunters killed more than
8,500 beasts, including zebras, rhinoceroses, giraffes,
buffaloes, and several species of antelope.^
In terms of tsetse eradication the Shinyanga experi
ment was a success.

G. Morsitans and G. Swynnertoni

disappeared completely while G. Pallidipes "was either
exterminated or very heavily reduced."
plementing the program was

h

The cost of im

50 per square mile, much less

than it would have cost to mount an extensive bush clearing
campaign.

Potts and Jackson pointed out, however, that

expenses would have been "enormously greater: were it not
for the fact that the tsetse site was isolated by villages
and a fence for the greater part of the experiment.

More

over, they concluded that professional hunters would have
to continue shooting indefinitely or the colonial admin
istration would have to erect and maintain a permanent
game-proof fence, or else the wildlife and then the tsetse
eventually would return to Shinyanga.

On the basis of

these findings, which vindicated Swynnerton*s earlier
work, Potts and Jackson informed the colonial government
that "Game destruction is not recommended except in isolated
areas of manageable

s iz e .

"97

Thus after thirty-one years these two scientists
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succeeded in convincing the authorities that wholesale
wildlife destruction was inimical to the country’s best
interests.

From an ecological point of view, Swynnerton

and his colleagues undoubtedly had prevented a wildlife
holocaust of frightening proportions, but they had failed
to stamp out the deadly trypanosomes, which impeded
Tanganyika's economic growth and development.
The sleeping sickness epidemic which started in Maswa
and spread throughout the greater part of western Tangan
yika eventually ran its course, but not without taking a
devastating toll of human life.

Between 1922 and 1946

approximately 23,000 people had contracted sleeping sick
ness; and in 1948 Dr. H. Fairbairn, a Sleeping Sickness
Officer, estimated a fifty-two per cent fatality rate
among the victims.^

Despite the Tsetse- Research

Department's continued work, the permanent control of
sleeping sickness and nagana remained an elusive goal.
As late as 1949 Dr. John F.V. Phillips informed Governor
Sir Edward Twining

that "there is more fly today than

there was twenty years ago in Tanganyika!"-^

The inability

to control the fly's activities had disastrous long-term
economic implications; and "Tanganyika entered the 1960s
as one of the poorest and least developed of African
countries

. " 1 0 0

Swynnerton's career was a testimony to the application
of scientific knowledge to the problem of game preservation.
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He worked tirelessly to attract highly qualified personnel
to the Game Department and then to the Tsetse Research
Department.

He also overcame the objections of many

powerful elements in the colonial administration— most
notably the Medical Department— and eventually convinced
several former opponents that the dangers of sleeping
sickness and nagana could not be eliminated by wholesale
game destruction.

Swynnerton's accomplishments undoubtedly

saved countless thousands of wild animals .that otherwise
would have been killed by professional or private hunters.
Contrary to the opinions of Alistair Graham and
others, the recognition and acceptance of scientifically
sound ecologically principles were not a panacea for all
the problems that beset the preservation of Tanganyika's
wildlife.

As in Kenya a rapidly expanding human popula

tion, brought about as a result of the introduction of
western technology and medicine, placed tremendous pressure •
on the country's fauna.

A brief perusal of Tanganyika's

Provincial and District Books, which contain administrative
and historical reports on every conceivable subject,
attests to the complexity and insolubility of the game
preservation problem.

In the southern portion of Rufiji

District, for example, an anonymous agricultural report
indicated that eland herds regularly raided African maize,
millet, and cotton fields.

So severe were these depreda

tions that the author, presumably a British official
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expressed the opinion that if the elands were eliminated
totally from this area African farmers could produce at
least 100,000 kgs. of cotton.

Elsewhere in Rufiji the

colonial administration was unable to implement effective
control operations despite the presence of Game Department
officials.

On 31 October 1928 representatives of the

people living in the Matumbi and Muhoro regions complained
to W.J. Macmillan, the District Officer, that "the Native
Cultivation guards pay no attention to complaints of damage
being done to game.

Clt isU emphatically stated that these

two men do nothing except to go out and shoot meat when
they want it."

The people of the Mbwara-Matumbi area

demonstrated that elephants were "breaking in the roofs of
houses in search of food."

Aside from concentrating all

available cultivation guards in these communities "while
their ammunition lasts," Macmillan promised-little in the
102
way of relief.
To a greater or lesser degree similar
situations existed all over the country.

Indeed, when a

1928 trade depression forced the colonial administration
to order severe cutbacks in the number of Cultivation
Protection Officers, matters became even

w

o

r

s

e

.

Ele

phants seriously plagued Tanganyika's cultivated areas;
and it was not until 1940 that E.H. Risley, Assistant
District Officer of Rufuji, could report that it was "a
rare sight to meet with a herd of more than thirty. "104
Indeed, the issues of crop protection and elephant control
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presented more of an economic threat to the country than
did the tsetse fly.

As the application of scientific

knowledge failed to resolve these problems, Tanganyika,
like Kenya and Uganda, was faced with the virtual ex
tinction of its wildlife unless the colonial administration
adopted a new more realistic and revolutionary game pre
servation policy.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NATIONAL PARK SOLUTION
Ey the end of the Second World War it had become
evident that game preservation and economic development
were incompatible concepts.

Indeed, because of the need

to improve East Africa's material standard of living there
seemed to be little prospect of the region's fauna sur
viving the twentieth century.
Game Departments —

To make matters worse, the

whose activities had been severely

curtailed during the war -- were hopelessly understaffed
and underfinanced, and unable to police adequately the
vast territories within their care.^

In addition, the

demand for land for every purpose, be it agricultural,
pastoral, or industrial, African or European, continued to
increase, bringing about a movement to develop areas
hitherto regarded as unsuitable for human habitation.
Medical and veterinary officers in each of the three
territories also voiced increasing concern over the role
played by m i d animals in the transmission of diseases
2

which retarded economic growth.
More importantly, according to Rennie Eere, Director
and Chief Warden of Uganda's National Parks from 1955 to
1960, a sense of greater concern for the political,
economic, and social well-being of the colonial peoples
permeated every level of government, from the streets of
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Whitehall to the loneliest administrative outpost.

3

The

Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 embodied this
philosophy and signalled the beginning of a new era in
imperial relations.

Under the terms of this scheme the

Eritish government provided grants limited to E 5 million
a year for ten years for programs "involving capital
expenditure necessary for Colonial Development in the
widest sense."^
In this atmosphere the preservation of East Africa's
remaining fauna clearly required a revolutionary policy
that would strike a balance between the forces of economic
and social development and those of nature.

Since the

1920s Arthur Ritchie, Charles Pitman, Charles Swynnerton,
and scores of other wildlife enthusiasts believed this
could be accomplished by establishing a comprehensive
national park system throughout East Africa.

According to

this strategy, a sanctuary's territorial integrity, unlike
that of an ordinary reserve, was inviolable and could only
be changed by the appropriate legislative authority rather
than by a mere administrative decision.

Conservationists

the world over therefore hoped that national parks would
provide permanent and absolute protection for wild animals
against the dangers of a modernizing society.
The history of the national parks movement began in
1372 with the establishment of the Yellowstone National
Park in the United States as a "pleasuring ground for the
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benefit and enjoyment of the people."

It continued with

the creation of the Yosemite, Grand Canyon, Rocky Mountain,
and Glacier National Parks.

In 1916 the American govern

ment constituted a National Parks Service which by 1946
had a budget of more than $50 million.**

The Canadian

government established Banff National Park in 1885,
followed by many others "dedicated to the people of Canada
for their benefit, education and enjoyment."

The Union

of South Africa's National Park Act of 1926 transformed

j

)

i
the Sabi Game Reserve, which had been established in 1898;
into Kruger National Park, the first such sanctuary in all
Africa.

The Belgian government incorporated several of

the Congo's game reserves, created by King Leopold II in
the nineteenth century, into the world famous Parc
National Albert in 1929.^
As far as East Africa was concerned the movement to
establish a national park system began on 5 March 1930
when the FPS dispatched a deputation —

which included

representatives of the Joint East African Board, an
organization formed in 1923 to link British commercial
interests in East Africa with their counterparts in
England —

to the CO for an interview with the Secretary

of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield.

The Earl of

Onslow, who headed the delegation, and, like his father,
was a wildlife enthusiast, opened the meeting by noting
that there was a general pro-wildlife consensus throughout
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the empire regarding future game policy not only in East
Africa but throughout the continent.

He also said that

the deputation "fully recognized that the development of
civilization in East Africa should not be imperilled by
an undue regard for the preservation of wild and destruc
tive game."

He believed, however, that it was desirable

to preserve as much fauna as possible, and to that end
suggested that a joint conference of East African Game
Wardens be convened to discuss the possibility of adoptint a common wildlife policy.

He also voiced his agree

ment with Passfield's view "that until development in
East Africa had proceeded further, the present system of
game reserves (the boundaries of which could be modified
when necessary) should be maintained in preference to a
system of National Parks, in which land would be perma
nently set aside for the use of game."

Onslow ended his

speech by stating that the proposed Game Warden's con
ference could discuss the possibility of formulating
a national parks contingency plan which would indicate
exactly when and where such parks could be established.

8

Although Passfield was in "entire sympathy" with the
FPS, he rejected the idea of a Game Warden's Conference
for several reasons.

A similar meeting already had been

held in 1927 and its recommendations had been forwarded
to the appropriate governmental agencies.

Moreover, if

the British government convened another conference it
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undoubtedly would interrupt the normal activities of the
respective Game Departments, which already operated with
pitifully small staffs.

Lastly, Passfield believed that

because differing local conditions made it impossible
to adopt a common wildlife policy, the question of when
and where national parks could be established should be
answered by the colonial governments rather than by their
Game Departments.

He pointed out, however, that if the

Closer Union scheme —

which sought the federation of

Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika —

became a reality, the

British government probably would appoint a High
Commissioner who. could formulate a uniform game policy
which would take into account varying local circumstances.

g

As an alternative to the Game Warden’s conference,
Passfield suggested that the FPS and the Joint East African
Board send a representative to East Africa to consult with
the local governments and the Game Departments and then to
recommend a .list of practicable policy changes to the
appropriate' officials in London.

The Earl of Onslow

welcomed this proposal, telling Passfield that he ’’hoped
that it would be sympathetically considered in the
Colonial Office together with the other recommendations
made by the Deputation.”^

On this hopeful note the

meeting adjourned.
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Although this exchange resulted in the temporary
rejection of the national park concept, it signalled the
beginning of a political process which gathered momentum
over the next fifteen years and eventually ensured a
modicum of security for East Africa’s wild animals.

At

least one CO official, A.B. Acheson, resented the FPS's
role in this process and criticized its repeated attempts
to influence official policy:
The Society is not an official body: nor is
it a body to which the Colonial Office is
accustomed to turn for advice: it is frankly
a propagandist body: its business is not to
cooperate with the Colonial Office and
Colonial Governments, but to get as much as
it can out of them for its own purposes and
to keep on asking for more: and information
which is given to it must be given with the
knowledge that it will be used publicly in
any way which the Society may think will
further its purposes.H
There is no evidence, however, that Acheson’s indignation
significantly affected the CO's subsequent actions.
On 23 May the FPS and the Joint East African Board,
acting on Passfield's suggestion, dispatched Major R.W.G.
Hingston, the FPS's African delegate who had spent many
years hunting in India, to Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland,
Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda "to discuss with the
Governors, Game Wardens, and other interested persons
the future policy regarding wildlife."^

After a five-

months whirlwind tour Hingston returned to England and
quickly changed the concept of game preservation throughout
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eastern Africa.

On

6

November 1930, in an interview with

East Africa, a London-based newspaper, he stated "that
the construction and development of National Parks . . .
would attract great numbers of visitors and prove not only
of instruction and interest to them but of real economic
value to the Colonies concerned."13
Approximately five weeks later Hingston published a
brief but cogent article entitled, "Plea for National
Parks" in the popular Illustrated London News.

Aside

from containing a number of photographs clearly designed
to gain the reader's sympathy, the article chastised the
British government's efforts to preserve East Africa's
fauna by a system of game reserves and laws:
The laws are drawn up carefully and
administered conscientiously, but they
cannot be regarded as anything but checks; .
they are brakes, as it were. on the
destructive machinery. . .
Then on the evening of 9 March 1931 Hingston delivered
a report on his recent trip to the Royal Geographical
Society, drawing attention to the fact that "The whole
African fauna is steadily failing before the forces of
destruction brought to bear against it."^

He believed

that the only solution to this problem was the complete
and permanent separation of man and animal, something
which ordinary game reserves could not accomplish:
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The weak point about the reserve is its
insecurity .and want of permanency. It is
brought into existence by a Proclamation
in the local Government Gazette, provided
that the Secretary of State agrees. It can
be removed by the same easy means. Should
at any time a demand arise for a portion or
the whole of a game reserve to be allocated
to some other purpose, as, for instance,
agricultural development, it is not easy
for even the Home Government to resist the
demand . . . In point of fact the game
reserves of Africa are from time to time
contracted, abolished, or altered in some
way by this type of legislation. It is
only a matter of time before a public
demand will arise for the reserves or some
portion of them to be thrown open, and
there is no guarantee that any game
reserve in Africa will last over an
extended period of time.16
Hingston said that national parks, on the other hand,
possessed a higher degree of permanency and stability
because they would be created by an Act of Parliament
and could only be changed by a subsequent Act of Parlia
ment.

He concluded his presentation by recommending the

establishment of nine national parks, seven of which were
to be located in East Africa.1?
In July 1931 the British government supported
Hingston's efforts to create a national park system by
dispatching a delegation to the International Congress
for the Protection of Nature, which was held in Paris
under the auspices of the French Natural History Museum.
Early in the proceedings the Earl of Onslow, who had been
appointed His Majesty's official representative by Prime
Minister Ramsay MacDonald, advised the delegates that in
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the territories for which they are responsible the British
government "regard themselves as trustees for the protec
tion of Nature not only in the interests of their present
inhabitants, but in those of the world at large and of
future generations.”

Because of the migratory nature of

most species, however, Onslow believed that international
action was required "to supplement the effects of indi
vidual Governments."

For this reason Captain Keith

Caldwell, delegate for the FPS, successfully proposed to
convene an international conference based on the London
1

Convention of 1900 to discuss the future of wildlife
preservation

. 1 8

In 1933 the British government invited all nations
with African colonies or territories to London to attend
the Second International Conference for the Protection of
the Fauna and Flora of Africa.

The conference, which was

chaired by the Earl of Onslow, opened on 31 October 1933
in the Moses Room at the House of Lords.
was ideal.

The location

The entire wall behind the chair is covered

with a picture of the world's greatest lawgiver, in
itself an inspiration to the delegates.

On another wall

is a likeness of the ancient hunter Daniel, with a cap
tive lynx and a gazelle slung over his back, a tragic
testimony to man's inability to live in harmony with the
earth's wild beasts.

19

On

8

November 1933 Egypt, the

Union of South Africa, and all the European powers with
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African possessions signed an agreement which remained in
force for the next twenty years.

Among other things, the

delegates agreed to a precise definition of the term
"national park":
The expression 'national park' shall denote
an area (a) placed under public control, the
boundaries of which shall not be altered or
any portion be capable of alienation except
by the competent legislative authority;
(b) set aside for the propagation, protec
tion, and preservation of wild animal life
and wild vegetation, and for the preserva
tion of objects of aesthetic, geological,
prehistoric, historical, archaeological, or
other scientific interest for the benefit,
advantage, and enjoyment of the general
public; (c) in which the hunting, killing
or capturing of fauna and the destruction
or collection of flora is prohibited
except by or under the direction or
control of the park authorities.
In accordance with the above provisions
facilities shall, so far as possible, be
given to the general public for observing
the fauna and flora in national parks
. 2 0

The convention also enjoined the delegates to "explore
forthwith" the possibility of establishing national parks
in their respective territories.

Other

im p o r ta n t

provisions included the regulation of trophy trade, the
preservation of endangered species, and the prohibition
21
of hunting from automobiles and aircraft.
Unlike its failure to approve the 1900 Convention,
the British government eventually ratified this document
on 9 April 1935, binding Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika —
and indeed all its African territories —

to its terms.

It was not until the post-World War II era, however, that
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an East African national park system became a reality.
Although this delay was due partially to the exigencies
of war, there were numerous other factors peculiar to
each territory that prevented the immediate adoption of
such a policy.

Overcoming these obstacles marked the

beginning of the last British attempt to create a more
stable environmental balance between man and animal
throughout East Africa.
KENYA
Kenya took the lead in East Africa in creating a
national park system.

22

Indeed, the process began shortly

after the FPS deputation visited the CO.

As was mentioned

earlier, Passfield rejected the idea of an East African
Game Warden's conference, primarily on the grounds that
one already had been held three years earlier.

On 5 April

1930, however, Sir Edward Grigg, Kenya's Governor from
1925 to 1931 and an advocate of European supremacy,
decided in Executive Council to convene a conference
"to consider outstanding questions relating to game
preservation."

Although it is not clear whether he was

aware of Passfield*s objections, Grigg strongly intimated
that delegates from neighboring territories would be
23
welcome at the meeting.
The conference, which eventually
included only representatives from Kenya, opened at
Government House in Nairobi on 31 July, with Grigg acting
as president.
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Others who attended included Arthur Ritchie;
Lord Delamere, who represented the European settler
community; and Major R.W.G. Hingston, an unofficial
observer.

After a brief discussion, the conference

appointed a sub-committee under Ritchie's chairmanship
to investigate "the desirability of establishing

a

definite National Park as a permanent game sanctuary in
the Colony."^

On 19 September 1930 Ritchie presented

to the full session a list of recommendations as to where
national parks could be established.

These locations

included the Northern Reserve; the area north of the
Sabaki River, between the Kamba and the Giriama Reserves;
and the tract on the Aberdare mountain range northwest
of Nairobi.

The conference, acting with unusual haste,

endorsed Ritchie’s findings the same day..

25

Approximately nine months later Ritchie, in a
memorandum to the Commissioner for Local Government, Lands
and Settlement, briefly reviewed the results of the
Government House Conference and then made the "first
definite proposal" for the creation of a national park:
Nairobi has a priceless and unique
possession in the proximity to its centre
of one of the most remarkable pieces of
game country in the world. Indeed I have
not seen nor heard of any area of country
so small in extent which contains a variety
and abundance of animal life at all
comparable.to that found in the Nairobi
commonage. b

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The commonage, an area of forty-four square miles, is
located about fifteen miles south of Nairobi and embraces
three different geographical zones.

Its western section

is forested and affords a sanctuary for numerous wildlife
species, including bushbuck, dikdik, leopards, rhinoceros,
and a number of small cats and rodents.

The central area

is comprised of open plains and is home for many prides
of lions and relatively large herds of wildebeest,
zebra, hartebeest, eland, impala, and Thomson*s gazelle.
The southern and eastern portions are characterized by
gorges and river valleys which form natural shelters for
crocodiles, hippotamuses, monkeys, and a host of smaller
creatures.
During the First World War the colonial government
had selected the commonage*s Mbagathi region as the
staging area for the East African campaign, and during
the late 1930s the RAF used part of the area as a target
range.

Numerous cattle-herding Somalis, the majority of

whom were retired askaris who had served the British in
the early days of the twentieth century, also lived on
the commonage.

Despite the very real possibility of a

clash between the wildlife and the Somali herdsmen, the
Kenya Land Commission, convened in 1933 to determine the
African population*s land requirements, supported
Ritchie's recommendation that the Nairobi commonage should
27
become a national park.
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Ironically, a controversy developed between Ritchie
and the British government over some of the clauses in
the agreements concluded at the 1933 wildlife conference,
thereby postponing the creation of Nairobi’s national
park for several years.

The conflict began on 17 Septem

ber 1934, when Ritchie sent an important communication to
the CO asking "What the Convention meant exactly by
’public control'," and "Whether an interpretation may be
28
placed on 'area' as meaning 'certain rights in an area'?"
I
The following year the Secretary of State for the Colonies
informed a stunned Ritchie that "a National Park does not
necessarily mean an area in which an active and possibly
expensive policy of development with a view to attracting
tourists must be adopted."

Moreover, the Secretary main

tained that "a National Park is not an area in which
hunting by members of the public must be entirely pro
hibited.
According to Mervyn Cowie, the first director of the
Royal National Parks of Kenya, the CO scheme offered the
animals "far less security than they had within the
existing and unsatisfactory system of game reserves."

30

In view of this drastic turnabout the Secretary’s dispatch
predictably "caused a lull in the enthusiasm of those who
had been actively striving to establish National Parks."

31

The national park movement received a further blow at the
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end of 1936 when Ritchie was seconded to Malaya to help
reorganize that country's Game Department.

32

The following year Acting Game Warden F.H. Clarke
appointed Cowie, at the time a Nairobi office worker, to
the post of Honorary Game Warden.

Cowie not only used

this position as authority to attack the colonial adminis
tration's overall wildlife policy but also as a forum to
organize public opinion against the British government's
lethargy.

His first achievement came on 21 May 1938 when

he helped to persuade Nairobi’s Municipal Council to limit
the number of Somali-owned cattle on the commonage to
eight hundred to reduce competition for the area's scarce
resources.

33

The colonial administration unfortunately

lacked'-sufficient personnel to enforce the decision and
the Somalis continued to graze their herds, which numbered
in the thousands, across the rapidly deteriorating land*s/

scape.

Over the next several months Cowie spoke to

several organizations, such as the Nairobi Rotary Club,
and scores of individuals about the necessity of preserv
ing Kenya's wildlife for future generations.

Although

everyone usually was sympathetic and even encouraging,
he failed to make any significant progress toward the.
establishment of a national park system.

35

When Ritchie returned from Malaya in August 1938,
Cowie immediately conferred with him and successfully .
proposed to launch an all-out campaign aimed at
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"provoking public opinion into such a state of enthusiasm"
that the colonial administration would be forced to
address the national park issue in a meaningful fashion.

36

As a part of his strategy Cowie started feeding a small
pride of lions in the Kesserian Valley near Nairobi,

(

knowing that they would remain in the area as long as the

j

handouts continued on a regular basis.

j

On several occa-

sions he brought wildlife antagonists to this "hidden"
game reserve to see the lions mischievously frolicking
around the feeding zone.
More often than not this tactic transformed opponents
into supporters or caused them to withhold their objec
tions and reconsider the wildlife problem.

One of the

more influential visitors to Kesserian was Sir Robert
Brooke-Popham, Kenya's Governor from 1937 to 1940.

After

seeing the lions and being charged by an old rhinoceros,
the breathless Governor according to Cowie, "was full of
praise, and asked how a scheme could be promoted to
enable visitors from overseas to enjoy the same exciting
37
afternoon which he had experienced."
Cowie of course
used the opportunity to explain the advantages of a
national park system.
Despite such successes the overall situation remained
unchanged, and at the beginning of 1939 Cowie decided to
adopt a more unorthodox strategy to attract the public's
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attention to the national park issue.

With the assistance

of George Kinnear, editor of the widely circulated East
African Standard, an avalanche of pro-wildlife "planted”
letters —

drafted by Cowie but signed by others —

poured
38
into the newspaper’s Nairobi office from all over Kenya.
Cowie himself started the campaign on 10 February 1939
with an emotional appeal to the Standard’s readers:
The insecurity and conflict of interests
resulting from the present system of Game
Reserves in Kenya urges me with utmost
sincerity to appeal for support through
your columns from anyone who really has the
interests of Kenya at hand and who shares
my belief that game can be made to play an
increasingly important part in the necessary
development of 'Britain’s most attractive
Colony*.39
Over the next several weeks the national park
question was examined from every possible point of view.
On 13 February, for example, an enraged "subscriber”
claimed that Kenya’s game situation is "now adrift among
the rocks of difficulty most of which have been deliber
ately dropped in the fairway of progress by lazy and
selfish officialdom.”^-®

Two days later Eliot Tarlton

of Nairobi argued for a commonage free-"from native cattle
and R.A.F. b o m b s . A n o t h e r "reader" maintained that the
very idea of a national park on the commonage "must appeal
as a sound business proposition -- a gold mine on the
/o
steps of our capital."
Cowie’s publicity campaign
reached its apex during the week of 17 February when
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the East African Standard printed seventeen letters and an
editorial favorable to the establishment of a national
park system.
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During the second half of February, Cowie patiently
waited for an official response; but, aside from the
Nairobi District Council's —

the legislative body

representing local European interests —

decision to

"associate itself" with the demand to establish a national
park on the commonage, nothing happened.^

Indeed,

officialdom "was singularly silent and apparently dis
interested."^

In despair Cowie resorted to reverse

psychology and wrote one last letter to the East African
Standard under the nom-de-plume "Old Settler," advocating
the total destruction of Kenya's wildlife:
How can any progress be made in a new
farming country unless the danger and
damag;e by game is removed? What was the
object of keeping thousands of useless
creatures merely to eat all the grass
which cattle should have, or to spoil
crops or kill livestock. Better to rid
the land of all this nonsense. Put the
army on to destroying them with machine
guns; it would be good training practice.
Destroy the females so that they could
breed no more. Put down poison for all
the predators.46
Much to Cowie's consternation the scheme initially back
fired and the Nanyuki Farmers' Association, which already
was on record as favoring wildlife extermination on
private land, came out in support of the total destruction

plan.^
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To extricate himself from this unsettling predica
ment, Cowie, with the support of the Nairobi Rotary Club,
planned to convene a public meeting at the Playhouse
Theater preceeded by a free showing of some spectacular
colored nature films.

Near the end of the evening Cowie

intended to put forward a national park resolution, which
immediately would be seconded by Major Jack Riddell, an
j
ardent conservationist who served in the Legislative
Council as the elected member for Kiambu.

!

Riddell

unfortunately became sick at the last moment and could
not attend the meeting.

In desperation Cowie approached

Mervyn Hill, at the time a staff writer for the East
African Standard, and persuaded him to replace the indis
posed Riddell.
held on

6

Hill agreed and the meeting finally was

March 1939 before a standing-room-only crowd

of approximately 700 settlers, officials, and interested
spectators.

Even Riddell had managed to escape from the

hospital and had walked a mile to the theater, despite a
high temperature and a bad attack of malaria

The films

were a success and the enthusiastic audience unanimously
passed the following resolution:
Be it resolved that this meeting emphasizes
the public demand, not only for the estab
lishment of National Game Parks in Kenya,
but for adequate Game Control, and protests
against any further delay in the formation
of a properly constituted National Trust
for the preservation of the Colony*s
invaluable assets — its fauna and flora.
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The gathering was, according to Cowie, "the final straw
which broke the sluggish Government camel*s back.”'*®
As a result of this public outcry, the colonial
administration appointed a commission of inquiry on 28
April 1939 known as the Game Policy Committee, under the
chairmanship of Cecil Hoey, a settler and former big game
hunter.

Its terms of reference called for recommendations

"concerning the institution in the Colony of a National
Game Park or Parks, including their location, extent,
constitution, control and management."^

Unfortunately,

the Committee had to postpone its activities temporarily
at the end of August 1940 because of the threatening
international situation.
At the beginning of 1942, however, it resumed
limited operations and, after hearing evidence from
representatives of the Nairobi Chamber of Commerce, the
Kenya Association, the Stock Breeder's Association, and
a host of government agencies, recommended that the
commonage he made into a national park.

It also urged

that each Somali family be .limited to a maximum of
twenty head of cattle and twenty-three sheep; that the
military cease its activities within the park's boundaries
after the war; and that a Board of Trustees be created
52
to administer and protect all national parks.
On the basis of these findings Kenya's Governor,
Sir Philip Mitchell, finally assented on 28 January 1945
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to "An Ordinance to Provide for the Establishment of
National Parks and for the Preservation of Wild Animal
Life . . .

53

Among other things, the Ordinance stipu

lated that "The Governor may, with the consent of the
Legislative Council of the Colony, by Proclamation in
the Gazette, declare any area of land to be a National
Park. . .

" 5 4

In the case of land situated in the so-called "White
Highlandis" region of southwestern Kenya the Governor had
to consult first with the Highlands Board; in the case of
land in the African reserves, the temporary African
reserves, and the African leasehold areas he had to
consult the Trust Board.

Once established, national

parks could be altered only with the approval of the
Governor, the Legislative Council, the Board of Trustees,
and by proclamation in the Official Gazette.

The ordi

nance also created a fourteen-member Board of Trustees
known as "The Kenya National Parks Trustees.
Encouraged by Mitchell's action, J. C. Rammell, the
Game Policy Committee's deputy chairman, issued a Second
Interim Report on 14 September 1945 calling for the
creation of additional national parks in the Sabaki-Tsavo
region of southeastern Kenya and in parts of the Mount
Kenya and Aberdare forest reserves.

Rammell also suggested

that "park adjuncts" (areas which could not be considered
for national park status because of "existent human rights"),
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later known

as national reserves, be established in: the

Ngong Hills

area near the Nairobi commonage; the Amboseli

region adjacent to Mount Kilimanjaro; the Trans-Mara zone
bordering on Tanganyika; the western foothills of the
Chyulu range in southeastern Kenya; and the land around
Marsabit in the Northern Frontier P r o v i n c e . M i t c h e l l
welcomed Rammell*s recommendations and at the Board of
Trustee's inaugural meeting on 15 October 1945 exhorted
the delegates to perform their duties with courage,
determination, and conviction:
I feel that we can look forward to steady
progress and I hope, to the fairly rapid
development of the enormously valuable
asset which our National Park’s will
certainly be. In wishing God-speed in
your important tasks I will add only this,
that I am convinced that a.project such as
the establishment of National Parks is not
worth undertaking unless it is undertaken
boldly and with imagination . . . We have
an opportunity of developing an asset of
the greatest value to the country. . .
the preservation for posterity of all
that is interesting and beautiful in wild
nature.57
Mitchell's energetic support facilitated the administrative
process and on 16 December 1946 the colonial government
gazetted the forty-four square mile Nairobi Park, on 2
April 1948 the 8,024-square-mile Tsavo National Park, on
December 1949 the 240-square-mile Mount Kenya National
58
Park, and on 19 May 1950 the Aberdares National Park.
6

Thus within six years of their appointment, the
Trustees, with government approval, had succeeded in
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establishing national parks in all the areas recommended
by the Game Policy Committee.

According to Cowie, these

sanctuaries had two functions:
The first duty is clearly to preserve and
safeguard all objects within a national
park . . . and as far as possible, to
ensure that the places forming that trust
will remain unimpaired for the benefit of
future generations . . . Our second main
duty is to develop our national parks for
the interest, advantage and enjoyment of
the public. . . ."59
For more than a decade Cowie, the trustees, elements
within the colonial administration, and thousands of

:

private supporters all over the world struggled to achieve
these goals.

The final chapter of this dissertation will

examine the results of that struggle.
UGANDA
By 1945 Charles Pitman, Uganda's Game Warden, had
realized for some years that to preserve the country's
wildlife in the face of a rapidly expanding human popula
tion and the relentless spread of cultivated land, he must
somehow prevent the larger game animals, especially the
elephant, from being an unmitigated nuisance to the agri
cultural community.

The Game Department's elephant control

policy, although providing the theoretical framework for
accomplishing this goal, clearly failed to make adequate
provision for the pachyderms* preservation.

As a result,

Uganda's Secretariat issued a statement bemoaning j:he fact
that by 1950 the country's elephant population had been
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reduced from more than 18,000 to approximately
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The other issue confronting Pitman concerned African
game poaching, which had intensified to such a degree
during the 1940-45 period that "by early 1946 even the
61
best-stocked areas were wearing thin."
The explanation
for this illegal activity, which, in time, became more
of an ecological threat than elephant control, lay in
the exorbitant cost of meat.

As late as 1959 Uganda's

annual per capita income varied between a low of

1 1

Shillings in Ankole to a high of 174 Shillings; in Buganda.
An African poacher, on the other hand, could earn as much
as 200 Shillings for selling the meat of one buffalo or
eland; 100 to 400 Shillings for a pair of elephant tusks,
depending upon their size and quality; or 150 Shillings
63
for a single leopard skin.
Efforts by the understaffed
Game Department to control the spread of this highly
lucrative business were nearly always ineffective, and
sometimes even dangerous.

On 20 July 1950, for example,

a "notorious poacher" killed Erinayo Muno, a Game Guard,
in the Siba forest near the Waki River in Bunyoro.

All

attempts to find the culprit failed and the Game Depart
ment concluded that:
It must be recorded to the undying shame of
the people of Bunyoro . . . that they are
willing to protect a cold-blooded and
brutal murderer .as long as he will provide
them with free or cheap meat from the
animals he poaches*^
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As early as 1931 Pitman believed that the creation
of manageable national parks that could easily be policed
and were of comparatively little or no value to African
or European agriculturalists would solve these problems.

6s

In addition, the parks would protect the country*s wild
animals from the “ambitious schemes of the post-war
development planners . . . Cwhich] . . . took no account
of the effect on wildlife of their despoilation of the
66
natural environment."
The movement to create a
national park system, however, failed to materialize until
the late 1940s.

Pitman maintained that this delay was

due primarily to the worldwide economic depression which
made it impossible "for the small Uganda Protectorate,
with its limited resources, to embark on a costly scheme
for creating national p a r k s . T h e

other problem that

delayed the establishment of national parks concerned
the fact that certain ungulates such as the buffalo were
known carriers of rinderpest, the dreaded cattle disease.
To have created permanent game sanctuaries —
function as reservoirs for the disease —

which could

before freeing

the country from the ravages of rinderpest only would
have alienated the human population against all wild
animals.

^

In the years following the Second World War the
possible extermination of Uganda’s wildlife gradually
overshadowed these economic considerations.

In 1947
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Dr. Barton Worthington, author of Uganda's development
plan and a noted conservationist, included in the govern
ment's budget a sum of E 16,600 for the establishment of
national parks.
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Then on 20 December 1948 the colonial

administration appointed the Uganda National Parks
Committee under the chairmanship of J. A. Addington "to
consider and make recommendations concerning the institu
tion in Uganda of a National Park or Parks, including
their location, extent, constitution, control and
m a n a g e m e n t . A f t e r holding four meetings during which
there was an inexplicable "general lack of response from
the public" the committee issued its final report, which,
among other things, maintained that:
. . . until it is unassailably proved that
conditions have so changed that cattle and
human beings can no longer live safely in
the proximity of game, wild animal life
should continue to be preserved in approved
areas, so that something completely
irreplaceable is not lost to the world.
The committee also agreed to apply certain standards to
the selection of suitable areas for national parks, the
most important of which were that there should be few or
no agricultural possibilities, few or no human inhabitants,
72
and no mineral possibilities.
On the basis of these findings the committee
recommended the establishment of four national parks:
I.

Ruwenzori - Located in the Ruwenzori mountains
of western Uganda, this area con
tained very little wildlife and was
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intended primarily to provide
tourists with a unique opportunity
for mountaineering.
II.

III.

IV.

Katwe -

Located near the Kazinga Channel
in the Kingdom of Toro, this area
contained a good selection of game,
was accessible from the north,
south and west by road, and was
within reach of existing hotels
at Fort Portal and Kichwamba.

Murchison Falls - Located in northwestern
Uganda, adjacent to Acholiland,
this area contained a wide variety
of wildlife.
Birunga Volcanoes - To be known as Gorilla
National Park, it would be con!
tiguous with a section of the
Congo* s Parc National Albert andy~
dedicated to gorilla protection.

The committee's report also included a draft of a
National Parks Ordinance, which provided the foundation
for subsequent legislative action.

74

Before accepting the report, the colonial administra
tion solicited the comments and recommendations of Charles
Pitman's successor, Bruce Kinloch, an authority on the
African elephant.

He submitted a highly critical memo

randum to Uganda's Chief Secretary on 21 May 1951,
admonishing the committee for suggesting that less than
ten per cent of the total area of Uganda's existing game
reserves should be granted national park status.

Most

of Uganda's wild animals were great wanderers and simply
could not be kept on a "postage stamp", especially in
view of the fact that extensive mineral and agricultural
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development threatened the entire Katwe region.

Kinloch

also was pessimistic about the Murchison Falls proposal
since the Acholi Council had declared itself to be in
total opposition to the national park idea even though
the area was a sleeping sickness restricted zone.

He

ended the report with a caustic comment obviously designed
to prod the colonial government into adopting a more
realistic national park policy:
It may be mentioned, that if national
parks are not created, Uganda will be
flouting world opinion and will stand
alone as the only territory in Africa
still enriched by the presence of
large quantities of big game that has
not established national parks.
Beyond submitting this memorandum there was little
else Kinloch could do as he was then in England on home
leave.

Back in Uganda, however, Acting Game Warden,

John Mills —

who strongly supported Kinloch's views —

continued to struggle admirably for the creation of a
meaningful national park system.

Mills discovered a

powerful ally in the person of Sir George Cartland, the
Secretariat's Administrative Secretary, who arranged with
Mervyn Cowie for the temporary secondment of Ken Beaton,
the Warden of Nairobi National Park, to visit Uganda to
advise the colonial administration on the suitability of
the areas the committee had recommended as national parks.
Beaton, an ex-settler farmer who had the reputation
of being able to charm a spitting cobra, arrived in
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Uganda near the end of October 1951 and spent three weeks
touring the game areas of Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro, Acholi,
West Nile, and Karamoja, and conducting interviews with a
number of people, official and unofficial, of all races.
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Immediately after this hectic fact-finding mission Beaton
submitted a report to the colonial administration
recommending the creation of two national parks.

The

first, to be known as the Murchison Falls National Park,
was in the area of the Victoria Nile and encompassed
approximately 1,500 square miles of game country.
*

Beaton's

other choice, initially known as Kazinga but later changed
to Queen Elizabeth National Park, was located about 300
miles south of Murchison Falls in the area between Lakes
Edward and George and was approximately 700 square miles
.
m

area.
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Meanwhile, in late September 1951 Charles Pitman,
then in retirement, advised Bruce Kinloch, who was still
in England on home leave, that Sir Andrew Cohen was slated
to replace Sir John Hall as Governor of Uganda.

Upon

receiving this news, Kinloch immediately telephoned the
CO and requested an interview with Cohen, then Under
secretary of State and head of the African Division.
After a brief session that was interrupted several times
by harassed-looking aides, Cohen suddenly stopped his
incessant pacing and glared at Kinloch.

"I believe in
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national parks,” he said.
have them.
I arrive

. ”

"And I think that Uganda should

I will look into the matter directly CafterJ
7 8

Three days after arriving in Entebbe in January 1952
Sir Andrew scheduled another interview with Kinloch to
discuss local opposition to the national park concept,
an especially troublesome issue that had plagued everyone
connected with wildlife preservation in general and
national parks in particular since the late 1940s.
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Most Africans simply believed that national parks were
"an imperialist trick" designed solely "to take land away
from the people."

80

Fortunately, the situation as far as

the proposed Queen Elizabeth National Park was concerned
had improved somewhat, enabling Kinloch to inform Sir
Andrew that:
The Omukama of Toro seems to be much less
hostile than he was to the prospect of a
national park in the area of Lakes George
and Edward, and the Omugabe of Ankole
appears to have become reconciled to the
idea that the park should extend into his
kingdom. 81
Kinloch ended his comments by claiming that the major
problem confronting the proposed Queen Elizabeth National
Park concerned the Agriculture Department's long-term
land-use plans.

According to a department spokesmen,

the land around Lakes Edward the George was suitable for
cotton growing and the local inhabitants were reluctant
to agree to its being absorbed permanently into a national
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park.

Sir Andrew welcomed the news about Toro and Ankole

and blandly asserted that he was confident that the
82
Director of Agriculture would be "co-operative."
As far as the Murchison Falls area was concerned,
Kinloch disclosed that the Banyoro were "coming round a
bit," but that the Acholi Council still was bitterly
opposed to the whole national park project and believed
that the colonial administration had designed the scheme
merely to take away a sizeable portion of their traditional
homeland and to deprive them of their hunting rights.
The council was particularly critical of the government's •
policy of the wholesale killing of wild animals in the
name of tsetse control.

Eventually, the impassioned plea

of Rennie Bere, then Provincial Commissioner of Northern
Province, persuaded the council to give its blessing to
the creation of the Murchison Falls National Park, though
opposition remained from a few of the more politically
motivated members.

83

After hearing Kinloch's report Cohen said:
I am convinced that Uganda must have national
parks and I agree with you that if we have
them at all they must be large enough to be
worth while. If necessary, I intend to force
this matter through the Legislative Council.
I shall ask the Attorney General to go
ahead with drafting appropriate legislation,
for which he will need your advice. In the
meantime I want you to get these boundary
questions settled as quickly as possible.®^
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Although with Cohen's firm support most of the opposition
to national parks rapidly collapsed, pockets of resistance
persisted.
The Uganda National Congress, the first African
nationalist political party founded in 1952 as a nation
wide organization open to membership from all races, also
was convinced that national parks were just ruses to take
land away from the Africans.

It therefore petitioned the

British government and then the Labour opposition for
support to stop the establishment of a national park
system.

When these tactics failed the Congress encouraged

the African press to take up the banner against the
colonial administration.

Ken Beaton defused this poten

tially dangerous situation by inviting a group of African
newspaper editors to visit the Ruwenzori area as guests
of the government.

After a brief tour he spoke to them

about the necessity of establishing and maintaining an
effective national park system:
It has caused me great distress to see
national parks used as a political platform
for there is nothing political about
national parks. They belong to the people and
cannot be taken away. In years to come you
will be grateful for the farsightedness of
those who fought to preserve these sanc
tuaries. You will be proud of them, and
they will become treasured economic assets.
There are national parks all over the
world. Just before coming to Uganda I was
asked by the Ethiopian government to advise
them and suggest ways of setting up a
national parks organization. Ethiopia is
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not controlled by European influences.
National Parks are an ideal. The hills,
lakes, plains and the wonderful wild
creatures were created by God. These
are things you should help to preserve
for yourselves, your children and your
children’s children. No one is being
deprived of land. Millions of acres
outside the parks are lying undeveloped
and m u s e d . . . I appeal to your sense
of fairness and justice not to bring the
national parks into politics. I ask you
to champion the cause of those who
cannot do this for themselves.
In assessing the country's progress
towards the highest standards of civiliza
tion. You will be judged by your history,
achievements and traditions. National
parks are part of this culture. They
are living museums for some of your
treasures.85
Beaton's strategy worked, press opposition to the parks
ceased, and the way was opened for the creation of a
national park system.
On the morning of 28 March 1952 Attorney General
Ralph Dreschfield introduced the National Parks Bill
before a full session of the Legislative Council.

To

allay any lingering suspicions among the African community
Dreschfield reiterated the government's position that
"when a national park is declared it is not taking land
from the people," but preserving it for the people for
all time.

He also pointed out the potential economic

benefit of the parks to Uganda by drawing attention to
the fact that in 1950 the Royal National Parks of Kenya
86
generated E 3 million in revenue.
When the bill was
debated that evening several appointed African
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representatives criticized various aspects of the proposed
legislation.

B. J. Mukasa argued for majority African

representation on the Board of Trustees, while P. C.
Ofwono claimed that the bill failed to "allow for consul87
tation with Local Authorities."
Dreschfield responded
to these remarks by saying that at least two African
members, and possibly more, would be on the Board of
Trustees.

He also agreed to move an amendment allowing

the Governor to declare a national park after consultation
with the local African authority in which the area is
situated.
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With these matters resolved, the bill easily

passed its second reading; and on 3 April 1952 the Legis
lative Council approved the National Parks Ordinance of
Uganda.

Less than four months later on 24 July, after all

the boundary details finally had been agreed upon, the
colonial administration officially gazetted Uganda's
first two national parks.

89

The Queen Elizabeth National

Park was 764 square miles, or about the same size as the
English county of Westmoreland, while the Murchison Falls
National Park was almost twice as large, with an area of
1,504 sqtkare miles.
Although the creation of a national park system was
a major breakthrough for wildlife enthusiasts it was by
no means the end of Uganda's ecological problems.

In the

years to come, marauding elephants continued to ravage
the country's crops.

In addition growing pressure from
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agricultural development and from African poaching
threatened to outweigh the aesthetic, educational, and
economic advantages of wild animals.

The final chapter

will analyze the various policies adopted by the national
parks organization to resolve this conflict.
TANGANYIKA
Despite Swynnerton's efforts to prove that the
destruction of Tanganyika's fauna would not stop the
spread of sleeping sickness and nagana, the diminution
of the country's wild animals continued at an alarming
rate.

Indeed, throughout the inter-war period Tanganyika

had a poor reputation as far as wildlife preservation was
concerned.

In 1948, for example, Captain Keith Caldwell

accused a succession of administrations of inducing a
"general anti-game mentality"; and even as late as 1965
George Rushby, Tanganyika's Deputy Game Warden, lamented
that the country "never had a governor, a chief secretary
or any other high administrative official who was in the
least game minded."
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Even Swynnerton's investigation

into the nature of the relationship between wild animals
and the tsetse fly had failed to impress the country's
anti-wildlife critics.

In such an atmosphere the early

development of a national park movement was inevitable,
but, unfortunately, a combination of factors delayed the
actual establishment of a meaningful parks system until .
after 1945.
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For all intents and purposes, the national park issue
revolved around the Serengeti region of northwestern
Tanganyika, a mammoth area of about 6,000 square miles
containing hundreds of thousands of wild animals.

As

early as 17 January 1928 General L. B. Boyd Moss, an
influential European settler, had warned the Legislative
Council that the government's lackadaisical attitude
toward wildlife in this area could have disastrous
ecological, political, and economic repercussions.
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Sixteen months later Andries Pienaar, an outraged Moshi
resident, wrote a letter to the East African Standard1s
editor decrying the activities of certain big game
hunters who had used motor cars to run down animals
before shooting them.

He also reported a deplorable

incident in which an American hunter had suggested to his
colleagues that they engage in a twenty-four hour killing
spree to see what bag was possible in a single day!

92

Pienaar's comments touched off a crisis that eventually
involved government and wildlife organizations on three
continents and started a process that culminated in the
creation of the Serengeti National Park.
On 3 July 1929 Denys Finch-Hatton, a concerned
conservationist, sent a letter, containing extensive
quotations from the Pienaar communication, to The Times
drawing attention to the Serengeti situation and the
colonial administration's seeming inability or unwillingnes
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to prevent these illegal activities.

93

Over the next few

weeks a flurry of letters poured into The Times* editorial
office expressing dismay and outrage at hunters who used
unsportsmanlike tactics to kill wild animals.

94

Douglas

Jardine, Chief Secretary to the Government of Tanganyika,
t

railed against hunters who crossed into the Serengeti •:
from Kenya *'in swift, and sometimes armoured, motor-cars
...

!

to massacre lion and buffalo and other game by the

score."

Jardine was, however, pessimistic about the
i

colonial administration's ability to prevent these crimes

, 1

pointing out that the Serengeti region simply was too
95
large to patrol adequately.
The public outcry reached
its apex on 18 July 1929

when The Times quoted the Prince

of Wales as saying that:
Record heads do not mean very much to me;
while the idea of going out in a motor-car
to massacre game at close quarters — well,
I don't care for that at all.96
When the issue came before the House of Commons a spokesman
for Lord Passfield assured everyone that "the Government
of Tanganyika had already been asked for a report on the
matter

. " 9 7

On 26 August 1929 Sir Donald Cameron, Tanganyika's
Governor from 1925 to 1931, responded to Passfield*s
request by dispatching a

lengthy report to the CO.

Among

other things, Sir Donald

claimed that the only representa

tion ever made to him on the subject of the indiscriminate
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slaughter of wildlife occurred on

6

January 1927 when he

approved a plan to limit the number of lions to be shot
on license in certain districts of the Serengeti.

Although

Cameron supported Jardine's contention that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to effectively guard an
area as large as the Serengeti, he stationed a Game Ranger
"with adequate transport" along the Kenya-Tanganyika
border to deter hunters from using motor-cars to kill
game.

He also directed the Attorney-General to draft

legislation for a comprehensive program to prohibit
hunting in previously specified areas except with the
permission of the Provincial Commissioner, to increase
the penalty for law-breakers to imprisonment without the
option of a fine, and to confiscate any motor-car used
to run down animals, and to reduce the number of lions
on a visitor's license from five to two in the Serengeti.
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Although Passfield approved these measures on 3
October 1929, there still was some public dissatisfaction
with the state of Tanganyika's game preservation policy.

99

On 19 October 1929 R. C. Bowring, a professional big game
hunter, and Theodore Schouten, a Nairobi resident,
reported to the East African Standard that they were
"equally depressed by the signs of wanton destruction"
of Serengeti*s wildlife.^®®

The following month the Earl

of Onslow once again called the British government's
attention to the Tanganyika situation; but after Passfield
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strongly indicated that the problem already had been
solved by Cameron* s three-point program, the matter was
dropped for the next eleven months.
Then on 16 October 1930 Arthur Loverdige, Associate
Curator of Reptiles and Amphibians in the Museum of
Comparative Zoology at Harvard, sent a letter to the
London-based newspaper East Africa informing its readers
that on a recent trip to Tanganyika he saw "miles and
miles of apparently ideal game country, almost uninhabited.
He also accused Cameron of ignoring wholesale game destruc
tion by African and American hunters who acted with "the
mentality of Chicago gangsters."

Loverdige even criti

cized Swynnerton for devoting so much time to tsetse fly
research.

102

At about the same time, Loveridge submitted

an inflammatory memorandum to the American Committee for
International Wild Life Preservation warning that:
With few exceptions . . . the majority of
Europeans . . . in Tanganyika Territory care]
either completely indifferent to the idea of
preserving the game or CareU arguing for its
ruthless extermination.103
Significant elements within the colonial administra
tion agreed in principle with Loveridge*s assessment
that "Game Preservation . . . appears to have been a
badly bungled business in T a n g a n y i k a . F o r example,
G. F. Sayers, Assistant Secretary to the Government,
intimated that the future survival of the country* s fauna
depended upon the adoption of a strict preservation policy
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in Tanganyika's natural (sic) parks." ^ 5

Another govern

ment spokesman admitted to "shortcomings" in the Game
Department's work but added that the situation probably
106
would be "tightened up" in the next few years.
At the end of 1930, largely as a result of the
1929-30 press campaign, the colonial administration
officially gazetted the Serengeti Closed Reserve (the
equivalent of a Partial Game Reserve), comprising the
Maasailand region west of the Rift Wall and Musoma
D i s t r i c t . U n d e r this scheme hunters could shoot
freely up to the limits fixed by their licenses, provided
that they obtained permission to enter the closed region.
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This action failed to satisfy the growing number of
national park advocates who argued that Serengeti's wild
life would be secure only within the boundaries of an
inviolable game sanctuary.

Indeed. Major R. W. G.

Hingston maintained that Serengeti possessed a unique
combination of advantages, "both as a sanctuary for the
conservation of the plains game of Africa and for provid
ing a world attraction for visitors . . . "

For these

reasons, he recommended on 9 March 1931 that the entire
area be granted national park status.

109

As Tanganyika was in the throes of an economic
depression that lingered on until the mid-1930s, the
colonial administration was unable to allocate the funds
necessary for the creation and maintenance of a national
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parks organization.^®

Nevertheless, individuals within

the government continued to support the establishment of
a Serengeti National Park; and on 1 July 1933 G. F. Sayers
published a detailed article entitled "The Serengeti Game
Park," outlining the benefits of a national p a r k . S i r
Harold MacMichael, Governor of Tanganyika from 1934 to
1938, also informed the CO that he favored "establishing
a sanctuary in the Serengeti area wherein wildlife can
112
be permanently preserved . . . "
As a result of this
renewed interest, the colonial administration adopted the
Serengeti Closed Reserve (Restrictions) Order, affording
complete protection to several species of game, including
lion, cheetah, leopard, giraffe, rhinoceros, buffalo,
113
roan antelope, hyena, and wild dog.
The next legislative landmark was the enactment of
the 1940 Game Ordinance.

According to the preamble, the

bill was to give effect to the provisions of the 1933
International Convention for the Preservation of Fauna
and Flora, a convention which had recognized the principle
that the best way to preserve Africa*s wildlife was to
create sanctuaries with boundaries which could not be
altered or alienated except by the competent legislative
authority.

The 1940 regulations were essentially a

compromise between two competing schools Of thought.
On the one hand was the wildlife enthusiast who argued
that Tanganyika should be maintained forever as a ;
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sportsman* s paradise, while on the other hand stood the
individual who believed that wild animals impeded the
country* s economic development and that all hunting
restrictions outside game reserves should be abolished.
According to Solicitor-General J. H. Vaughan:
Between these two extremes the Bill steers
a middle course. There are provisions for
the establishment of National Parks and Game
Reserves in which the hunting of animals is
forbidden, and outside these areas the
hunting of game is restricted by a licensing
system . . . There are other provisions
designed to preserve the rights of agri
culturalists and others to defend their
property against the ravages of wild
animals, and the right of the indigenous
population to hunt game for food purposes
has been specifically provided f o r .
Although the 1940 Game Ordinance established the
Serengeti National Park in principle, the bill failed to
introduce significant changes in the degree of control
exercised over the area.

The park*s administration

remained in the hands of the colonial government, advised
by the Game Department, instead of an extra-governmental
national parks organization.

Given the fact that the

Game Department was concerned primarily with animal
control rather than with the permanent protection of the
country's wildlife, this arrangement, b o m of economic
necessity, negated the raison d*etre of the Serengeti
National Park.

The ordinance also neglected to subjugate

the interests of the Maasai people who used the Serengeti
for grazing or for residence to those of the park's fauna.
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Indeed, the colonial government gave the Maasai positive
assurance that ’’their rights would not be disturbed
without their a g r e e m e n t . A s had been proved so many
times before throughout East Africa, it was sheer folly
to expect man and animal to live side-by-side in peace
and harmony; yet the government, hoping to neutralize its
critics, pursued just such a policy.

Actually, the

administration believed that the Maasai, attracted by
the provision of additional water supplies in other areas,
eventually would move out of the Serengeti; and even if
this strategy failed, it would not seriously conflict
with the Park's objectives, "for their customary way of
life was in harmony with, and not inimical to, the
natural fauna."

Here the matter rested during the war

years.
By the end of the Second World War powerful elements
within the European settler community had joined wildlife
enthusiasts to press for legal means to control the
administer the Serengeti National Park according to the
principles set forth in the 1933 International Convention
for the Preservation of Fauna and Flora.

On 20 April

1948, for example, Major Dutoit, a settler who served in
the Legislative Council as the unofficial member for
Arusha, argued on economic grounds for the quick adoption
of a revised National Parks Ordinance:
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We farmers have been handicapped now .' . . for
nearly forty years under the restrictions of
game preservation, but at the expense of the
poor farmer.. We cannot farm and have game
or vermin . . . The sooner this Bill can be
implemented . . . the better . . . I should
hate to see any game killed unnecessarily,
but a National Park is the place for rare
game. Having that, we can bring our visitors
to see it and the farmers in their own areas
can keep a clean area away from game and
vermin.
When the Legislative Council finally enacted an
\

amended National Park Ordinance later in the year it
placed full responsibility for controlling and managing
any park on a properly constituted Board of Trustees
which was given authority to appoint a Board of Management.
It failed, however, to alter the government's previous
policy regarding human entry and residence:
Nothing in this Ordinance shall affect the
rights of His Majesty, his heirs or
successors, or the rights of any person
in or over any land acquired before the
commencement of this Ordinance.
In view of the fact that as of 1948 some 8,000 Maasai
and their livestock, amounting to approximately 150,000
head of cattle and 150,000 head of small stock, resided
within Serengeti's boundaries, it was highly unlikely
that the Board of Trustees, or any other administrative
agency, could fulfill the terms of Article IV of the 1933
119
Convention.
According to that clause all contracting
governments agreed to ''The control of all white or native
settlements in national parks with a view to ensuring
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that as little disturbance as possible is occasioned to
the natural fauna and flora."

The inability to fulfill

this commitment not only engulfed the national parks
organization but threatened to poison relations between
the colonial government and the Maasai nation.
Arthur Ritchie, Charles Pitman, and Charles Swynnerton,
as well as countless thousands of wildlife enthusiasts in
East Africa and throughout the world, believed that the
creation of a comprehensive national park system would
ensure the continued existence of East Africa’s fauna
without hampering the region's social and economic develop
ment.

Even the scientific community, which eventually

dominated much of the day-to-day operations of East Africa's
national parks, was convinced that the relentless destruc
tion of wild animals could be slowed significantly or
stopped altogether by the rational management of these
sanctuaries.

The assumption unfortunately proved to be

false.
Between the early 1950s and the twilight of British
imperialism in the early 1960s the land use conflict
intensified at a frightening pace, leading some critics
to suggest that European rule was guilty of malfeasance.
As will be shown, these accusations took little or no
account of the actual ecological problems confronting
East Africa and were, for the most part, based on
unwarranted political preconceptions.

The following
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chapter, by way of concluding this investigation, will
examine briefly some of the more serious man-animal
conflict that plagued East Africa during the 1950-1963
period and will demonstrate the futility of trying to
preserve large numbers of wild animals in societies
committed to rapid political, economic, and social
development.
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CHAPTER V
NATIONAL PARKS:

THE REALITY

Wildlife enthusiasts in East Africa and throughout
the world naively believed that the institution of nation
al parks, wherein the interests of wild animals supposedly
predominated over all other considerations, would create
a stable and harmonious balance between man and animal
without disturbing the region’s social and economic de
velopment.

In February 1939, for example, Captain Keith

Caldwell told the Conference of Game Wardens in Nairobi
that national parks would "give greater promise of per
manence and freedom from disturbances" than any other
method of game preservation.^"
Indeed, from an economic standpoint the parks were
an unqualified success.

During 1948-9, for example, the

British government estimated that visitors had brought
about L 5 million into Kenya.

By the end of 1955 tour

ists had spent t 7,021 just to gain entrance to Uganda's
two national parks, and in Tanganyika the national parks'
organization had realized more than t 4,470 from Serengeti* s
. .
3
vxsxtors.
As far as the fauna were concerned, the consensus
seemed to be that "there has been steady and thorough
work in the field of game preservation."^

Despite these

initial advances, however, the wanton destruction of wild
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animals continued at an alarming rate.

In May 1960

Elspeth Huxley', an observer of East African affairs for
more than forty years, pointed out that in Tanganyika
"game has been virtually wiped out of large areas" and
in Kenya the situation was "little better.""*

Later that

year the Board of Trustees of Tanganyika's national parks
bemoaned the "considerable amount of pessimism voiced in
the press and elsewhere as to the chances of saving the
game of East Africa from rapid extinction."^
Several factors contributed to the national park’s
inability to provide "permanence and freedom from distur
bance" for East Africa's dwindling herds.

Ever-increas

ing pressure from farmers and big game hunters took its
inevitable toll of wild animals, but the parks themselves
created a more serious ecological imbalance by attracting
countless thousands of tourists.

In 1946, for example,

the number of people visiting Kenya's game sanctuaries
barely exceeded a few hundred, primarily because these
areas lacked suitable hotels, restaurants, and swimming
pools.

By the end of 1955, however, more than 120,000

tourists flocked to the country's national parks and
reserves, which by then were providing a wide range of
tourist amenities.^
Since most of these sanctuaries were hours away
from the nearest town or village, the trustees provided
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housing for thousands of employees needed to ensure the
smooth functioning of these conveniences.

The authorities

also built unpaved tracks allowing tourists access to
parts of the parks heretofore closed to humans.

During

the rains--and during the dry seasons in areas of volcanic
ash soils--these tracks became so rutted that drivers had
to use ground on either side of a track, thus widening it
and sometimes destroying the vegetation and greatly ing

creasing the possibility of irreparable soil erosion.
Thus, in their eagerness to fulfill that part of the 1933
convention stating the "facilities shall, so far as pos
sible, be given to the general public for observing the
fauna and flora in national parks," the trustees unwit
tingly created a conflict between man and animal within
9
the latter's sanctuaries!
The national parks also contributed to the negative
attitude that many Africans held toward wildlife in gen
eral and the parks in particular.

Ever since the imposi

tion of British colonial rule in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, Africans had resented and resisted
the imposition of game regulations; by the post-World War
II era this hostility still existed in nearly all of East
Africa's indigenous communities.

In 1959, for example,

District Commissioner Charles Chenevix-Trench reported
that because the colonial administration had refused to
pay compensation for damage or to do anything to control
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and cull wildlife, the Samburu people felt "more sore
about the Governments game policy than about any other
subject" and believed it hopeless to expect the "small
est co-operation" in any preservation project.^

T.A.

Watts, Commissioner for Machakos District, declared that
the Kamba people of southcentral Kenya "consider all
game animals as a menace to their crops and their live
stock

. " 1 1

In terms of all East Africa, however, the most im
portant ethnic group vis a vis the national parks was
the Maasai who occupied vast stretches of the most dra
matic game country in southwestern Kenya and northweste m Tanganyika.

12

The Maasai are primarily a pastoral

people who regard their flocks, especially cattle, as a
matter of wealth and prestige.

Their attitude toward

the wild animals that compete for grazing and water with
domestic stock has been a subject of concern to the
colonial administration since the turn of the century.
In 1907, for example, Colonel John H. Patterson,
Kenya's first Game Ranger, argued that because huge
Maasai cattle herds "eat up everything," the Laikipia
Plateau north of the Uganda Railway was a wasteland as
far as wild animals were concerned.

13

On 4 April 1911

the colonial government "persuaded" the Maasai to evacu
ate this region to make way for land-hungry European
settlers, and to move south of the railway to the enlarged
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Southern Reserve.

14

The area selected for expansion

was in the Loita/Mara region in southern Kenya, which
amounted to 9,210 square miles, or more than twice the
size of the old Laikipia Reserve.

Even before the Maasai

completed their move, John Ainsworth, then Provincial
Commissioner of Nyanza, warned the administration on 28
September 1911 that substantial parts of Maasailand were
overrun by various kinds of wild animals which, by con
suming considerable quantities of available grazing and
water, were "a source of considerable inconvenience" to
the people.

He therefore suggested the adoption of a

scheme whereby concessions would be granted to big game
hunters to shoot the wild animals, the hides and meat of
which would be exported for profit.

Ainsworth maintained

that despite the fact that Maasailand's eastern border
coincided with the Southern Game Reserve "it was neces
sary to regard Masai interests as paramount" throughout
the entire region.^
Over the next several decades Maasai complaints
about wildlife increased dramatically.

Ravenous hyena

packs frequently raided their villages and killed their
sheep and calves.^

Their cattle were highly susceptible

to malignant catarrah, engeeya oingati, which was spread
on the grass by the afterbirth of wildebeest calves.^
Other cattle diseases spread by wild animals and affect
ing Maasai herds included rinderpest, anthrax, black quar-
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ter, and brucellosis.

Wildlife also competed for pre

cious water supplies and contributed to Maasailand's
desiccation by their eating habits.

According to the

Masai Annual Report for 1935, most colonial officials
believed that:
...the game do not ruin the grazing them
selves but force the cattle to do so, they
nibble off the tops and pass on while the
cattle come behind and complete the destruc
tion. Any plan for rotational resting of
grasslands during seeding time is doomed to
failure while vast herds of game roam at
will.
On numerous occasions the colonial administration
attempted to rectify some of these problems by adopting
control measures.

In 1938, for example, the government

permitted Jack Bonham, a big game hunter who later be
came Game Ranger of Kenya's Coast Province, to kill some
8,000 zebra and 5,000 wildebeest at Narok to provide
extra grazing land and to reduce the incidence of malig19
nant catarrah.
The following year hunters killed
another 1,500 wildebeestes to stop the spread of this
dreaded disease.

20

Despite these efforts the situation

between the Maasai and the wild animals that inhabited
their country remained tense throughout the post-World
War II era.

In 1975 Ole Sindiyo, a Maasai Game Warden,

underlined the hopelessness of the situation during the
late colonial and early post-colonial period by point
ing out that most Maasai people viewed fauna preservation
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in bitterly hostile terms:
We have to share our land with wild and
dangerous animals. We have to learn to give
way to the elephant, the rhinoceros, the lion,
etc., and this has not been our way of life.
Many of us have lost children, others have
lost stock and relatives to these wild animals
which belong to the government. The government
has value for these animals but they are of no
value tc us.... The value of wildlife being
gone, we know of no other value whatever and
yet our cattle are either being killed or in
jured by these animals for food....The presence
of these animals in our districts means loss
of lives and stock every year and nothing
else
. 2 1

In such an atmosphere wildlife enthusiasts experi
enced a great deal of difficulty in persuading the Maasai
that the wild animals inhabiting their country actually
were a precious asset which could be exploited economi
cally.

In Kenya this predicament threatened to precipi

tate an ecological crisis at Amboseli, a particularly
rich 1,259-square-mile game area at the foot of Mount
Kilimanjaro.

As it was part of the Maasai Land Unit and

contained the only water available for many miles, large
numbers of Maasai and their cattle congregated in the
area for the greater part of the year.

This caused

...a conflict between domestic livestock
on the one hand and wild animals on the
other, in competition for the 01 Tukai
water. As a result of the constant pound
ing of the hooves of thousands of cattle,
vegetation and soil structure are rapidly
being destroyed and if allowed to continue
this will inevitably result not only in
the total elimination of wild animals but
also in the area becoming practically use-
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less from the point of view of the Maasai
themselves
. 2 2

In the immediate post-war era the colonial adminis
tration tried to resolve this issue by establishing a
national park at Amboseli; but according to Kenneth Cow
ley, Provincial Commissioner of Kenya's Southern Province
from 1956 until 1963, the Maasai objected to this course
of action for several reasons.

In the first place a

national park would have meant that the land around the
Amboseli Lake and swamps would have had to be excised
from the Maasai Land Unit, and the people simply refused
to agree to the total exclusion of humans from this im
portant area.

The second and more significant objection

concerned the fact that Amboseli was a vital dry-weather
grazing area for livestock which was brought in annually
when the wet-weather regions had been exhausted.

In

addition to these practical considerations, the Maasai
believed that Amboseli's swamp and spring water contained
23
medicinal salts which their herds needed.
Because of this opposition the colonial government
placed Amboseli under the nominal control of the Trus
tees of the Royal National Parks of Kenya in November
1948 as a park adjunct (later known as a national reserve).
Under this scheme the trustees had "the care and responsi
bility of the fauna and flora, and the right to retain
them, so far as may be possible, in their pristine
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condition."

To protect the Maasai people and their

cattle, however, the trustees had to "do all in their
power to prevent inconvenience to human rights as a

2/
result of the priviliges they are granted."
Such opposing responsibilities inevitably led to
a serious conflict of interests and a tragic diminution
of wild animals.

In times of drought, such as in 1955,

there was fierce competition for the sparse grazing
and for the few permanent watering places.

Kenneth

Cowley and his officers believed that the only hope of
ensuring the preservation of game was to convince the
Maasai that "it was in their own interests to look after
the wildlife and profit from it because of its great
attraction for tourists."

25

Since his efforts were not

immediately successful, the Game Policy Committee recom
mended in 1956 the abolition of the Amboseli National
Reserve and the creation of a Game Reserve Committee,
consisting of representatives of the colonial administra
tion, the Game Department, the national parks organiza
tions, and the Maasai people, to be under the chairman
ship of the District Commissioner or District Officer.
The Amboseli Game Reserve Committee would be responsible
for formulating and for implementing policies within the
26
sanctuary.
The government hoped that by encouraging
Maasai participation the Amboseli situation would improve
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gradually, with wild animals and cattle sharing the same
limited resources.
The Game Policy Committee’s recommendations unfor
tunately failed to overcome Maasai fears regarding the
status of their land; many of them believed the proposal
was merely a subterfuge designed to gain control of their
property.

By the end of 1958 the Game Department reported

that the Maasai attitude toward wildlife had deteriorated
to such an extent that most people supported the eradica27
tion of all wild animals within Amboseli.
Relations
between the Maasai and the national park staff improved
slightly the following year, largely because the colonial
government financed an alternate water project designed
not only to provide permanent watering points for cattle
but also to assist in breaking up the huge cattle herds
which were congregating at Amboseli and threatening to
turn it into a dust bowl.

The Maasai elders also agreed

to form a game committee with Major Taberer to study
28
Amboseli's ecological problems.
To further encourage the development of harmonious
relations, the colonial administration mounted an exten
sive publicity campaign in 1960 "to persuade the Maasai
that there was money in game."

At two separate meetings

the African District Council voiced their desire to
cooperate with the government in game conservation "if
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they were given some say in their own district and some
financial compensation." Toward the end of the year the
administration acceded to these requests and further pro
posed

to incorporate a new game-cropping scheme to lessen

the tension between man and animal at Amboseli.

29

These

tactics were successful; and on 14 July 1961, at a short
ceremony held at 01 Tukai, Sir Patrick Renison, Kenya's
Governor from 1959 to 1962, formally entrusted control
of the Maasai Amboseli Game Reserve, as it was to be
known, to the Kajiado African District Council.

Renison

was careful to warn the Maasai that:
Each animal. ..is worth many thousands of
shillings to you and your Council if it
remains alive; but dead it is worth only
a few shillings to the selfish and miser
able poachers who killed it. I hope there
fore that you will take the sternest mea
sures to prevent and stamp out this illegal
theft of your a s s e t s . 30
In terms of wildlife preservation, the creation of
the Maasai Amboseli Game Reserve was clearly a secondbest solution in that humans and wild animals were to
share the same land and limited resources.

In a national

park the interests of the fauna would have taken prece
dence over those of humans; but under the circumstances
there was little else the government could do but recog
nize the fact that national parks were not an ecological
panacea, and could solve Kenya's faunal problems only
in those parts of the country where human habitation was
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extremely difficult or impossible.
Almost immediately the Maasai Amboseli Game Reserve
became tremendously popular with visitors; between

1

July and 1 November 1961 a total of 5,668 people paid
31
58,885 shillings in admission fees.
Ironically, the
following year the Game Department, in its last pre-inde
pendence report, indicated that Amboseli's success as a
tourist attraction had opened yet another chapter in the
tragic story of man's age-old struggle with East Africa’s
wild animals:
As a result of the present popularity of the
reserve.. .many areas are now churned up seas
of dust, resembling tank training courses,
and the last vestiges of grazing and of cover
are being removed. If this is not to result
in the disappearance of the animals on which
the fauna of Amboseli rests, immediate action
must be taken, and that action can only be...
the restriction of cars....32
The presence of the Maasai in Tanganyika's Serengeti
region caused even more of a disappointment to those wild
life enthusiasts who believed that the establishment of
a national park system would solve the country's ecologi
cal problems.

When the Serengeti National Park came into

being on 1 June 1951 the Board of Trustees:
...hoped that as the human inhabitants were
Masai, who do not normally eat game meat,
their continued presence in the Park would
not constitute a threat to the fauna, and
that they would in themselves provide a
certain added attraction to visitors from
overseas.33
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More importantly, the Trustees thought that the Maasai,
attracted by the provision of additional water facilities
3^
in other areas, eventually would move out of Serengeti.
On the basis of these assumptions the Trustees attempted
to administer Serengeti as a national park rather than
as a national reserve, in which hunting was prohibited,
"but the game remained undisturbed until such time as it
began to conflict with the progress and development of
the human inhabitants."

35

This strategy nearly resulted in a tragic ecological
catastrophe as the Maasai found themselves forced into
a relentless struggle with Serengeti's wildlife for con
trol of the park's limited resources.

The first three

years.after the Trustees had assumed responsibility for
the Serengeti National Park were a period in which cat
tle grazing was adversely affected by dangerously low
rainfall.

To make matters worse the alternate water

supplies developed by the colonial government proved to
be unfit for human and animal consumption.

The Maasai

therefore concentrated their herds in the Crater High
lands and Moru Kopjes where grazing and water supplies
remained adequate.

As Serengeti's fauna also sought

nourishment in ever-increasing numbers in these oases,
the relatively harmonious relationship that had existed
in 1951 between the Maasai and the Board of Trustees was
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quickly destroyed.
The park authorities, alarmed by this development,
endeavoured to protect Serengeti*s wild animals from the
huge ravenous cattle herds.

The Maasai, who had been

reassured that the establishment of Serengeti National
Park would not interfere with their normal way of life,
"became seriously perturbed at the attitude and actions
of the Park Authorities."

36

Because of their inability

to resolve this issue, the trustees reluctantly concluded
that the continued presence of the Maasai and their live
stock within the Serengeti National Park was incompatiable with the existence of large numbers of wild animals.
They also realized that Serengeti, embracing more than
4,800 square miles, was far too ambitious.

The trustees

therefore charged a special committee to confer with the
provincial administration and to investigate the possi
bility of creating a true national park at Serengeti
entirely free from human interests.
After consulting with the Maasai, the trustees pro
posed in April 1956 that the following three areas within
Serengeti be reconstituted as "true" national parks:
I)

The Ngorongoro region in the Northern Pro
vince, covering approximately 450 square
miles.

II)

The Embagai Crater also in the Northern
Province, covering about ten square miles.

Ill)

The western Serengeti region in the Lake
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Province, covering approximately 1,400
square miles.
The great central Serengeti plains, comprising more
than 2,600 square miles, was to be excised from the pre
sent national park and protected by special legislation
which, while providing free access for the Maasai and
their livestock, would prohibit all development within
the area which "might lead to permanent settlement or
interfere with the normal migration and seasonal grazing
of game, or be in any way inimical to game."

Lastly,

the colonial government agreed that the Crater Highlands
and the Moru Kopjes, together covering some 400 to 500
square miles, should be "development areas" where the
interests of game would be subordinated to those of man.
Moreover, it promised to provide permanent water supplies
and improved pasturage in these areas to replace those
in the Ngorongoro and Embagai Craters which would no
longer be available to them.

37

One month after these proposals had been made the
Tanganyika and Kenya Wild Life Societies registered their
opposition to the scheme by publishing a highly critical
pamphlet called Comments on the Tanganyika Government* s
White Paper Entitled "The Serengeti Park."

Among other

things, these two organizations criticized Tanganyika's
colonial administration, the Board of Trustees, and the
Maasai people for concluding a behind-the-scenes agreement
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and presenting the public with a fait accompli.

More

specifically, they claimed that "the proposals set out
in the White Paper do not constitute a satisfactory so
lution of the present problem from the point of view of
game protection."

The societies therefore requested

that a special committee be established and that the
public be consulted fully before any of the White Paper's
38
recommendations were adopted.
The FPS also opposed the government's strategy, and
proposed to the CO that before any radical changes in
the Serengeti National Park were made, an independent
ecological survey should be conducted.

It also suggested

that the entire situation should be considered at a con
ference of the International Union for the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources, which was about to open
in Edinburgh.
Eager to avoid international criticism, the CO
acceded to these propositions and the Union's General
Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution calling for
a full investigation of the Serengeti matter.

The

FPS accordingly arranged for a survey to be carried
• 9

out under the leadership of Dr. W.H. Pearsall, Director
of the East African Agriculture and Forestry Research
Organization, who visited Kenya and Tanganyika in
November and December 1956.

His report pronounced
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the regions proposed for the new national parks too small
to be ecologically self-sufficient and therefore hopeless
ly inadequate for the preservation of Serengeti's vast
39
herds of plains game.
In view of this domestic and international opposition,
Tanganyika's colonial government appointed a commission
of inquiry on 3 April 1957, under the chairmanship of Sir
Barclay Nihill, to consider the existing conditions in
the Serengeti National Park, to examine the 1956 White
Paper proposals, and to recommend modifications.

40

The

committee's final report, issued on 16 August 1957, strong
ly supported Pearsall's findings, claiming that the Seren
geti National Park "must cover an area large enough to
provide a viable ecological unit embracing the full cycle
of animal migration....
The report also caused a great deal of consternation
among the Maasai, who had accepted the White Paper's pro
posals only because the colonial administration had pro
mised to develop adequate alternative water supplies.
According to the report's findings, porous soil made sur
face storage of water impracticable and high flourine
content made subsurface supplies unfit for humans and
animals.

The government in the report concluded that it

would be impossible to "readily assure the Masai that
its proposals can be implemented."

42
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Upon learning of this decision, Oltimbau Ole Masiaya,
a Maasai spokesman, criticized the administration, saying
that:
... the stage has been reached where we no
longer feel masters in our own country but
rather that we live there on sufferance
only.
Masai value personal freedom above
anything else, but in the National Park we
are not free.
He also pointed out that the government had promised
to provide alternative water supplies if the Maasai per
manently abandoned Ngorongoro and Embagai Craters, but
this was not done for "practical reasons."

He concluded

by warning the administration that if it was unable to
find additional water, the 1955 agreement would be null
/ O

and void.

The Maasai community also issued a statement

insisting that the people living in Serengeti had certain
fundamental rights, including:
I)
II)
Ill)

The right to move without restriction
within Maasailand’s boundaries.
The right to defend lives and property
against wild animals.
The right to continue to graze and
water stock wherever facilities for
this existed.44

To prevent the situation from deteriorating even
further, the government adopted a policy in favor of the
Massai and disadvantageous to the Serengeti.

Under this

new scheme the administration stated that the proposals
to establish national parks or nature reserves in the
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Ngorongoro and Embagai Craters were unacceptable because
it was not proper "to seek Masai consent to a relin
quishment of their rights in the two craters at the same
time as they were giving up established rights within the
Park itself."

Instead, these regions would be recognized

as Conservation Units, administered by the government with
the object of conserving water, forest, and pasture.

In

exchange for the Maasai promise to evacuate the reconsti
tuted Serengeti National Park, covering approximately
5,000 square miles, the administration stipulated that
"full compensation must be paid to all who are to be dis
turbed by the exclusion of human rights from the new
Park."

This compensation took the form of a t 35,000

fund which was used to develop new waiter supplies in
areas outside the park and to made individual cash pay
ments.^

On 17 June 1958 the Legislative Council finally

ended eighteen years of controversy and bitterness by
accepting these proposals and reconstituting the Serengeti
National Park.
Although the resolution of the Serengeti issue sig
nalled the long-awaited completion of East Africa's
national park system, it soon was evident that these
sanctuaries were just as incapable as the old game reserves
had been of maintaining a proper balance between man and
animal.

By the late 1950s the greatest single cause of
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game eradication in East Africa was the indiscriminate
poaching of all species of wild animals.

The poachers,

who were primarily Africans but included many Europeans,
used barbaric and merciless tactics to pursue their quarry.
They slaughtered giraffes for their sinews to make bow
strings and their tail hairs to fletch arrows.

Poachers

killed wildebeests for their tails, rhinoceroses for
their horn, and elephants primarily for their valuable
tusks. Numerous other animals, including most species
of gazelles and antelopes, were destroyed for their meat.
Indeed, according to the Kenya Wild Life Society, there
was an "insatiable demand" for this meat in most parts
of East Africa.^
The appalling waste caused by the poachers was the
most disturbing aspect of this large-scale slaughter.
Often traps and snares were not inspected for weeks or
even months on end, and the poacher returned to find
only a broken skeleton.

Animals that fell into game pits

usually died after days of suffering from lack of water
and food.

Another favorite poaching tactic was to prod

entire herds into a continuous line of nooses sometimes
stretching for more than a mile.

After a successful

drive the poachers usually were unable to dispose of
such huge quantities of meat, so many of the animals
were hamstrung and left to be collected as needed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Often

239

it was days before these poor beasts were put out of
their misery

. 4 7

The extent of poaching activities during the late
1950s and early 1960s was mind-boggling.

In 1960 Lieu

tenant-Colonel Peter Molloy, Director of Tanganyika
National Parks from 1955 to 1960, estimated that in addi
tion to those animals killed by firearms, 150,000 beasts
were being slaughtered annually by snares on the perimeter
of Serengeti National Park.

According to his account,

given to Elspeth Huxley, the approaches to water-holes
in dry seasons were so ringed by snares that no animals
could escape alive; those that managed to get through to
the water usually were killed by poachers lying in wait
48
with poisoned arrows.
In October 1960 an anti-poaching
team sighted a gang of more than one hundred poachers,
which included women and children to carry meat, in
Uganda’s Murchison Falls National Park.

In December and

in February park officials confronted roving bands of
poachers in the same park.

Similar problems also existed

in Queen Elizabeth National Park where rangers surprised
49
large poaching gangs in November and in December.
The
situation in Kenya was so desperate that on 2 January 1961
Sir Patrick Eenison, the Governor, issued the following
directive to all administrative officers:
I am disturbed by the grave threat to Kenya's
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wild life caused by the activities of
poachers. These activities have recently
become so extensive as to present a seri
ous danger to the preservation of the game
population of the Colony. Though it is
primarily the responsibility of the Game .
Department to protect the Colony's game....
I wish all officers and particularly those
of the Administration and of the Police...
to take all possible measures to put down
poaching. I am sure that I can rely on
all officers to apply themselves to this
task. Kenya's game population, although
unhappily diminished during the past two
decades, is still a great natural asset and
it is of the fi^st importance that it should
be protected.
Despite the exhortations of Renison and scores of
other government officials throughout East Africa the
region's wildlife continued to disappear at an alarming
rate.

It must be pointed out, however, that this de

plorable state of affairs resulted not from the inepti
tude of wildlife officials but rather from factors large
ly beyond their control.

In 1959, for example, Huxley

claimed that Kenya's colonial government allocated an
extra L 30,000 to the Game Department to recruit and
equip mobile anti-poaching squads, especially in and
around the area of the Tsavo National Park.

After the

Legislative Council approved this budgetary increase the
Department of Forests, Game and Fisheries re-allocated
the entire sum to some other purpose and the Game Depart
ment did not receive an extra penny

In Tanganyika

wildlife officials believed that when they did catch
poachers penalties were inadequate, and "many magistrates
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out of sympathy with game laws are inclined to dismiss
52
cases, or inflict minimum penalties.
Unwarranted poli
tical preconceptions also played a significant role in
the diminution of East Africa's wildlife during the
last years of British colonial rule.

Indeed, Bruce

Kinloch maintained that in Uganda the greatest obstacle
to effective anti-poaching, measures x*as "the pessimism
of most of those in high authority, which sprang from
their deeply ingrained belief that when Uganda was
granted independence game reserves would be abolished
53
and all large game animals would be slaughtered."
It
was in this atmosphere of despair and cynicism that
Kenya (1963), Uganda (1962), and Tanganyika (1961)
gained their independence from Great Britain.
In reviewing the 1895-1963 period it is evident
that the British were unwilling or unable to expand the
financial and human resources necessary to create an
atmosphere in which man and animal could live side by
side in relative peace and harmony.

It is also apparent

that the history of game preservation throughout East
Africa passed through three distinct phases.

Prior to

the First World War the primary initiative for fauna
protection came from the British government, and, to
a lesser extent, from the FPS.

Aside from encouraging

the creating of game reserves and the adoption of
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game regulations, however, the British government failed,
to establish a meaningful enforcement system, causing the
ecological situation to deteriorate even further.
Beginning in the 1920s East Africa's game preserva
tion establishment came under the domination of Arthur
Ritchie, Charles Pitman, and Charles Swynnerton.

To

gether these men struggled successfully against the
growing indifference of the British government and the
local administrations to improve the quality of game
preservation throughout East Africa.

They also mounted

an effective publicity campaign to persuade wildlife
enthusiasts in East Africa and throughout the world that
the only way to ensure the future existence of the re
gion' s fauna was to create a comprehensive national park
system.

This strategy unfortunately engendered an unreal

istic optimism among conservationists, causing them to
pursue self-defeating policies.
Indeed, it became increasingly clear that most
African communities which competed with wild animals for
limited land, food, and water resources failed to under
stand or appreciate the aesthetic justification for game
conservation.

In Amboseli and in Serengeti, for example,

national park advocates alienated the Maasai people with
their inflexibility and dogged determination to establish
and maintain national parks whatever the cost in human
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terms.

They also unwittingly encouraged the growth and

development of an ecologically harmful tourist industry
to ensure the financial success of the parks.

Even before

attempts were made to rectify these problems it was
apparent that the Ritchie-Pitman-Swynnerton strategy was
incapable of stemming the tide of wildlife destruction
that had begun during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century and continues to this very day.
For the independent nations of East Africa the les
sons learned during the colonial period can be used as a
valuable guideline for future land use and wildlife pre
servation policies.

Indeed, if the region's remaining

herds are to withstand the increasing environmental pres
sure of the twentieth century it is imperative that these
principles are recognized and adopted by conservationists
throughout the entire region.
Foremost among these prescripts is the inescapable
fact that economic growth and social development are
totally incompatible with the existence of large numbers
of wild animals.

As East Africa's human population in

creases and more and more land is brought under culti
vation or sacrificed for roads, towns, tourist facilities,
schools, hospitals, airports, and countless other pro
jects, the destruction of the region's fauna will continue
unabated.

This process is ine^nltable and cannot be stopped
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or reversed; it can, however, be slowed appreciably by
realistic policies that take into account the political,
economic, and social difficulties of preserving wild
animals in close proximity to rapidly expanding human
communities.
In view of these harsh realities it is astonishing
that so much wildlife survived the colonial period.

For

this the world owes a debt of gratitude to the officials
who devoted their professional and private lives to the
wild animals of East Africa.
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ABSTRACT
East Africa's wildlife is justly famous.

This study

examines the difficulty of preserving large numbers of
wild animals in societies committed to widespread and
rapid economic development.
In Xenya the colonial administration had to devise a
policy that would enable a rapidly expanding European
settler community to live side by side with hundreds of
thousands of potentially destructive wild animals.
As far as Uganda was concerned, the authorities had
to prevent the country's elephant herds from destroying
agricultural crops without destroying them.
Tanganyika's situation was even more complex.

A

large number of European and African farmers believed
that the only way to stop the spread of sleeping sickness
and nagana was to eradicate totally the country's fauna.
It fell to Charles Swynnerton to disprove this theory.
By 1945 it had become clear to conservationists
throughout East Africa that if the region's wildlife was
to survive the twentieth century a comprehensive national
park system would have to be established in Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanganyika.

Within fifteen years, however, it was

evident that, even national parks were unable to stop the
relentless slaughter of the area's fauna.
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Indeed, after reviewing all pertinent published and
unpublished materials it could only be concluded that man
and animal could not live side by side in peace and
harmony.

The only realistic wildlife preservation policy

was therefore one that would delay rather than prevent the
destruction of East Africa*s fauna.
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